LIFE AFTER DEATH?

PALINŌDIA.

BY

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Στέργοι δε' με Σωφροσύνα,
δώρημα κάλλιστον Θεῶν!

EURIPIDES.

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

Translation of Motto:

"May Heaven's fairest gift, Sobriety of Heart, cherish me [or, train and nurse me]."

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LIFE AFTER DEATH?

INTRODUCTION.

More than one friend has pressed me to giv to the world my maturest thoughts concerning a Future Life. I am not so vain as to imagin that anything that I can write will bring this contested question nearer to a close. The contending schools seem to move on different planes, and never to meet the opposit argument. If from unwillingness to giv pain to friends, those who hav thought on both sides keep silence, how shall any approach to Truth be made? To state how I now view the controversy, I seem called, because in my book entitled "Theism" I hav long seen that I was one-sided. I there wrote, less as an inquirer, than as an advocate. Accounting the physical argument to be quite notorious, I omitted to dwell on its real strength. Various counter-arguments I set forth, as probability higher or lower. I believe I never assumed the dogmatic tone, but I heartily labored to make my case good; not indeed because I felt any spiritual and emotional need of it. Only because logically it seemed an important complement to a Theistic creed, I tried to persuade myself of its truth.

Perhaps it is right to make a further personal statement. In reading Cicero and Plato in early days, I always regarded as trash Plato's arguments for immortality, as, I make no doubt, Cicero himself did. Therefor, as soon as I ceased to trust the scriptures of the New Testament as a divine revelation, my acceptance of a Future Life *as a dogma* at once fell away. But, knowing that so many holy souls had devoutly believed it and

Some moderns throw dust into our eyes by intruding the wholely irrelevant question, "Is the soul the *cause* "of the bodily organization, or, conversely its *effect?*" Of course every Theist holds that a Greater Cause is behind *both*. They ar a *simultaneous* Product of Nature and of God. Theists and Atheists ar agreed as to simultaneousness, also that, so far as fact is observable, each is a *condition* requisit for the other. Let us not run from light into darkness by allowing the sham argument, "Which is cause and which is effect?" to distract and delude us. This is visibly a sham, if applied to the elephant or the dog: we must not endure its needless obtrusion in the case of Man. If the soul be with us the *Cause* of our organization, it is equally the Cause with the elephant and the dog; and if in the latter the topic is irrelevant to the question of survival after death, it is also irrelevant with us.

SECTION II.

THE GREEK AXIOM.

The argument of Panætius is given by Cicero (Tusc. Q. I. 32) as follows: "Vult enim (quod nemo negat) "quidquid natum sit, interire: nasci autem animos; "quod declarat eorum similitudo, qui procreantur, quae "etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus, appareat." Here the words, *quod nemo negat*, ar from Cicero, asserting as an Axiom universally accepted, that "Whatever is born perishes," or "Whatever has a beginning "has an end." If this is really a just Axiom, there is an end of discussion. What began with the organization of the brain ends with the *dis*organization.

SECTION III.

ST. PAUL'S ARGUMENT.

Paul himself avows that "God only hath immortality," (1. Tim. vi. 16,) meaning (no doubt) that in no creature can immortality be *inherent* and *natural*. According to him the resurrection even of Jesus was *not* in conformity to the laws of nature, but in vehement contrast: it was an extraordinary display of God's mighty power (Ephes. i. 20). Christians also ar to be "raised from the dead" by a like extraordinary exertion of divine power, because of their *moral* relation to the Christ, the *first-fruits* from the dead. Only by the Author of Nature abandoning the routine of Nature did Paul expect any future life. This position of the argument is then intelligible and clear. There is no pretence of reasoning out immortality from Physics, nor any possible clash with Physical Science. The Creator (according to him) for *Moral* reasons *violates Physical analogies*, just as in the other Christian and Jewish *miracles*.

SECTION IV.

PLATO'S ARGUMENT.

Plato, in the celebrated chapter of his Phaedrus, which Cicero has closely translated (Tusc. Q. I. 23) evades the Greek Axiom on which Panætius relies, by asserting that every soul is *unoriginated*, or, as he entitles it, *unbegotten*, (ἀγένητον), because "it moves itself," and "will never be deserted by itself." It is hard to make those Englishmen who ar unversed in ancient literature, to believe that one is not misunderstanding and garbling Plato; so incredibly absurd is his reasoning to English

common sense. Nor is that all; but on religious grounds it is gravely offensiv. Plato's first words (Phaed. 51) are: "Every soul is immortal: for, what is always in "motion is immortal:"—and with him the word *soul* includes all animal life. Whatever moves itself, he maintains to hav had no origin in the past, and to be certain to hav no end of life in the future. This makes every living thing to be virtually *a little god*, uncreated and eternal. Thus all, whether oyster or man, are cöeternal with God; and man is to believe himself to be immortal, by force of the argument which makes shell-fish, worms and butterflies immortal. Whence has Plato deduced this doctrin? From his own assertion that every soul is ever in motion (ἀεικινητον) and "will "not desert itself"! Can any effort at wisdom be more fatuous.

Elsewhere the *past* existence of every *human* soul is inferred by Plato from the ease with which children learn. Therefore (according to him) learning is simply remembering. The children (forsooth) knew the thing, when their souls were inhabiting other bodies, and because they remember, they seem now to learn easily.

Whatever be the merits of Plato in topics which I do not profess to understand, I cannot repress nor care to conceal my utter contempt for such argument. The very notion that my soul once lived in an earlier body destroys all moral importance in the alledged immortality. For (nearly as Cicero puts it) if my soul animated the body of a hero who fought at the side of king Agamemnon, I yet cannot identify myself with that hero. I hav no intelligible relation to him; I care nothing about him; why the more should I care about my future soul? It will not be myself, any more than was the old soul. Thus Plato's doctrin of immortality is as empty of moral as of logical weight.

SECTION V.

BISHOP BUTLER'S MODIFICATION OF PLATO'S ARGUMENT.

Signally unchristian in tone and spirit as was Plato's argument, Bishop Butler did not despair of it, and (some say) has improved upon it. He throws away the absurdity of a past eternity for the soul, and is satisfied with the doctrin that "all living power is indestructible." But this principle is not proved—nor, it seems, is it provable. No Christian can seriously alledge that in creating the souls of men and of butterflies God barred himself from destroying them: how then can they fitly be called "indestructible"? Further, in Butler's day Geology was not yet born. He did not know that rocks of vast extent and depth consist of shells once animated; while according to his theory the souls which formerly dwelt in those *billions* of shells either ar now roving ghosts or animate new bodies.

SECTION VI.

TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.

The idea of Transmigration seemed natural to an old Egyptian or Indian, or to an Arabian story teller. I scarcely believe Plato, when he represents it as not inadmissible even with Socrates. In the Sanskrit moral poetry, the Centuries of Bhartrihari, which the Rev. B. Hale Wortham has recently translated [Trübner's Oriental Series] take for granted that every human soul has lived in some earlier body. So too in our fourth Gospel, ix. 2. That the doctrin is revived in our "Hermetic Society," I now infer: for, a member writes to me, that Jesus of Nazareth "had attained full regene-

"ration" through the fact, that his "soul was perfected "by suffering *in his former lives*." But for this, I should hav dared to assert, that no educated European now believes in transmigration. The ancients supposed that if the soul of Phalaris (the Greek type of cruelty) migrated into the body of a panther, that panther would be the identical Phalaris, and that thus the tyrant would be fitly punished. Morally, it is more specious to believe, that if a man cruelly misuses his horse, he will be punished after death by being turned into a horse, because (say we) "it will serve him right." The identity of an animal seems to be lost, if it be deprived of its fundamental instincts. Not only is it impossible to imagin *what is meant* by affirming that the soul of a horse has migrated into the body of a panther; but even into the body of a bull, seems self-confuting. The instincts of the animals ar contrasted. The same soul cannot hav opposit qualities. Identity perishes in such a transference. If it be said that some instincts ar bodily, not mental,—as the proclivity to *eating* grass in the horse and to eating flesh in the panther,—yet other essential instincts ar mental. The dog loves companionship with man; his gratitude for caresses and kind gifts is instinctiv, essential and purely mental. To imagin his soul passing into a hyæna and remaining the *same* soul, is to me a contradiction. That the ancients admitted such ideas as steps of religious thought, warns us of their mental unsoundness.

No such collision of primitiv instincts is involved in the idea of the re-birth of a deceased man in a human infant, the fundamental nature being in this case preserved. Nevertheless, knowing as we do how the mind and whole character of the child is moulded, built up and trained, and the highly complex variety of character in the human adult, acquired and made habitual in the course of a previous life,—the notion that the old soul

can anyhow be identified with the unformed infant soul appears an error as glaring and indefensible, as any metamorphosis of bestial souls. Where religious fear crushes every attempt at criticism as a sin, of course all contradictions can be accepted reverently; but when a mind that has cast off traditional beliefs and aspires to think freely, propounds *as truth* that the same human soul has lived through a series of human bodies, — to me it betokens a state of mind too antiquated or (shall we say?) too Oriental to be argued with.

Naturalists will not even admit that the soul of a modern oyster may be the very same soul as one which animated an Ammonite or a nautilus. Hence in each new series of Geological inhabitants of our Oceans, consisting of new species, no one believes the Creativ Power to hav economized vital forces by using the old souls again and again in new bodies. Excluding this Transmigration, we hav to supplement Bishop Butler's theory by supposing that all the old souls that lived in the vast periods of time which Geology in vain tries to measure, *ar roving, disembodied ghosts*, perpetually increasing in number. The whole idea is so grotesque and so gratuitous, that respect for the wise and able Bishop seems to compel a belief, that in the present stage of knowledge he never would hav broached such a theory.

SECTION VII.

IS THE GREEK AXIOM QUESTIONABLE?

Plato wanted a past eternity for souls in order to evade the Axiom, "Whatever has had a beginning, will hav "an end." This, if admitted, refutes Bishop Butler, when he dispenses with past eternity. *Can* we disown the Axiom?

In my "Theism" I hav attempted to deny its *universality*, by an argument from received Astronomy: namely, "The Planetary System had a beginning: It (as "it were) sprang out of nebular chaos, and was at length "consolidated into chronic stability, such as presents no "ground for imagining that it will come to an end from "any *inward* cause." Since I wrote that piece, Sir William Thomson has published his theory that the Sun is always losing heat. If this become an accepted fact, my argument against the Greek Axiom fails. But an eminent Cambridge Professor has propounded to me an opposit belief, that the Sun is perpetually *receiving* heat *back* by innumerable missiles impinging on its surface with velocity unimaginable; so that, for aught we yet know, as much heat is daily received back, as is daily given out.

While I still hesitate to accept the Greek Axiom as universally true, I cannot deny that it has vast weight. What is here further important,—Spiritualists lay immense stress on the *indivisible* nature of each soul. But this at once bars my astronomical argument. For in it, the chronic stability arises from the balancing of diverse parts by forces variously directed; but if a disembodied soul be argumentativly allowed, and indivisibility be attributed to it, no analogy of such a soul (without body or parts) to our planetary system exists. The Greek Axiom is overwhelmingly powerful against the idea, that any soul can hav *natural* and *inherent* immortality, except the great unparalleled Soul of the Universe.

SECTION VIII.

ONE STAGE HIGHER IN GEOLOGY.

Another attempt to underprop human immortality by modern Science has drawn my attention. It is said that

in Geology we learn of steps from lower to higher life on this globe. At first inferior animals peopled the seas; in succession came more complex and nobler forms; afterwards, birds and quadrupeds; finally, man. Such a history givs augury of a still higher state, above the human. Let us call it the angelic state. Thus out of material science itself dawns upon us the idea which Christians contemplate as their heaven and immortality in the future.

But this argument strangely overlooks the fact, that the human souls of our era *ar not* the resuscitated souls of apes who lived in a former era, any more than the apes and mammoths were the same individuals as earlier ostriches and whales. Grant that some much nobler species than man may possibly dominate this globe in a distant future, this will not add a feather's weight to the probability that any individual of that angelic troop will be a human being from our era, revived into the angelic life. On the contrary, the Geological argument emphatically dissuades, and one may say, forbids the thought.

SECTION IX.

CONCLUSION FROM PHYSICS.

I HAVE always taken for granted that the Spiritualist argument does not *contradict* the Physical argument; but only tries to *supplement* it. Physical Science discovers no reason for a breach of continuity between Man and Brute: therefor general ANALOGY suggests that if the soul of the brute perishes in death, so also does the soul of man. Analogy is not demonstration, it is simply suggestiv; yet undeniably in all comparativ physiology, Analogy is very weighty and in many directions is

abundantly confirmed. If the Spiritualist adduce *moral* reasons why the soul of man should survive death, though the soul of brutes does not, he is not thereby in collision with one whose Science pretends to *no* cognizance of moral reasons at all. Nevertheless the Analogy holds, and must prevail, *until* very solidly disproved. The moral argument which introduces a new element to transmute finite life into infinitude, ought to be intelligible to all moral reasoners,—ought to be popular, not transcendental, nor overlearned, nor fanciful:—ought to be consistent* in tending to a single result, clear in meaning, unambiguous as well as weighty; if it is to inspire confidence and afford a basis for Hope or Fear, Comfort or Warning *to the mass of mankind*, in face of the powerful Analogy on the Physical side. What weight of moral argument will be *adequate*, no words could state intelligibly: indeed different minds ar sure to form different estimates. Moreover the physical reasoner insists, that a disembodied soul is a Chimæra, and his argument deserves to be answered, not skipped over, of which I certainly was guilty.

SECTION X.

IS IT A CHIMÆRA?

In reply to Moral Reasons for a future life it is objected that a disembodied soul is a form of existence of which we hav no specimen and no proof: therefor we cannot with any sound logic introduce it into a hypothesis for the satisfaction of our moral aspirations.

* This sentence was written before the pages which follow; indeed before I was at all aware *how much* I should find to say against my former argument. I knew from the first that I had to retract one topic, but fresh and fresh considerations pressed on me, after I set myself to write from the adverse point of view.

The Divine Spirit cannot be adduced as relieving this objection. He is wholly unique, having *nothing* (as a Latin poet says) *either like or second* to himself.

Cui veget nihil simile aut secundum—

He may not unjustly be entitled "the Soul which "animates all Matter," but He is no specimen to us of a *dis*embodied soul to which we may expect parallels.

I see not how to reprove one who argues that if the soul of a dead dog has no existence, the fact is a vehement *præjudicium* against human survival. The discriminating love and other strongly marked mental qualities of the dog admit of precisely the same line of argument which the advocates of immortality employ in proof that the human soul is "a spiritual entity, capable "of existing independently of the material organization in "which it began its existence." That it no longer has activ power, is as clear in the man as in the dog: that it is *capable* of separate existence, is no clearer in the case of the man. If the soul were supposed to be *material*, it must go somewhither, when animal life ceases; and Chemistry might try to track it. But precisely because it is *not* material, we ar without any reason for supposing it to *exist*, when the organ with which it was cöeval is broken up. If we admit that, in the case of all other animals, the soul perishes, when the vital fluid ceases to circulate, we seem to attain a *general* law of Nature that the animal soul exists only *in*, *with*, and *by* the animal life: then to assume concerning the *human* soul exception co-extensiv with the human race, involves us in a greater difficulty than that of ordinary miracles.

Religious Miracles ar in general presented as isolated facts, which can be believed as *exceptional*, without any reconstruction of physical science. But here we seem required to renounce our trust in Comparativ Anatomy, Comparativ Physiology and Psychology as Sciences.

In my memory an esteemed clergyman maintained that Fossil Shells and Bones were created as we find them; he did not see that the Creator must then hav aimed at deceiving mankind. So here, the wonderful harmonies discerned between the human and the bestial,—whether you study the bones, the vital processes or the mind,—seem to serve no purpose but that of misleading us, if the Analogy is *false* which argues from the Brute to the Man in a matter so cardinal as the cessation of Life when the vital fluid stagnates. We seem to need a Physiology founded on the Axiom that the human soul was from the beginning constituted in essence and quality fundamentally diverse from that of other animals, being physically independent of flesh, blood and bone. Yet surely all the facts point the opposit way, and the visible harmony on all sides seems aimed to deceive us, if it ought not to be trusted. If when a horse or dog dies, his soul vanishes, and is *nothing*, is *nowhere;* but when a man dies, his soul remains *something*, *somewhere;* the contrast must be strictly original.

Apparently to attain standing ground in this argument, a belief in Ghosts has been clung to, by certain eminent persons, of whom John Wesley may be named as a type. For a like reason, many who hav lost confidence in the Christian Scriptures eagerly embrace a revived Necromancy, which professes material and scientific proof that Disembodied Souls not only exist, possessing memory of human events, but ar able to impart thoughts and knowledge to us, and to act upon material objects, as in rapping, table-turning, marking a photograph, guiding the hand of a writer. Nay, I heard with my own ears a lady preach powerfully in a deep masculine voice, which those present explained as *the utterances of the deceased George Dawson's soul*, speaking by her organs. (Her *doctrin* differed notably from George Dawson's.)

The belief in Ghosts, universal with the ancients, relieved them from some embarrassments which Science has brought on us.

To criticize the arguments of modern Necromancers would be quite out of place here; yet it seems right to state two *counter*-arguments which wholely forbid me to take refuge under their sheltering roof from the missiles of objectors.

First, the power over Matter ascribed by them to secret roving spirits would vitiate our material Sciences fundamentally. Every Experiment which is made, as in Mechanics, Chemistry, &c., assumes as *a Postulate* that Matter is not tampered with by secret and arbitrary Will. If in weighing gold against lead (to mention a very simple case) a Spirit could be believed to pull down one of the scales, the Experiment would be worthless. To sustain the credit of our fundamental experiments, we need to suppose these Spirits to be so conscientious *towards men of Science* as never to interfere or mar an observation or an experiment, however wild their pranks at other times.

Next, to believe that God would allow unseen Spirits to play tricks with us, would so alter my conception of Divine Rule, that I cannot tell how much of practical religion I should be able to retain.

If we could prove the existence of even one dis-embodied soul; or else one transmigration of a human soul into a "new house" at the moment of losing its old house (so as never to be *dis*-embodied), this would be a step forward. Our inability to prove either, involves our moral argument for "life after death" in serious tangle. For, unless we ar first *nearly sure* that an arrangement which we desire on moral grounds is within the sphere of Power, it is vain to pile reason upon reason why it *ought* to exist. To reconcile human ideas when intrinsically incongruous, (like "undoing the past") is no problem for Deity.

SECTION XI.

CONSENT OF MANKIND.

A CURRENT argument from Cicero down to Theodore Parker claims in favor of human immortality the fact that all nations believe it. The reasoner in Cicero adds, that as the concurrent testimony of mankind to the existence of Divine Power is a just ground of belief, so is it for a belief in future life for individual man.

Hesiod and Aristotle rightly lay stress on "the voice "of many nations" (*not* vox populi, *but* vox multorum populorum) as " a sort of divine voice." As a ground of Human Ethics and a belief in Divine Power, I accept it as very substantial, very important: moreover in both Ethics and Theology increased knowledge and culture justify the sentiment of barbarian mankind. Ever since Newton unveiled the law of Gravitation connecting distant worlds, a man who accepts the law as a fact writes himself down as on the mental level of a Fetish-worshipper, if he deny that a Universal *Mind* is activ and prepotent in Nature; which Mind or Spirit we entitle GOD. In these two branches of thought cultured intellect adopts and re-inforces the earlier belief. But as to human immortality the argument is sophistical. First, there is no real Consent of Mankind. Next, what consent there is, we may trace to weakness of understanding. Thirdly, advance in culture does *not* corroborate herein the thought of ruder men; on the contrary, seems rather to undermine it.

SECTION XII.

NATIONS NOT UNANIMOUS.

IN Cicero's day the beliefs of foreign nations were far less known than now. Of China and Africa scarcely

more was known than of the undiscovered America: even as to the Hebrew religion the grossest error was current. We cannot censure Roman ignorance. But in English authors of this century to whom the Hebrew Scriptures ar familiar, the assertion that all mankind unite in believing human immortality damages their case; for it suggests that through lack of valid argument they rashly make false assertions. Nothing is clearer in the Hebrew prophets, in most of the Hebrew Psalms and in the whole law called Mosaic, than that in the national creed (until changed by Captivity and Dispersion) no future life for individuals was taught. Next, in Roman and Greek literature and in all their Epitaphs, it is clear that life after death was not a practical belief, but only an occasional poetical fancy or flattering compliment.

Concerning Ancient Egypt we know now that three notions contended for mastery: *first*, resurrection of the flesh, — which was the apparent stimulus to embalming; *next*, the doctrin of Transmigration of human souls into other perhaps bestial forms; *thirdly*, in the Ritual of the Dead, (as early as king Mycerinus,* earlier, I believe, than the patriarch Abraham, and thenceforward) the sacred and perhaps secret doctrin was, the absorption of the soul into the divinity by death. This, it seems, was a privilege; a higher and better lot than to reanimate a human or bestial form; the latter being a punishment. This "absorption," which Sophocles expresses by "going "back thither, whence we came," is a delicate phrase, which prosaic Englishmen interpret by annihilation, and insult it as "dying like a dog." We now know that also in the Buddhist creed this reabsorption into the Divine Spirit is the normal lot of the blessed. And what number of the human race hold the Buddhist

* Rawlinson's *Egypt*, vol. ii. p. 64.

creed? Not less than four hundred millions in any estimate. Thus from the "consent of the human race" we hav to except the Hebrews, whence we derive our highest and purest inward religion; the Greeks and Romans, our intellectual and political teachers; and the very numerous votaries of Buddhism. When a religious minister to whom we cannot impute ignorance or fraud rests human immortality on this "consent," it seems as though his mind were drugged unawares by a traditional creed. The formula uttered by religious Moslems in dying: "From thee we came, to thee we return," has a smack of the old Buddhism, and I hav my private reasons for thinking that dying Christians ar often in reality closer to that creed than is generally suspected or than they ar themselves aware. The Christian Heaven is to us at most an *intellectual* belief, but it can hav no color or form to the *imagination*.

SECTION XIII.

"CONSENT" EASILY EXPLICABLE.

HOMER'S poetry exhibits plainly how futil ar barbarian notions on this matter. Achilles sees in a dream his slain friend Patroclus, and tries to embrace him; in vain. Then he raves against the stupidity of ghosts, who do not know their friends. The dream givs a vivid notion of a ghost. In Cicero's dialogs we see that spectres in dreams ar adduced in proof of fact, and even the Epicureans supposed such spectres to hav a material existence, of which they must giv some explanation. To savages whose life has had its main excitement from war and hunting, nothing is more natural than to fancy and

desire like employment after death: hence their effort to furnish a deceased chief with the means of continuing his old gratification. No just weight could be given to such notions, were they even universal. As well might we argue from universal consent, that the Earth is still, and the Sun moves round it. Discerning the cause of the vulgar error, we smile at the ignorance which would giv it importance. Time (says Cicero sagaciously) pulls down Error, but establishes Truth.

SECTION XIV.

A COUNTER PHENOMENON.

Cicero and Lucretius (iii. 911) allude to the ejaculation over one deceased: "Ah, poor fellow" (miser ah miser!) The same thing continues among Christians, even when the deceased is revered as a pious relativ (as, "My *poor* "father"), however firmly they think they believe that he is "gone to a better world." I hav heard this in quarters very various, and when I least expected it. The fact suggests the idea, that the heart contradicts the head. The head is possessed with a creed that the next world is a better world, but instinct forbids the reception of the idea into the heart, and suggests (as I hav heard) that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." In all such cases there is no consent of the *whole man* to the idea that untimely death of one, however saintly, is a benefit and promotion to him.

An amiable preacher lately pronounced over the grave of an honored gentleman, that Death was *either* a highly melancholy event *or* matter of joyful felicitation. (I hav not the actual words before me.) The inference implied was, that, unless we were willing to accept it in this case

as deplorable, we must glorify the departure. But to me every *untimely* death seems mournful, even of a criminal who is too dangerous for human society. But if death comes as the close of a complete life, after vital force is spent, it is natural and not to be regretted, though parting with one beloved is painful. A "Dilemma" cannot here yield any positiv truth.

SECTION XV.

MORAL TENDENCY OF THE RECEIVED BELIEF.

Among average Englishmen the idea prevails, that unless a man believes "After Death is the Judgment" his oath is worthless. It is assumed that Fear of Punishment alone deters from Wrong, and Hope of Reward alone prompts to Right. This stupid error, this degrading view of man, is heard from the same persons who talk high of human nature as ennobled by an immortal soul. Many a magistrate or judge has scolded out of court with rude insult a witness whose evidence would hav damaged a hostile party, when this party has cunningly objected that the witness had no belief in Judgment to come. Such wise-acre judges would hav ruled that the solemn word of Joel, Isaiah or Jeremiah was not worth a straw. I try to formulate their doctrin *as accrediting* the tenet of future life; thus: "Belief in a Future "Judgment is essential to make men truthful: therefor "the belief is true."

But it is not true that truth is spoken so much through fear of Future Punishment, as through hatred of Falsehood and love of Justice; nor in general hav the worst criminals rejected their national creed, whether it threaten them with persecution by Furies in old Greece, or by

Devils in Christendom. I myself essayed an argument: "The more spiritual Religion becomes, the more does "belief in a Future Life gain assent." But I am less able than I was to assert this to be certain truth; moreover, unwelcome facts of opposit tendency hav to be considered. To this side of the question I pass.

Timidly I mention first a weakness widely prevalent, as must be judged by popular phrases. In the "next "world" God is supposed to be *nearer* to us than in the present. To die, is called "going *into the immediate* "*presence* of God." This very prevalent idea tends to bedim or obliterate the true Hebrew realizing of the Divine Presence at every moment, and by simple faith "seeing Him who is invisible." I am quite aware that this is by no means a necessary result of believing in a Future World. Yet it seems to be a very common tendency, and in so far, adverse to spiritual life. "Enoch "*walked with God*" is surely now accepted as alone describing worthy religion.

SECTION XVI.

PRIDE ENGENDERS CRUELTY.

When among reasons which weigh on the Christian (as opposed to the old Hebrew) side, I said that the belief in human immortality ennobles man, a Reviewer seized eagerly on this avowal as sufficient in itself to decide him in favor of the belief. He had me on his side! I am since taken aback as to this "ennoblement." An eminent priest in Rome has preached with contempt of those who object to the torture of brute animals. Men (says he) must not be tortured; *for*, they hav immortal souls. Other animals ar not immortal; *therefor*, they

hav no rights that man needs to respect. They may be tortured at his pleasure.—Now if this were the doctrin of one man, it might be passed by as an eccentric insanity. But I learn that it is really Catholic doctrin, and that historically it has leavened the vulgar Italians with dire callousness to the sufferings of the lower races. Thus, as, in common belief, princes "born in the purple" ar prone to be, through royal pride, selfish and apathetic to human suffering, so the vulgar masses of mankind ar, not "ennobled" by a belief that their souls ar immortal, but simply made disdainful to the docile creatures on whom they look down. Disdainful? nay, but heartless; though these inferior races *hav nerves as sensitiv as the human*, and share the labors of life with their unfeeling tyrants.

SECTION XVII.

CRUELTIES FROM WILD FANCY.

Some press me with the great enlargement of the mind rising out of a belief in human immortality. Doubtless all dwelling on Infinity givs width to thought, whether in Time or Space, whether in the starry heaven, the boundless ocean, the black depths of an unfathomable crevasse, or in strata which suggest Geological measures of time. The nobler and more cultured minds rise higher by such contemplations. With them a severe logic checks *the riot of Fancy, and of Poetry which apes Philosophy.* But the case is widely different with the uninstructed, to whom the indulgence of Fancy becomes a Frenzy.

I must not shrink from pressing historical facts, which attest (however disagreeable to me and to my readers)

that to barbarous man a belief in human immortality is on a large scale *a depraving influence*, propagating cruelty by a contempt of human life. This takes two courses,—contempt of one's own life, which tends to reckless bravery in war,—and contempt of the lives of other men, which leads to a sanctification of murders. Perhaps the noblest tribes of barbarians ar the very men who hav been possessed with sanguinary delusions; rather, their contempt of life has made them to be at once bravest and reputed noblest.

Herodotus tells us of a tribe of Getans (that is, Goths, according to Grimm) on the Danube, who believed themselves immortal. He calls them signally noble and just. Every five years they sent a messenger to heaven, to acquaint their God of their special needs. The process was as follows. They used to fling a man aloft, and catch him on three spear points. If he died quickly, it was a good omen; but if he happened to survive, they reviled him as wicked, and had to kill a second victim as his substitute. No doubt these Getans were brave, and with barbarians bravery is a chief virtue; but when thus excited, it diffuses cruel superstition more widely. We may make sure that the victims who perished were accounted meritorious,—perhaps as Quirinus or Hercules, drinkers of nectar at the heavenly banquet.

But this Getan superstition is dwarfed by the Funeral for every chief of the Imperial Scythians. Could he who had held so lofty a station here be less than a king in the Spirit-World? Every priest or magician, every poet, was sure to say, No!—Well; as a king, he must hav a body-guard and a royal household. Herodotus givs us grotesque and ghastly details, more than we need here to quote. Fifty young men and fifty horses of finest breed ar killed for his military escort. Besides, he needs a wife; a cook, a cupbearer, a page, an adjutant,

and other horses, apparently for his personal riding. All these ar killed to accompany him. Such atrocities might be disbelieved, had we not confirmations from similar facts elsewhere.

In 1661, the Jesuit Fathers Grueber and Dorville undertook to travel by land from China to India, and passed in Thibet through a desolate region called Tangut, where they found a religious practice prevalent. A sacred boy called Buth, equipped with sword, quiver and arrows, and with numerous standards stuck about him, sallied forth [on certain holy days only, we presume] to kill at pleasure whomever he met. No one resisted him; for *to be thus slain was believed to be a signal blessing to them in a better world.*—[Hugh Murray, *Travels in Asia*, 1820.]

Most persons hav heard of the Customs of Dahomey, which perhaps ar declining under European influence. The Dahomeyans ar described as tall, graceful, brave and devotedly obedient to their king. At his death, as used to be narrated, the guards issued from the palace and killed whomever they met. This was a First-fruits. Afterwards, as a Wesleyan missionary tells, deliberate "sacrifices" of numerous men, women, beasts and fowls were made for the fancy of sending *spirit messages* to the soul of the deceased monarch, and (as the missionary seems to say) to the spirits of the beasts and fowls. If this interpretation be uncertain, it is yet clear that as soon as the idea of the "Spirit-World" is accepted, concerning which absolutely nothing is known or knowable, wild Fancy has deadly power to override Justice and Humanity. Dahomey is not a singular case in the modern world. Similar atrocities of superstition ar reported from other parts of Africa; and in America the killing of a chief's war-horse to secure a mount for him in the World of Spirits hints to us how easy the step is

into slaughter of his retinue. Indeed East Indian SUTTEE, in which a widow was burnt on the funeral pile of her husband, belongs to the same ghastly family of religious fancies. What of the suicides to Juggannaut?

SECTION XVIII.

HELL AND PURGATORY.

OUR sage Judges and Magistrates claimed a belief in Hell to guarantee the validity of oaths. Little they knew of the horrors entailed by this belief, in many directions. It is not here pretended that a belief in life after death necessarily or logically requires belief in Hell Fire, much less a belief that the non-acceptance of a creed is an offence unpardonable with God. But hitherto nations hav found it much easier to imagin an awful Hell than a desirable Heaven. The old Greeks readily understood Furies and maddening torment; but as to the Elysian fields, the poet of the Odyssey makes the great Achilles say, that the life of a slave on earth is far better. Until the forces of life ar spent, or disease is agonizing, to desire Heaven would be morbid and unnatural. Necessarily, where future *Retribution* is received in theory, the only effectiv practical belief is in Hell, — a Hell not for oneself (for no vile sinner believes that his vileness deserves it), but for one's opponents, political perhaps or religious. Thus the poet Dante paints his political foes in Hell: Christians in the middle age put Moslems there, Moslems consign Christians to it. ["Come away from him!" screamed an African woman to a girl, to whom Captain Clapperton put a question. "He is a Christian, who "eats pork and will go to Hell."] This deadly doctrin has exasperated contempt and hatred between Christians and Moslems, and has hardened Christians into cruelties

against Jews, into worse still against Heretics; cruelties, which without a belief in Hell could hav had no lodgment in religious theories. Bigotry and Cruelty, it has been said, nowhere vanish from the multitude, until crushed out by disbelief in this authoritativ creed.

It is not easy to exhaust the tale of mischief which the tenets of Hell and Purgatory ar still working; but from one side only does the topic concern my present argument; viz., the question raised in Section xv., *What is the Moral Tendency* (on a broad national scale) of believing in a Future Life of Retribution for Saints and Sinners? The practical result is very weak from the tenet of Heaven;—except that under religious persecution it may animate martyrs and keep them faithful to their convictions. But from the tenet of Hell, *which always tends to be the more powerful influence*, while religious credulity is unimpaired, great exasperation of malignant sentiment arises; nay, it gravely darkens the believer's view of the Divine character. A clear proof is found in a very popular argument against capital punishment; viz., that "it hurries a sinner away to the "dread Tribunal, giving him no time to repent." The multitude pity the sinner in spite of his sin and crime, but count that God will be *less* merciful and considerate than they ar! When the Hell is believed to be actually Eternal, the case is worse and worse; but no "Purgatory" is ever thought to be *less* than a day's roasting alive.

SECTION XIX.

IMPROVED MODERN CREED.

Amiable modern Christians more and more refuse to retain with Spurgeon and the Salvationists the doctrin of Hell. Paul never teaches it, and seems in Romans xi.

and 1 Cor. xv. to propound Final Universal Salvation. So in 1 Timothy iv. 10, "God is the Saviour of all men, "especially of those that believe." But when these amiable reasoners glorify their private creed, *which the General Church has never accepted*, the thought presses, that we hav no experience how it will work if generally adopted. Hitherto among Protestants, eminently in Wesleyans and Salvationists, zeal for "conversion," has chiefly turned on *saving souls from Hell;* to which the word Salvation is banefully confined.

We must hope that when no longer stimulated to practical zeal by the frightful theory that impenitent Vice damns people to Eternal Hell, they will not undervalue the noble result of converting sinners for the sake of *this* world, even though they believe the sinful "doomed to be saved" in the next world.

But when preachers do *not* rest the belief of a blessed future for us all on a miraculous revelation, it is to me unintelligible that (as far as I can hear) the tenet is quietly assumed by them as scarcely needing proof and encumbered by no difficulties. In Indian Brahmos this perhaps may be ascribed to Eastern heredity, which naturally imbibes ancient metaphysics and psychology. But in our "Free Christian" Churches, which disclaim authority as any basis of belief, whose laity also ar well aware that miracles tampering with physical law for moral objects justly call for intense jealousy and suspicion, it is quite wonderful that the preachers account elaborate argument for Life after Death superfluous. I write under correction, if I am wrong as to fact; but if Free Thinking preachers took any pains to establish that a future life certainly awaits us, I fancy that I should hear of it. That the belief makes one comfortable and "ennobles mankind," seems (as far as I can learn) to them a sufficient proof.

SECTION XX.

FUTURE OF THE WICKED.

In the heart of every savage is engraved the motto, that "the Violent must expect like Violence;" and as Prometheus in Æschylus expresses it, "That foe should "suffer from foe, is no-wise unseemly." Incipient philosophy then sets up an Axiom, "The evil-doer "*deserves* to suffer evil," and the doctrin of "Life for "life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth," easily gains currency. If the kinsfolk of a murdered man, alledging special extenuation, accept pecuniary compensation and condone the murder, ere long the public and the law-giver take fright, lest mild treatment encourage crime: the Judge is forbidden to pity an offender, and "*Retribution without* "*Mercy*" is enacted.

Religious thought next transfers the law of the Human to an imagined Divine Tribunal. Retribution for crime, if it be not inflicted in the present world, is thought nevertheless inevitable. When public curse follows into the grave an unpunished criminal, surely (is the popular inference) if there be any God who abhors crime, he will punish it in a future world.—This logic widely approves itself concerning *signally cruel* tyrants, even among nations which hav no serious belief of *general* human immortality. Once uttered by Prophet, Priest or Poet, the idea sticks fast. Extreme cruelty of a man, whose power forbids human tribunal to arrain him, *must* be punished after death, *somehow*, *somewhere*, by *some* unseen deity.

So felt and so judged Pagan Antiquity. Even after the special mythologies were exploded by philosophic thought, it was hard for philosophers themselves to disown the claim of "late-avenging Retribution." They discerned that punishment, if delayed and put out of

sight, very ill deters a hardened conscience from crime; moreover, that to punish a criminal after death brings no solace to his victim; therefor such punishment is mere futil Vengeance, in fact, is *useless Cruelty disguised as Justice.* Though they were unable to believe it, yet in argument the popular instinct was distressingly against them and difficult to parry. MERCY was in a human judge an unpermitted weakness: could a Divine judge be *so weak* as to let off a high criminal with impunity?

Greek and Roman philosophers, unable to accept as Justice punishment that comes too late, adopted as moral the maxim of assassinating a tyrant who dominates and crushes the human tribunal before which he ought to be arrained. Thus Timoleon for assassination of his brother was honored by all Greece, and to his last day was held to be a model of virtue; thus the assassins of Caius Julius were panegyrized and envied by Cicero. But in the latter case events painfully showed that to slay the tyrant did not slay the tyranny.

With the old PAGANS Nature and God were not identified. Their chief God was a sublime Potentate, sitting external to Nature. Nature or Fate had allotted to every God his special task. The tyrant Phalaris, if brought up before the tribunal of Pluto or Rhadamanthys by the Furies, and permitted to defend himself, had no case for turning on his judge and asking: "Why did "not you arrest my career earlier and rescue the innocent "from my cruelty?" For the judge would reply: "Fate gave me no jurisdiction on upper Earth; my sole "function is to punish *here* those who were guilty *there.*" With CHRISTIANS and JEWS this after-death tribunal is only an anachronistic survival of a Pagan theory which with us is illogical and worse than absurd.

For, God is with us the animating power of Nature, the force by which we breathe and liv, a Mind cognizant of

our purposed wickedness. A magistrate who knows that crime is being planned, yet remains inactiv and allows it to work cruel wrong on the innocent, though he has police force abundantly at hand, is condemned as AN ACCOMPLICE in the crime. We cannot attribute to the Supreme Ruler *inability* to cut short the career of the criminal, yet (for his own excellent reasons) he deliberately refuses to put forth his resistless power. This undeniable and glaring fact utterly overthrows all analogy to a human tribunal and human *processes* of Justice. The Power which calmly allows the perpetration of cruel guilt, *cannot* rationally be supposed to promote justice *on the same lines* as a human magistrate. Therefor all argument of a future tribunal based on such analogy is utterly futil. Delay of action until action is too late to save the innocent, foils all our reasonings from the imagined analogy.

"As the Heavens ar higher than the Earth, so ar my "ways higher than your ways," saith the Lord.—*Later Isaiah.*

ἰθεία Διὸς ἐν παναληθεῖ
Διὸς ἵμερος οὐκ εὐθήρατος ἐτύχθη.
δαυλοὶ γὰρ πραπίδων
δύσκιοί τε τείνουσιν
πόροι, κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι.—Æsch. Suppl.*

No plea for a future life is weaker, than that without it many wicked will escape punishment. But do they escape it, in this world? Very often, *perhaps.* I do not hold, with Socrates in Plato, even that the worst and most cruel tyrant is sensibly miserable: deadness of conscience encrusts sensibility. The bloodiest of the Huns or

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* "In the straight line of Jove, though truthfully drawn,
"The heart's desire of Jove is not easy to track.
"For the paths of his heart stretch winding and overshadowed,
"Uncalculable in the survey."

Moguls had no more consciousness of cruelty than English sportsmen in a battue: nor possibly had Nero or Torquemada. But however prosperous a selfish or malignant man may be, he forfeits all the highest joys; for these spring out of unselfishness and activ love. *How much* bad men punish themselves, only the All-seeing Eye can know. I do not pretend to clear this great argument and "vindicate the Most High." Faith is severely strained by the awful results of stupidity and dull selfishness, —say nothing of wanton cruelty; but whatever the strain on Faith, no relief is brought by the theory of Punishment in the Future; for, it comes too late to rescue sufferers; *which is the vital point.*

No Tartar, no Roman, no Russian tyrant could act with extreme inhumanity, were not his tools callous-hearted. In our days, after War has been softened in many respects, Gibbon avows that even now (ch. xxvi., first paragraph) War is "*out of all proportion* more "calamitous than earthquakes, deluges, hurricanes and "volcanoes." War from a Maria Teresa or a Victoria may cause miseries *worse* than those of a Nero. War-loving princes and statesmen could not now inflict on the world this awful pest, had they not standing armies under hirelings ever eager for "glory;" *that is*, eager for the job of wholesale murder, with promotion to follow; perhaps elevation to the Peerage.

Before the age of Constantine the military profession was not accounted consistent with Christian *duty*. "Be not "partaker of other men's sins: keep thyself pure;" said good St. Paul. But now—the Churches make no protest against hiring oneself to be a *blind* tool of slaughter; our Anglican Church seems to glorify the profession. What is this, but to take part in a system of crime, and then claim that *God* will revenge it in a future life? *Does not he claim of* us *to do our best to hinder and prevent it in*

this life? Who can imagin how different the world might now be, if in the last 1550 years the Catholic Church had continued to brand the *trade* of the hired soldier, ready for any or every war?

SECTION XXI.

COMPENSATION TO THE WRONGED.

Two typical men, Leibnitz and Baxter, thought an Eternal Hell necessary to God's justice, and deserving of applause from all saints. But now from a far more compassionate heart with a mind untrammelled by traditional creeds rises a fervid claim of Redress in a future world to the innocent men or brutes who hav been wronged in this life. In bolder, harsher tone it is asserted,—"If there be *no* future life, GOD IS UNJUST to "wronged innocents."

Such utterance from one in present agony, would elicit only pity and respect. Yet nearly every martyr expecting cruelty, if asked beforehand whether he would count it a mercy never to hav been born, would emphatically disown the thought as false and impious. No one can measure the *quantum* of another's pains; but it is to me credible that the pangs of some diseases and of some accidents (as from fire or fracture) equal the worst misery which artificial cruelty can inflict. But what patient, in his severest pang ever called out: "God "owes me a *compensation* of bliss in a future world for "these torments." If no sufferer, except in madness, ever put in such a claim, *who* and *where* is the plaintiff who thus arrains the Author of his life, saying "God "has been *unjust* to me in this world, and thereby is in

"an arrear of *debt*, which he is bound to repay to me, "his creature, in some future life?" If any one seriously presses the argument, that God's world, as we know it, is so bad, as to make the Author liable to a claim of compensation for negligence and delay of justice; the reasoner seems bound to answer the question: "How "otherwise would you hav the world fashioned?" John Stuart Mill drew an awful picture of elemental ravages in this world, as displaying the utter heartlessness of its Maker [if there were a Maker]; but he did not venture to tell us under what physical laws this world *ought* to exist, *if* its Author were benevolent. Philosophy becomes as childish as Epicurus, if it undertake such problems. If painful necessity forced on me the conclusion that this world is an "utter failure," and that in it God deals "unjustly" with his own creatures, I should lose all confidence that he will be any the more just (as I measure Justice) in a future world. To avow that "Compensation "for Wrong" is required from him, appears to me a fatal concession from a pious Theist. But, I am asked, "What "comfort will you be able to giv to wretches,—diseased and "dying, guilty perhaps, yet foully wronged,—if you cannot "promise them redress and happiness in a future blessed "existence?" One question may be answered by another: "What comfort hav the believers in Eternal Hell and "Heaven for 1700 years past been able to giv effectually "to nineteen out of twenty of the cruelly wronged and "miserable?" and "what to the pious who ar aware that "many of their dearest hav died impenitent?" It is no new fact, however painful, that it is hard for the outsider to bring comfort to the miserable by *any abstract doctrin*. A kind heart, prompting kind deeds and kind words, never fails to bring *some* relief. To cultivate such a heart, is excellent: but not, to make the pleasantness of a doctrin any more than of a reported fact, a measure of its truth.

SECTION XXII.

MY OWN IDEAL OF HEAVEN.

All my life I hav never particularly wished to go to [the Christian] Heaven. It is certainly too monotonous for an Eternity. The *negativ* side of it sounds all right. Absence of pain, of mental disquiet, of cold and heat, of hunger and thirst, of turmoil and contention, of toil and weariness, of sin and death,—thus much I understand, and for a moment approve; but all this is completely provided in the old Hebrew grave, without any after-life. To make a new life desirable, it must giv us something to do, something worth striving for, and *a career by which we may improve in Virtue.* Some modern speculators hav suggested that in Heaven we shall all learn the mysteries of Science and more beside. Just so, Cicero's talker imagins that his soul, escaping from the body, will mount aloft in the atmosphere until it floats steadily in a stratum of its own density, and then will delight itself in the magnificent spectacle of this Earth in all its parts, its geography and its landscapes. Moving about with inconceivable velocity (for what is so swift as Mind?), without toil it will enjoy endless scenes of beauty. (Tusc. Q. i. 18, 20.) But Beauty and Science in entire isolation cannot satisfy a human soul or mind long. We emphatically need moral relations, old or new. If we ar to retain activ powers, we need some object that worthily calls out those powers. If we ar to increase in Virtue, we need occasions for *self-denial*, *self-controul*, and *self-sacrifice*. But these cannot exist, where there is no want, no offence, no pain. Want and pain, toil and trial, cannot be wholely banished out of *my* Heaven. Pursuing the thought, I find (like the simple savage) that no world is to me desirable, which has not *the elementary principles* dominant with us: only let not

their sterner forms be in such excess as to crush immature virtue. Out of this I infer, that, but for man's misconduct, this world is in the main as good a world as we can wisely desire. If only, if only! the better men could rule over the worse, would not that make upon this Earth as good a Heaven as we ar capable of receiving.

SECTION XXIII.

A HEAVEN ON EARTH.

Is it Quixotic to imagin the better men ruling over the worse? Which class is the more numerous? The answer partly varies with time and place, partly depends on the meaning of the epithets. Nowhere can the Many stand criticism by saint or sage; yet the Many everywhere hav a deep interest in Justice, and those who profit by Injustice ar the Few; while from Injustice spring the great miseries of this world, entailing Enmity, Crime and Vice. Were not a vast numerical majority on the side of Law (which is supposed to be Just) crime could not be punished. In every industrious, law-abiding community the popular sentiment for Justice vastly preponderates, and is amenable to wise exhortation. To be practical, let our argument be confined to England. Those who claim to be "the Salt of the Earth" hav, as their proper function, to rally the force of Opinion and direct it to the aim of making the national *institutions* and the national *policy* just. Old institutions, founded on conquest, ar seldom likely to be just. A true Church must be open-eyed on this point. It would hav been Quixotic at the birth of Christianity to deal with national affairs. Apostles necessarily limited their task to saving

out of the world "an Elect Remnant." The time of "leavening the whole mass" was not yet ripe. But three centuries later, the Bishops of the Church woke up to a new ambition of claiming the whole world as "the "kingdom of God and his Christ." How and why they failed, this is no place to tell: but that the failure was complete and disastrous is manifest in the horrible fact, that after fifteen centuries more, to this very day, without public rebuke, Statesmen who prate of Christianity act as though *Might made Right.*

There always hav been individuals (and there ar plenty among us now) so unselfish, so sympathizing, so loving, so just, so thoughtful and discreet, so activ in lessening temptation to immature virtue, that they make *a little Heaven all round them;* but they ar seldom aggressiv against public evil. Individuals ar not strong enough. Societies ar formed to contend against *special* evils; but however useful this may often be, they constantly thwart one another, each claiming precedence. Only Christian Churches, or other Churches united on our common Morality, comprizing a massiv force of men and women *pledged to* ALL VIRTUE, are equal to the battle against Ambition and Avarice. Ambition in a Court turns on royal or national pride. Ambition in military, naval, or civil servants and aspiring merchants turns almost wholly on AVARICE, which crushes and corrupts weaker nations, demoralizing us at home. Let us hope that the Churches, learning their strength, will learn their duty better than hitherto, and abandoning partial interests, will struggle for universal Justice, alike in legislation and in Foreign policy. If England led the way, many other nations would follow, and the effort which little Faith calls Quixotic would redound to world-wide blessing.

Hitherto, alas! the Churches seem to hav interpreted the sacred prophecy that nation shall not make war

against nation, in the curious sense that there is to be no war *in Heaven*. Else,— did it never occur to a single Bishop, that to bring about fulfilment of the prophecy is the Church's sublime task? Must we wait for Disestablishment to moralize the Clergy?

SECTION XXIV.

WILL THE FITTEST SURVIVE?

ACCORDING to the New Gospel, all ar "to go to Heaven." All human souls ar traditionally accepted as immortal; souls of babes, souls of barbarians which rejoice in bloodshed, and hav little more moral development than apes and lionesses, which love their young. From a Catholic priest I learned that, under certain circumstances, to baptize an *unborn* child is approved by the Church. Ar we thus to extend the idea of inevitable immortality?

Yet if that *exceptional boon* is to be granted for *moral* reasons, the grant (methinks) would discriminate morally. The theory suggests as program,—(1) annihilation to all to whom immortality would be as encumbering as to dead wolves; (2) continued life to all who hav passed well enough through God's primary school to be fitted for an upper form. Under this regimen, Darwinianism would triumph; for the Fittest would survive.

SECTION XXV.

MY OVERSTRAINED ARGUMENT.

I HAV never been able to giv up the belief which pervades both Hebrew and Christian thought, that God verily has a "peculiar people,"—his "fellow-workers." Proceeding from this basis, I hav overstrained an argument in my

"Theism," and am bound to retract it. This world (I argued) was designed by its Author to be a School of Virtue to man, his highest creature in it. But if Virtue, by Divine decree, perish with each virtuous man, then the Divine aim is thwarted by its own enactment, and a normal blight seems even to impair the Divine Counsels and the Divine Bliss.

I now argue against myself as follows. If the Divine aim be the moral advance of *the race collectivly*, it is not necessarily made void when good souls cease to liv: *for*, their Virtue may hav helped forward the Virtue of survivors, as in Science the "Lamp" is passed on. The nobler souls do not liv in vain, if *their work* survive; and each will say gratefully: "Lord! now lettest thou "thy servant depart in peace," when his handiwork has been prospered.

Another side of the topic has since pressed vehemently on me. Though Virtue is our most sacred possession, without which Life is not to be coveted, and therefor is that which, as we hold, God most approves in Man, (*θεοφιλέστατον*, to use the phrase of Aristotle,) yet Human Virtue is in its essence largely relativ to Human circumstances and almost requires such circumstances for its exercise and maintenance. In the Christian Heaven neither Chastity nor Bravery nor Compassion nor Prudence nor Generosity nor Justice nor Longsuffering can hav any exercise. This single fact weighs heavily against the idea, that, when torn up from its own soil, any human virtue can hav absolute value great enough to be preserved (as it were) *in vacuo* by exceptional physical law, or sacredly in-urned as a memento, after its occasion is past. Everything distinctiv of the individual seems to vanish, when all the dearly-earned peculiarities ar stripped off or locked up, which, admirable in this world, ar superfluous in the *quasi*-angelic state.

SECTION XXVI.

CAN VIRTUE PERISH?

From the treatise of the celebrated Malthus, I think, I learnt the formula, that God ordained this world as *a manufactory of Virtue*; a doctrin which seemed to point further to a belief, that he would not permit the loss by death of a product elaborately earned or bought at vast price. But now I am pulled back by perceiving that nearly all our separate Virtues, especially those that ar gained or sustained by earnest effort and grave sacrifice, ar virtually lost in the *Christian* Heaven; while it is hard to imagin *any* Heaven in which they will grow and thrive, unless its climate approximate to that in which they were nativ. A further inquiry arises, whether pious Christians would think it a boon from God to liv a second life in a world *sufficiently like* to ours to need and maintain our Virtues. I half remember from old days a hymn on the dying Christian, in which, after a whisper from him that "Worlds should not tempt him" to accept a second "dreary life" such as the present, the hymn-writer closes with the verse:

> Thus spake the Christian, firm possest
> Of Faith's supporting rod:
> Then breathed his soul into his Rest,
> The bosom of his God.

This verse suggests (and to me other facts support the belief) that the "Rest in God's bosom" for which many a Christian longs, is not perceptibly different from that "Absorption into the Divinity," which, in the Egyptian Ritual of the Dead and in the modern Buddhist Creed, is greeted by English scorn and gibes. Virgil well understood that painful effort was wisely planned for man by the Supreme Power. He tells us:

> Pater ipse, colendi
> Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem
> Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,
> Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.

An Eden, a Paradise, such as under ancient *Saturn*, would, according to Virgil, hav been the torpor of mankind. True and sound philosophy. Effort is essential to Progress. In the finite Being, Rest, unless as preparativ for new Effort, is Stagnation. Indeed, if a *superlativ* Virtue can only be attained and "perfected by "suffering" (Heb. ii. 10), then no future Heaven can be characterized as a Rest, but rather will be a wrestling ground where higher and ever higher Virtue is to be laboriously earned. If such lofty Virtue is destined to become a reality, beyond a doubt it will hav an inward well of joy unimaginable. Possibly some ambitious souls may aspire to be "baptized with this baptism;" but the many seem to pine for a royal and easier road to the celestial plateau. These thoughts somewhat hint that a single life may be quite enough for average saints, who hav "served their generation by the will of God, and "then fallen asleep." It is not for us to deny, that Eye hath not seen nor Ear heard what the Secret Counsels may reserve for some. My sole question now is, whether it is wise and legitimate for the preachers of *unauthoritativ* religion to announce future life as an ascertainable fact, that ought to influence Theory, Sentiment or Conduct. To pretend that it is essential to having any worthy religion at all, is not only a wonderful historical error, but a very pernicious one in the face of modern material Science.

SECTION XXVII.

THE RELATION OF MAN TO GOD.

For more reasons than one the relation of the Dog to Man seems instructivly to represent in some respects that of Man to God. Man's normal life being five times as long as the dog's, no man thinks of a dog as his life

partner. For his death the master has a short grief, but to *cherish* grief would be a weakness. In the unequal friendship the inferior gives far more love, yet is not wronged; for he gains the full satisfaction of his nature. The man is to the dog vastly more than the dog can be to the man; yet the two hav moral affection in common. They hav in common love and hatred, and other emotions. The dog *apprehends* the man, understanding his commands and believing in his love, yet certainly does not comprehend him.

Between God and Man the gap is prodigiously greater than between Man and the Dog. Our failure to comprehend the mighty Superior, whom yet we apprehend, is out of all proportion vaster. If there be in the man something divine, much more is in the dog something human; much ampler also is God to us, than anything that all men can be to him. Human love to God can only be, or mean, with an intellectual belief in his Supreme Goodness, a love of *all* goodness in the abstract; *therefor* supremely to him. Such love and reverence ar due to him, just as obedience to us from the dog: but love *on the same basis* men cannot hav from God. A man is not heartless to his loving dog in calmly accepting his timely death: must God be accounted reckless of his grateful devotees if he does not make them sharers of his own Eternity?

SECTION XXVIII.

IS ETERNITY COMMUNICABLE?

THE question further presses, May not Eternity like Omniscience and Omnipresence be a special peculiarity of the Most High? I marvel at the levity with which many Christians scoff at any who doubts of human

immortality. In reply to insult sometimes unsparing, it is vain to ask, "Would you fling such words at Isaiah "and Jeremiah?" for an average Christian is too deeply drugged with dogma. But to one who can listen, I reply: Do you really think a saint's life of seventy years to be a mere dog's life? Surely the question is, *How* a man livs, not *how long*.

Antiquity believed that man could be deified: we regard this as the babbling of childhood. The Infinit One is in permanent and necessary contrast to all his finite creatures. It is not piety, but folly, to suppose his illimitable power, his illimitable knowledge, his illimitable reach in *space*, imparted to one of us. Who can wisely reverse the presumption in the case of illimitable *time?* To propose as a dogma, an Axiom, that man is to be co-eternal with God, is to me like an infatuation. If any one believe it on the ground that it is *miraculously revealed*, that is quite another matter. But to present it as a first principle, is simply inadmissible: and if it be argued out morally, it must be held modestly,—as an opinion, or a personal conviction,—not as a dogma. Certainly *a priori* all analogy concerning the Infinit and the Finite is strongly adverse to the notion.

But I here add a protest not superfluous. It is indiscreet to use the grand phrases, *Eternity*, *Immortality*, and exposes us to attack by the Greek Axiom.* The Power which givs to Man eighty or one hundred years of life, does not communicate any Divine peculiarity in granting a second or a third limited term of life; and so on, however often repeated. *If* there be no intrinsic contradiction, or other absurdity, in the idea of a human Life *renewed* after Death, argument for it is admissible without invading the characteristics of Deity.

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* Section ii., above.

SECTION XXIX.

THE JOY OF RE-UNION.

Undoubtedly the present contemplation of joy in the future meeting of the tenderly beloved is very fascinating. I find it hard to read without unmanly tears Southey's lines on Ladurlad and his daughter meeting the deceased mother in Paradise (*Kehama*, canto x., Mount Meru.) But how is this topic (which kind friends press on me) connected with the present argument? Can it be implied that *whatever is pleasant to believe is true?* Truth is often bitter to digest; but Falsehood,—indeed *all Delusion*, draws endless mischief after it, if not to the individual, yet in its further growth: therefor Truth, even if it be bitter, ought to be welcomed. But temperaments and circumstances vary. Years ago, in converse with an amiable and very thoughtful widow, I asked whether in the loss of dear ones she had found the hope of meeting them in a future world a sustaining power. To my surprize she answered: "Oh! the idea of meeting "would be quite painful, utterly embarrassing." For a test case I take what I hav just now read in a newspaper. A young couple ar married in the morning: in the same afternoon the bridegroom ventures on the ice, and is drowned. Will it console the bride to say to her: "Weep not! for in due time you will rejoin your lost "lover in heaven?" Alas! she expected to hav him in this world as her life-partner, perhaps as her bread-provider, certainly as her protector and friend, to soothe her in grief and sympathize in joy. How cold the comfort, to assure her that after she has fought perhaps a hard battle of life, bereft of her dear one while she wants him, she will regain him where she will *not* want him, after she is mentally so changed, as perhaps not to be recognizable. Deviation from the Physical Analogies

for a moral purpose, requires weighty reasons and a complete result. Jesus is said to raise from the dead a youth who was the only son of his mother, and she was a widow: there the consolation is complete. But to re-unite the widowed mother and her son in a distant and unknown future, is certainly a lame result from the moral correction of physical law. Is it not possible, that when consolation from this topic is administered conventionally, with intention however kind, reticence is imposed by good taste on one who gains no real assuagement. *In precisely the cases which most need it, this ground of consolation signally fails.*

Elsewhere I hav adduced the case of a good mother made wretched by a graceless undutiful son who has died impenitent. The logic of the Christian Church for 1700 years bids this mother to believe that her son is gone to an eternal hell, and comfort herself by the assurance that *she* is herself going to a happy heaven. The new school which rebukes me as *flippant* for the argument, has to *put its own new wine into old skins;* and, while glorifying in theory the doctrin of Jesus, marvellously transforms his "worm that dieth not and his fire unquenchable" into something of totally opposit spirit.

Whatever the first joy of Ladurlad, however delightful the remembrance of his earthly affection and its object, Southey's heaven provides for his hero no material to elicit or sustain his love for Yedillian, such as on Earth daily wants, mutual service, mutual thoughtfulness, common joy, common sorrow afford.

SECTION XXX.

YEARNING FOR GOD'S KINGDOM.

Nor does this yet touch the bottom of the matter. A right-hearted man has no desire for anything in his own future *at all to compare* with his longing that Truth, Righteousness and Universal Mercy may triumph; especially on that area on which his knowledge is most complete and his interest keenest. Next after praying that we may ourselves hallow the thought of God, zeal that God may be everywhere obeyed ought to possess us, according to the received "Lord's Prayer." He who rejoices in God's coming kingdom, better fulfils the ideal of God's servant and fellow-worker, than he who rejoices in his own personal prospects and future ecstasies of spiritual joy. A rude ancient Roman, a not very virtuous French soldier, accepts the pang of his death-wound with joy, if he believes it has contributed to the victory of his country. In this idol of his fancy, however ill-deserving it may be, he entirely forgets and sacrifices himself. Hav we not something to learn from his wild virtue? If we choose our paramount object of desire wisely and rightly, the less we think of our own future the better. When the progress of *the kingdom of heaven* chiefly kindles our enthusiasm, we easily forget self, longing only that Sin may vanish and God may reign *actually*, wherever ar creatures capable of Sin and Holiness. Only on this Earth do we *know* of such creatures. Concerning planetary inhabitants and angelic beings we only guess. Therefor precisely concerning the future of *this Earth* does it seem most reasonable for a *heavenly*-minded man to be specially concerned. To *liv* and *see* the kingdom of heaven triumphant is naturally his dearest wish. Nearly such was the Hebrew aspiration: "Oh visit me with thy "salvation, that I may see the good of thy chosen and "glory with thy inheritance."

We regard Wilberforce as eminently favored,—so too Charles Sumner, Garrison and Wendell Phillips, because they lived to *see* the triumph of Negro Freedom, to which they had devoted their lives. What we cannot hope to see or hear, we anticipate by Faith, which, buoyed up by undemonstrable Hope, becomes to the heart a substantial evidence; the Faith that the kingdom of Charity will triumph there, *where the heart has most ached for it.*

This in fact was the true primitiv Christian faith; that God would establish his kingdom here, over men in flesh and blood. The saints were to share Messiah's triumph, to sit beside him on his throne, as in some sense superintendents and agents under him. The joy was not selfish, for it turned on the prevalence of Righteousness to supersede the reign of Satan. Contrariwise, in the modern Christian notion of Heaven, *the broad, unselfish desire is evanescent*, and *the purely personal desires ar made prominent and paramount.* For a moment it seemed to me, that to look serenely from above and see the advances of God's kingdom on this Earth would be an intense joy; but I quickly had to check myself. Only He to whom a thousand years ar as one day, could look on without agonizing impatience, if in the future the advances of his kingdom ar to be slow as in the past. *If so*, then:

> "Quid æternis minorem
> Consiliis animum fatigas?"*

It is better to believe, than to watch inactivly.—But Hope, Faith and Charity all suggest, that the future advances will be more rapid, though Little Faith call the idea Quixotic.

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* "Why out-wear thy soul, unequal to Eternal Counsels?"—*Horace.*

SECTION XXXI.

WHAT IS IDENTITY?

No one can care for his own future life, unless he is convinced that his identity is preserved, when his soul is dis-embodied or re-embodied. To me no question is darker than "What is the test of Identity?" Practically it is by memory that each makes sure that he is the same person. This suffices, while the brain is in a normal state: but in a morbid state, as in an ugly dream, a man may hav false memories, so as to fancy he has committed crimes. Other anomalies of the insane ar attested: yet no one supposes that Identity is lost in such disease. Indeed if it were, much more would it be lost by death which dissolves the brain.

Moreover, memory of eighty or one hundred years on Earth is a very poor *capital* (so to speak) for a million years to come; not to embarrass ourselves with Eternity. To each adult his infancy is of no importance: scarcely any one identifies himself with what he was in his first three years. If the soul is to liv through vast ages, the events of human life ever dwindle in importance and the consciousness of Identity seems to evaporate. There is a terrible disproportion between the narrow limits of human life and the endless years that ar to follow. The more the mind dwells on this contrast, the more does the sober truth of the Greek Axiom impress me: *Whoever has a beginning of life has also an end.* He alone who, like his own Universe, is unlimited in Space and Time, can inherit a future Eternity. For us it remains to be *grateful* that he has given us that very noble gift,* Human Life, and absolutely to *trust* him with child-like confidence, when he recalls it.

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* "Glorious manhood," according to simple, genial Homer.

SECTION XXXII.

WHEN IS MORAL ARGUMENT ADEQUATE?

In the close of Section ix. it was remarked, that what force of moral argument will here be *adequate*, will be estimated differently by different minds. It seems, in this stage of our discussion, not amiss to observe, that the same difficulty is encountered, whenever *Miracle* is propounded. Inexperienced man lightly believes in miraculous tales. To giv to Joshua longer daylight for slaughtering a beaten enemy, seemed an adequate moral reason for arresting the Sun's movement in heaven. To manifest his controul of the elements, Jesus walked on the water of the Lake of Galilee. To deliver the host of Israel from Pharaoh, the waves of the Red Sea stood up like a wall to the right and to the left, and opened a passage through the depths. To minds which hav insufficient acquaintance with human inaccuracy and our vehement love of the marvellous, Miracle passes without severe scrutiny: yet experience teaches even the multitude how very ill we *(homunculi)* judge in what crisis a moral reason will be *adequate* with the Most High for breaking the continuity of his physical laws. Our wishes would multiply miracles a thousand-fold. This phenomenon might warn us, how wrong we all ar likely to go, if we imagin that we can *by our moral insight* survey physical law *from above*, and suggest corrections or exceptions which the Divine Author will find reasonable in the interest of morality.

I may be asked, Why did not this objection drawn from Miracle press on you earlier? I *suppose*, because of traditional doctrin imbibed as mother's milk. But human immortality was to me only a religious theory, not a personal, pressing question; hence, after saying my say, I was quickly absorbed in other ample lines of

thought and inquiry. Nevertheless, misgivings as to the fundamental Christian assumption ar with me of very old date.

SECTION XXXIII.

CONCLUSION.

In Section ix. above, I propounded that only if the moral argument for human immortality were unambiguous as well as weighty could it bring supplement and correction to the Physical Analogy which leans so strongly to the opposit side. My reasonings thirty years ago (quite sincere, though prompted by an eager desire to establish my case) differ so vastly from my present reasonings (equally sincere) that I find the moral argument to be undeniably *double-voiced*, and therefor to me inefficacious. In confessing this, I feel pain, especially through fear lest I seem to scorn a tenet very sacred to the piety of the moderns. Yet after all, I do but vindicate the old Hebrew doctrin against that "Oriental philosophy" which the Pharisees borrowed and Christianity *has passed on* to us by mere routine, in a miscellany of notions which we hav discarded as silly and noxious error. The creed of Isaiah and Jeremiah sets Religion on a simpler, surer basis, at once more popular and less offensiv to Scientists; on which also it is less liable to degenerate into sentimental unreality, selfishness, subtleties of theory, and contempt of this world as transient; while Events and our widest Knowledge proclaim that it is, not indeed Eternal, but an eminent type of Permanence. Such too was the sentiment of the Hebrew sages. But I still maintain, that Knowledge being inevitably limited, a margin beyond always exists for Opinion and Conjecture; an area which I call a Penumbra between Light and

Darkness. In this Penumbra for many long years I hav quite happily left this question. It will be at once understood, that I am not anxious to press anyone to quick decision on a topic with which I myself hav dealt so leisurely.

But here it occurs to me to digress. When I first heard that an esteemed American philosopher had pronounced it hard to decide whether Christianity had been to the world more beneficial or more pernicious, I thought the doubt to betoken a jaundiced mind. On further thought I concluded that under Christianity he comprized all the mischiefs and horrors of the Papacy, and, if so interpreted, he might not be wrong. But *now* in a new aspect the same doubt confronts me. For, the Christianity of Luther, Zuingle and John Wesley, equally with Romanism, has taught that all mankind ar born under the wrath of God, that this globe is early destined to fiery destruction, that no good is to be expected from it, (for neither sages nor saints can mend it,) and that future good will come only in a heavenly home, which Christ is gone to prepare. Necessarily, whoever *heartily* accepts this creed, regards labor for the improvement of this world useless. Its evil state being inevitable, he not only will not himself struggle for any fundamental change, but will use all his moral and religious influence to induce oppressed classes and nations to submit quietly to outrageous injustice from pretentious authority, under the belief that "in another world" all will be set right. How very unimportant is "the world which passes away"!— Has not such a creed played a fatal part to paralyse those efforts for *a better Present* which history recognizes as essential for improving this world ?

Thus on one point I am willing to utter a confident judgment. Belief in a Future Life becomes pernicious,

first, if the argument require us to disparage the present life, which is certainly God's work, and his only work directly known to us. To speak with contempt and despair of this world cannot glorify its Author. How much better judged the old Hebrew: "God saw that it was good." "All thy works praise thee, O God." *Again*, the belief is mischievous, if, as always hitherto, it divert good people from striving to tear up the *roots* of Evil. From the true Church ar due to the World, not a mere salving of wounds, as "mercy" to the wretched, but sounder bases of Society, to *prevent* Injustice, Impurity, Cruelty and Misery, hitherto dominant in spite of Christianity.

I hav heard of a good Scottish minister, who defined as the right object of life for each of us: "To leave this "World *better and bonnier* by reason of our having been "born into it." Clearly this is our divinely allotted task:—and he who is faithful in little, may be trusted with much. Our best preparation for another world, if we expect another world, is, by working for Justice and Mercy in this.

I thought I had here written my last line; but I see now that it remains to sum up, for simple truthfulness and for the convenience of anyone who may assail these pages. They assert that the doctrin of Heaven and Hell has its source, not in Christianity, much less in Judaism, but in a shallow and monstrous Oriental Theosophy. They plead that this doctrin is not only unproved, but unprovable; that the idea of Hell or fiery Purgatory is wholely pernicious, and that of Heaven (variously and on the whole) far from harmless.

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To those who hav pressed for *reprint* of matters Religious, Moral, Political and Literary from my pen, which were expected in continuation of *my Volume called "Miscellanies,"* I desire here to state that I hope soon to put forward at my own risk a second Volume wholely religious; but must wait for the co-operation of a Publisher to proceed any further.—F. W. N.

WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY WITHOUT CHRIST?

BY

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WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY WITHOUT CHRIST?

Hindoos are sometimes astonished to hear invectives from one or other zealous Christian against English education and English literature as "godless," when it has no definitely avowed theological creed. They insist, that even when the literature cautiously and purposely evades allusion to Christ and his teaching, it still is pervaded by Christian sentiment, winning the approval of some, but exciting the jealousy of others.

Christian writers, who have been accepted as standard advocates of the religion, have often boasted of peculiar excellence in its moral and spiritual tone. The morality of Aristotle and of the Stoics, they say,—great as the honour which each deserves on many accounts,—had special deficiencies, in part imputable to its standing aloof from religion. When God bore no part in it, man became too prominent, too self-sufficient. Their ideal of a perfect man differed sensibly from our ideal. Nobly self-sacrificing though he might be, his self-esteem was very perceptible and too conscious. The "magnanimous man" of Aristotle aspires to self-exaltation in forms which make him unamiable and almost absurd. The perfect man of the Stoics is to us too unemotional, too purely intellectual. Christian humility, as we name it, is at bottom only a sober and

reasonable measure of our own importance—necessarily small; yet it was hardly esteemed a virtue by the most eminently good heathens, nor had it any distinctive name: for its nearest Latin counterpart, *Modestia*, is not restricted to the quality which Christians name Humility; Meekness was certainly disesteemed. Further, it is claimed that our morality is pervaded by a spiritual element not often discoverable in the Socratic schools, and by a severer purity than any to which they aspired; also, that none of the Greeks—few indeed of the Romans—regarded all nations of men as brethren before God; but their patriotism unduly interfered with humanity. In short, these esteemed Christian advocates teach, as cumulative honour to the religion, that the disciples of the great Master breathe the spirit of the Master. Thus they permit us to infer, that the goodness of the Christian, as of the Christ—consisting (as it does and must) in something else than an orthodox creed—is felt without any talk about theology; inasmuch as it is a substantive moral essence, transcending the morality of antique philosophers.

If this be so, then to speak of "Christianity without Christ" is no paradox, no contradiction in terms, nothing that can deserve scoffs from the religious press of England. It *may* be true, that no man can attain Christian virtue without first believing the miraculous and unique supremacy of Jesus of Nazareth; but it is not an axiomatic truth. It needs proof to establish it. No one imagines that it is impossible to imbibe the moral virtues eminent in this or that school of philosophy without special beliefs concerning the person of the Founder. If such qualities commend themselves as virtues to the heart of Mankind, Man is naturally susceptible of them, and the paradox lies with those who deny that such virtues are attainable apart from the apparatus of miracle, and belief of things alien to common experience. Nay, as it was possible to *imitate*

Plato or Zeno without any belief that either teacher was supernatural, not even the zealous imitation of Christ at all obviously implies what is called "belief in Christ"; that is, belief that he was a miraculous personage, who in a coming High Day of the Universe will appear as the Divine Judge of living and dead.

For centuries back in Europe hundreds of pious souls have regarded the effort to imitate Christ as identical with an aspiration after all human virtue—an aspiration to obey God. Nor does this belong to the past only. With the majority of Christians it is an axiom, that the life of Jesus of Nazareth attained the highest point of human goodness, and that the more closely we follow in his steps, the more surely do we please God. The precept to imitate Jesus shows itself in literature for the first time in the epistles of Paul, who wrote to the Christians of Rome (xv. 2), "Let every one please his neighbour for good unto edification: for *even Christ pleased not himself.*" Apparently he then proceeds to reveal how he knew the fact—namely, from a Hebrew Psalm (lxix. 9); for he adds: "but, *as it is written*, the reproaches of them that reproached thee, fell upon *me*. For, whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we, through patience and comfort of the writings, might have hope." That is, the apostle referred them to the 69th Psalm to give them information of the personal qualities, which were predicted in Messiah, and *therefore* (no doubt) actually existed in Jesus. In writing to the Corinthians (2 Cor. x. 1) he does not distinctly call them to imitate Jesus, but (apparently) * he assumes them to know that Jesus was meek and gentle:

* Nevertheless, some will maintain, that as "the word of Christ" (Coloss. iii. 16) means only *Christian teaching*, not any definite words of Jesus, so "the gentleness of Christ" means only *Christian gentleness*. The Hebrew language is prone to use the genitive of a noun as a supplement for an adjective: as "O God of my righteousness," for, "O my righteous God." Hebraic Greek imbibed the idiom from Hebrew.

for he beseeches them "by the meekness and gentleness of Christ" not to drive him to extremities in acting against their disobedience. In his letter to the Philippians Paul exhorts them to have the same mind as was in Christ (ii. 5); but in what instantly follows we find that he does not allude to anything in the human conduct of Jesus humanly attested, but only to the mystical fact, that when the Messiah pre-existed in a superhuman state ("in a divine form"), he divested himself of it, and submitted to the lowly form of a man. On the whole, Paul seems thus to explain his avowal (2 Cor. v. 16) that though he once "knew Christ after the flesh," he no longer so knows him: that is to say,—once he took interest in Jesus, or cognizance of him, as a human person; now he is past that stage, and regards only his superhuman character.

Peter also in his first Epistle says (ii. 21), "Christ left us an example, that ye should follow his steps; who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth; who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, threatened not, but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously." Obviously, if you look to this as historical testimony, there is not much in it. If it had been attested by observers, that Jesus was free from sin and from guile, no other freedom from sin and from guile could be understood, than such as man might testify of man in a thousand other cases in every age. Most persons will believe that the apostle meant *more* than sinlessness which can be vouched for by observers. Surely he had not in mind the conduct outwardly visible, but the inward perfection piously ascribed to Jesus by Christian faith. That this was his meaning, is made almost certain by the words which follow, as quoted above—words which the margin of our Bibles and the consent of interpreters unhesitatingly refer to Isaiah liii That Jesus was free from sin and guile could not be established in any high and complete sense from even daily

contact with him. An observer must be all perfect himself, and all but a discerner of hearts, to bear valid testimony to the perfection of another. Peter did not learn the absolute moral perfection of *Jesus* from his own observation ; but he made sure of it, he had faith in it, because he interpreted a Hebrew prophet to say that *Messiah* had done no violence, neither was deceit in his mouth. That Jesus did not revile the soldiers who reviled him, nor threaten his judges, *may* have been known to Peter (who, according to Matt. xxvi. 58, was not actually present) by the testimony of others. But unless his logic was different from that of contemporary Christians, he "had the word of Prophecy, a surer attestation, as a light shining in a dark place" (2 Pet. i. 19), which told him that Messiah, "when oppressed and afflicted, opened not his mouth ;" not even when brought "as a lamb to the slaughter." Thus, in the mind of both Paul and Peter, as far as we can see, to imitate Jesus had no meaning properly historical. By meditation on prophecies which they applied to Messiah, or by studying the *ideal* of human virtue, they filled out to their imaginations, as best they might, the adult and perfect manhood, which (they inferred) *must* have been embodied in their Lord and Master, though, when he walked on this earth, Peter had most imperfectly discerned it. But, after all, the exhortations to imitate Christ are exceptional and almost isolated. In the writer to the Hebrews (who perhaps was Apollos) not so much as this appears. His Jesus has no other human trait than that of *suffering*, and thereby learning sympathy. The character is majestic, superhuman, ceremonial, or sacerdotal, with scarcely anything in it for us to imitate. The same remark applies to the Jesus of John the son of Zebedee, in the Apocalypse, and to the Jesus of John the Elder in his epistles. Nor in the epistles of James and Jude is any exhortation to imitate the human conduct of Jesus found. James, "the Lord's brother" and first Bishop of Jerusalem,

bids us to take *the patriarch Job* and *the prophets* as examples of goodness (καλοκἀγαθίας), and patience. Eminently noble and intensely moral as his epistle is—and of a colour wholly germane to the best precepts of the first three gospels—yet imitation of the human Jesus is no topic for him, any more than the cross and the resurrection, atonement by blood, justification by faith, or the pre-existence and divine nature of Christ.

The process of thought, which began with Paul and Peter before our gospels were written, has continued to the present day, nearly as if they had not been written. Disciples have not often attempted to imitate the actual conduct ascribed to Jesus in the narratives. They have taken a far better course in following their own highest convictions—or, let us say, the promptings of God's Spirit within them—and have moulded to their imagination the character of Jesus with a very superficial regard to the documents called historical. It is impossible to speak without sympathy and approval of the many pious men and women who have professed to take Jesus as the model of their conduct, and have, in fact, devoted themselves to a self-denying philanthropy. Guided by a noble instinct, they have picked out a few points from the gospel narratives to amplify and glorify, while passing over in silence many other and very significant portions. Accepting a few features, they have filled up their picture by bold and independent imagination of what *must* have been the conduct of a holy and heavenly being. Misgiving, if sometimes it arose from parts of the narrative, has been quieted by the theory that he had a supernatural insight into hypocrisy and wickedness; moreover, that he was meek and lowly in spirit has been accepted as fact, because he is said to have said it. Traditional and pictorial skill has given solidity and fixedness to the popular belief of the character of Jesus; so that those whom we *may* and *do* revere have rejoiced to call themselves not disciples only,

but *imitators* of Jesus. Nothing here is written against such Christians, who live according to the spirit, not according to the letter, of a book which they account sacred. Much less do I disparage the ideal of perfection, which I believe them to hold up to their imagination.

Nevertheless, there is a second side of the subject, which urgently demands attention, at which, nevertheless, very few are willing to look. The plain fact is, that the character of Jesus, *as actually drawn in the gospels*, abounds with manifest and grievous blots ; and of necessity, whenever a book is made sacred, its worst parts become more widely influential than its best. Hence, unless we destroy that reverence which forbids criticism and subjugates the mind, we cannot act against a pernicious influence. It is not here asserted that the gospel picture is true, nor yet that it is false, though in many details its inaccuracy is beyond reasonable doubt. But what is here pressed is, that *either* the picture drawn for Jesus is grossly false, so that the narrative deserves no reverence, but needs slow belief and severe criticism ; *else*, Jesus of Nazareth was not at all the equably perfect character which his disciples imagine, but (with whatever high and partial excellence) his whole mind was pervaded by a reprehensible fanaticism.

The first fact which I signalize is, the evil and odious result which follows, as soon as any one, accepting the letter of the precept, believes himself safe, if he imitate the conduct of Jesus as described in the gospels. The public press has recently told us of a Baptist minister in San Francisco, who has taken up the cause of a large body of workmen, *so called ;* men who will *not* work, except for such wages as they themselves dictate ; men who display ferocious cruelty to the Chinese because they work for less. The preacher severely attacks the avarice of capitalists, to which he imputes the stoppage of white labour, and asks them (in the words attributed to Jesus) *how they can escape*

the damnation of hell! No reason appears for doubting his sincerity and his belief that he is doing just the right thing in *imitating the Saviour*. Of course, he is condemned by a vast majority of the educated and the thoughtful. He is declared to be a conceited fool for thinking that because one who could see into men's hearts might pronounce stern and dreadful sentence on them, therefore every one of us may do the same thing. To this I give full assent; but surely, if even this case stood alone (and it does not at all stand alone), it would suffice to show how dangerous is the precept of imitating Jesus in the only sense in which rude and vehement intellects can understand it. If his position was unique, if his powers of discernment were unique, if his authority was perfect as his knowledge, if his task was wholly peculiar, then it is most improper to imitate him: none but a conceited man with a twist in his mind will do so, and the doctrine IMITATIO CHRISTI, for which so loud a trumpet has been blown, ought rather to be changed into "Beware of imitating one who was essentially unlike to us."

But the form of conduct persistently ascribed to Jesus in the gospels cannot be justified by any theory concerning his divine knowledge and power. No man can make sure how a really divine messenger, gifted with miraculous power and insight into the heart, would act; but, *unless* we are to sacrifice moral judgment, and become Pagans bowing blindly to Power moral or immoral—that is to say, *if* we are to venerate God as Benevolent and Wise—we necessarily are confident as to how his messenger would *not* act. He certainly would not *so* speak, as to lead his hearers, *while judging from the best morality and highest wisdom current among them*, of necessity to condemn him morally. If he chose to mask himself as a man, and dissemble his superhuman nature, he would take care not to present himself as one whose good behaviour was lower than the average,—one

extravagant in his language, enormous in his claims of superiority, scanty in expounding his position, bitter and fierce to all who were incredulous. Christian divines have debated, and will perhaps debate by the hour, whether Jesus did or did not rest his authority on his miracles. The epistles of Paul, Peter, and James may lead one to doubt whether these apostles had ever heard of Jesus as a worker of miracles: but it cannot be denied that in the gospels an immense stress is often laid upon them. Nevertheless, the three first narratives do not pretend that he ever worked miracles within cognizance of the rulers, or when asked for his authority. On the contrary, they represent him as casting out devils in distant places or by stealth, and forbidding those healed by him to reveal it; refusing to give a sign from heaven; indeed, stigmatizing those who asked for it as a wicked and adulterous generation (Matt. xii. 39, xvi. 4). When asked for proof of his authority to teach (Matt. xxi. 23), he does not reply that his unparalleled miracles are his evidence of divine authority, but he evades the question by asking them, What authority had John the Baptist? He thus puts himself on a par, as regards authority, with one who never professed to work nor was thought to work miracles. No one who will not grossly mutilate and garble these gospels, can reasonably deny that, according to them, Jesus often refused to give any external dazzling proof of his mission,—any proof cognizable to the senses and to the unspiritual mind. Hereby he assumed the position of one whose duty it was (in Paul's words) *to commend himself to men's consciences*. The fourth gospel, called John's, states that when asked for a "sign," he replied: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." Matthew represents the same words to have been imputed to him by *false* witnesses. John tells us, that he meant the temple of his body; but his interrogators could not so understand him. If he really replied thus,

they would innocently and confidently regard it as clear that he was an impostor, who made sure that they would not pull down the temple in order to see whether he could miraculously reinstate it. Matthew, moreover, plainly declares that Jesus could not do many miracles before certain persons (xiii. 58), *because of their unbelief;*—a decisive avowal that miracles were not the divine process for generating faith in the incredulous. Thus the only evidence on which the priests and elders could rest a belief in his divine mission was purely moral and spiritual; a fact which made it simply impossible that a really divine messenger should so act, as to appear not *superior* to ordinary men in moral goodness, but *inferior*. Inferior he would necessarily appear, if he uttered condemnations which nothing could justify but a divine insight into men's hearts. For the rulers were then left without any means of discovering his supereminent wisdom and virtue, and could not help regarding him as outrageous.

If we try to sum up from the gospels what outline of his character was presented to the priests and elders, we find simply thus much: that he had forsaken his trade of carpenter, and had become a wanderer in the land, not working for his livelihood as Paul afterwards did, but living as a religious mendicant; that he disowned his mother's claim on him, and had induced *twelve* men (Luke says *seventy* more) to become a sort of retinue of honour to him, two of them at least abandoning a parent at his call. No one can imagine that dry facts such as these had any cogent force to recommend him as Messiah or as a Prophet. But since he was largely known to be a teacher, nothing was left to commend him to men's consciences but his *words:* and it was of vital importance that his utterances should not be such as to revolt and repel those whom it was his task to win. If it would be utterly wrong for one of us to fling at men in authority and clergymen, with-

out proof, without ceremony, and without discrimination, such epithets as fools and blind, hypocrites, children of hell, vipers, whited sepulchres, and so on; then such a tone of address was morally impossible, alike to any wise man and to a divine messenger, whose task it was to win his hearers by appeal to their moral faculties. For, instead of attracting them by a manifestation of goodness, it would shock them all, lead to a universal and deep disapprobation, and drive into active hostility all who had not a marvellous forbearance seldom found in union with high office. No man not insane would so act, except with the purpose of exasperating them: hence it is inconsistent alike with a moderately wise man and with an incarnate God.

All this is so very manifest that reply seems impossible. But a learned Anglican divine has solemnly warned me that to sit in judgment on Jesus (he means, on the conduct ascribed to Jesus by anonymous writers of unknown date) is intrinsically inadmissible, because (says he) I cannot be quite sure that Jesus will not be my judge at the last day. If I may not use my moral faculties to judge of a book proffered as sacred, I am shut up into possible Paganism: there is no absurdity, no enormity, no impurity which I may not swallow. But I claim further that if Matthew be trustworthy, Jesus himself bids me sit in judgment on him. For he is made to say, "Beware of false prophets: ye shall know them by their fruits," &c. He virtually lays down for me *a general rule* that if any man come to me, professing to be a prophet from God, I must not be in a hurry to take him at his word, but must compare his professions with facts. This is to me the only honourable interpretation of his precept: but I told my learned monitor that if he chose to insist on another interpretation, I was aware that he could reason powerfully for it; namely, if he expounded the passage as follows:—"If any one, *except myself*, come to you as a prophet, be not quick to believe:

beware of him, especially if he praise himself; for this may be the sheep's clothing on a wolf. Compare his conduct with his pretensions. Examine whether he is simple and consistent, or confused, enigmatic, evasive, and a shifter of his ground, especially as to his claims of divine authority. If he extol his doctrine as unparalleled in wisdom, compare it severely with earlier teachings. If he avow that 'he is meek and lowly,' watch whether he is not arrogant and dictatorial, pleased with abject submission and prostration, haughty to simple questions, irritable, virulent in language, and immeasurably high in his claims. But, *observe carefully*, nothing of this applies to *my* claims. Never compare *my* professions with facts. Never suspect *me* when I praise myself. Never doubt *my* meekness, however irritable and foul-mouthed I may seem to be. Never criticize *my* precepts, however extravagant their aspect. Against those who criticize ME, the Queen of Sheba and the men of Nineveh shall rise up in judgment, and I MYSELF will disown them before my Father which is in heaven." He must be a very reckless and fanatical Christian who imputes to his Lord so dishonouring an interpretation of his words.

Many Christian controversialists indulge themselves in the fancy that it is the goodness and holiness of Jesus which alone raises opposition to the gospels. Truth and Holiness are indeed the two jewels which Religion is bound to enshrine and conserve; but for that very reason the criticism, which is by some slanderously called blasphemous, becomes essential to those who know the proneness of mankind to accept delusive pretensions, sham truth, sham holiness. As soon as we begin seriously to compare the conduct ascribed to Jesus with the notions of right which have world-wide acceptance, a moral shock is felt in chapter after chapter,—nor can the theory that he was an incarnate God in any case relieve the monstrosity. In Matthew and Luke he sends out deputies to preach; namely, the twelve

apostles in Matt. x., the seventy disciples in Luke x. In each case the moral features are the same. They are to recite the formula, "The kingdom of heaven is at hand, [or] is come nigh to you." On entering a town they are to salute a house in hope that it may be "worthy." If they are not received, Jesus declares (Matt. x. 14, Luke x. 11) that in the day of judgment that city will be accounted *more guilty than Sodom and Gomorrha*. "He that receiveth *you* (he adds) receiveth *me*, and he that receiveth *me* receiveth HIM that sent me." Surely such utterances, so far from being wise and admirable, are unjust and irrational! No man becomes a messenger from God by repeating a parrot phrase, "The kingdom of heaven is at hand." If a member of Mrs. Girling's sect knock at our door, and utter some such formula, and we shut the door in his face, are we less guilty than these cities of Israel? or why less guilty? Jesus tells us—It is because HE sent these messengers! If He was really a superhuman being, yet chose to maintain a disguise, it was foolish and immoral in him to complain that common men were blinded by the disguise. Yet through the whole narrative this tone runs. Every one is accounted impious who does not by a mysterious instinct see through the mask. Every one who is quick to believe in his vast superiority is extolled as pious: in Luke even a harlot's affection for him is avowed to earn forgiveness for her sins (Luke vii. 42, 47).

While it is open to a theorist to allege that if a Son of God came down from heaven to teach authoritatively, he would never come in disguise, that is not the argument here adopted. But what I maintain to be incredible is, that an incarnate God, after hiding himself under the mask of manhood, *should reason evasively, scold impotently*, and *escape from the scene of life furtively*. Paul holds up to us a beautiful outline of the teacher who comes in God's name (2 Tim. ii. 24): "The servant of the Lord must not strive,

but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, enduring of evil [men or things] ; in meekness instructing opponents, if God peradventure may give them repentance to the acknowledgment of the truth." Paul disapproves of striving (*μάχεσθαι*) ; would he approve of scolding? and of railing? of heaping up epithets more offensive than any flung out by our bitterest political wranglers? and this, as far as appears, without provocation, and without moral result. To Pharisees and Teachers of the Law they could appear as nothing but outpourings from a malignant heart. Gentleness, candour and patience to inquirers are not visible even once in these narratives. Jesus is made uniformly obscure, abrupt, enigmatic, evasive to questioners. Nay, Matthew tells us (xiii. 10—15) that Jesus confidentially explained to his disciples that he did not intend the multitudes to understand him, and purposely spoke to them in enigmas, which he knew must be unintelligible. Would then Paul have accounted him "apt to teach"? When one of his own disciples asked him, whether his precept was addressed to them in particular, or to every one, a direct and simple reply might have seemed inevitable (Luke xii. 41) ; nevertheless, only an oracular response, as dark as from the cavern of Pytho, is elicited ; a response in the form of an interrogation : "Who then is that faithful and wise steward, whom his lord shall make ruler over his household?" words which do not shed a ray of light on Peter's natural and reasonable doubt. If a question was put to Jesus by any religious but educated man, neither a civil nor an instructive reply could be counted on ; so prevalent is the imputation to him of insult and defiance when any invested with authority wanted from him reasons and proof. Hearers who desire to be his submissive disciples do not fare much better, at least in Luke. Jesus called out to one, "Follow me ;" and when he replied, "Lord (or sire), suffer me first to go and bury my father,"

Jesus is made to reply heartlessly, "Let the dead bury their dead, but go thou *and preach the kingdom of God.*" Another said, "Lord, I will follow thee, but let me first go and bid farewell to them which are at home in my house;" yet he did but elicit an unsympathetic and harsh answer. *Heartlessly* imperfectly expresses the gross offence here offered to the primary moralities of life, to family affection and duty: and for what object? If the nameless disciple had been a Paul, what damage to "the kingdom of God" would have ensued by his spending two or three hours at a father's funeral? But (forsooth) only the dead in soul are to bury the dead in body! If Mohammed had given utterance to such precepts, Christians would call them outrageous and brutal.

Nothing can be more evasive than the treatment of questioners by the Jesus of the narrators, as—in regard to the urgent and painful doubt, whether allegiance to a foreign prince was not positively forbidden by Deut. xvii. 15. Again, when asked what was his authority or title to Messiahship, he was bound to instruct the people mildly, if the current expectation of signs and wonders was an error. Nothing can be darker or less consistent with simplicity than his systematic application to himself of the title "Son of Man," a title which could be at will either pressed as Messianic, or explained away as unassuming. Nothing would be less creditable than the answer, "Destroy this temple," ascribed to him in John ii. 19, whether he had or had not a secret double sense. No subtle wrangler in a school least honoured for candour can outdo the sophistry which defended "I give unto them eternal life; I and God my Father are one," by the plea that in Hebrew poetry leaders are styled gods (John x. 28—36). The whole tissue of conduct ascribed to him is such as cannot be justified by a purely moral critic, whatever his theory concerning the person of Jesus. Moral criticism will either dishonour the narrative as grossly in-

accurate and virtually slanderous, or will pronounce that Jesus was neither a prophet from heaven nor an immaculate man. To forbid criticism is a cheap defence.

Theodore Parker in America adopted the double method of disbelieving the narrative in one part, but believing it and censuring Jesus in other parts. It is not here contended that such attempts to recover the historical facts are wholly and necessarily vain. But every thoughtful person, every mature mind, might be expected to see the impossibility of winning general acceptance for a narrative, if after 1800 years it needs to be conjecturally patched up and worked into harmony with our more advanced moral perceptions. To correct, cancel, and re-write documents of the past until a character depicted in them is made ideally perfect according to our notions of perfection, certainly cannot aid or exalt our morality: what historian of repute will admit that it can aid us to historical truth? No end whatever seems attained by our toil. No man can base Morals or Religion on even the most perfect History; much less on narratives full of misapprehensions and needing multifarious expurgation. Still, if a rising school in England with which I feel warm sympathy will execute that task which its Highest Genius declares to be needful, it may be my duty to reconsider some matters. At present it is a more urgent duty to take to heart the moral certainty, that the millennial sufferings of the Jewish nation from the cruel injustice of Christians are largely due to the one-sided utterances diffused through these gospels.

I am told, that to censure the Jesus herein depicted is a mean, not to say malignant, undertaking; prosaic and adverse to spirituality. But Justice never can be unspiritual, be it ever so prosaic. It is surely *more* malignant to believe easily that the ancient nation, on whose piety we still continue to feed, were both intensely stupid and gratuitously wicked, and that their teaching made their heathen converts

children of hell (Matt. xxiii. 15), than to account legend writers credulous or one man fanatical, whichever may be our alternative. Let us try to recite the undeniable facts of the case,—the crimes attributed to the adversaries of Jesus. The cardinal fact is his crucifixion, to which Pagan writers allude, as undoubtedly inflicted by the Roman Governor. Crucifixion was not a Jewish punishment, nor did Roman policy allow to the Jews power over life and death: hence the direct and chief responsibility rests with Pontius Pilate. If any one was guilty, he was the chief criminal. But, according to all the four narratives, Pilate was most unwilling to condemn Jesus, and acted under fear of being accused at Rome of injudicious lenity. This implies that Jesus had committed himself to conduct which ostensibly was the first step of insurrection: nothing less could make it dangerous for Pilate to acquit him; and herewith all the narratives are in entire harmony. The tale in this part is self-consistent, and agrees with probabilities. Moreover, this is precisely that part of the narrative which Tradition was most competent to transmit accurately. Besides the immediate friends and disciples of Jesus, many inhabitants of Jerusalem, who soon after were converts, must have personally known the details of Pilate's judgment, and were sure to remember them to their lives' end. For full forty years, evangelists had great facility for gathering sound knowledge on the question, "For what alleged crime was Jesus crucified?" And the tale runs thus:—Jesus, in order to exhibit himself as fulfilling a prophecy of Zechariah (ix. 9) concerning a king of Jerusalem, who was to have dominion from sea to sea, had ridden into Jerusalem on an ass over garments spread in the road amid triumphal branches, while a very great multitude shouted to him as King of Israel and Son of David. Several deadly revolts had cost the Romans much blood and anxiety, and in all of them religious zeal had held the torch of war. In consequence,

Roman jealousy of religious movements in Judea was intense, and Pilate needed full proof that Jesus was *not* aiming at royalty, as others had done, before he dared to acquit him. He made several attempts to elicit from Jesus a renunciation of the title, "King of the Jews;" but could get nothing out of him but what appeared to be an obstinate assertion and retention of the title. For when asked, "Art thou the King of the Jews?" (Matt. xxvii. 11.) Jesus answered, "Thou sayest it;" which in that idiom is interpreted, "You have hit the exact mark." But after confessing thus much, Jesus refused all explanation, and became (what a Roman would call) contumaciously silent. By this refusal to exculpate himself from the imputed guilt of rebellion, he deprived Pilate of all arguments for saving him. But according to the narratives, Pilate was still uneasy in conscience, and, if we accept the tale, seems to have tried to save his life, even after condemning him to the cross. The title, "King of the Jews," was written over him, obviously to warn future insurgents; yet what Pilate inwardly thought is clearly enough suggested, and may be supplied as follows: "Stupid wretch! I did what I could to save him. He insists on calling himself King of the Jews, and will not add a word to strengthen me against accusation, and enable me to prove that he is *no* insurgent. Since he rushes on his fate, he deserves his fate. Yet I will try to save his life, for he seems a sheepish fanatic—no warrior. I will have him taken from the cross as early as I decently can, and will give him up to his friends. *Perhaps* they will restore him, and, after the taste of crucifixion, he will be a soberer and better man."

What judgment may be passed upon Pilate, in comparison with average Romans, for the part which he is said to have played, is of very minor importance; but our judgment concerning the conduct ascribed to Jesus himself, and to the Jewish rulers, is really important. Unless the narrators

grossly deceive us, Jesus was a deliberate accomplice in his own death, by refusing to explain an ambiguous phrase and ambiguous acts. When a man has done nothing at all ambiguous, and perceives that his death is determined on, he may afford to be too proud to exculpate himself. But when his judge desires to set him free, and wants only a few words of frank avowal that no insurrection was intended, then to refuse those necessary words and hereby drive his reluctant judge into deadly severity, is surely a greater sin than to rush upon death by one's own direct act. The man who stabs himself or drowns himself does not implicate another in his guilt, as does the fanatic in quest of martyrdom. The effort "to imitate Jesus" bore abundant fruit in this respect; but, in particular, the conduct attributed to so eminent a bishop as Ignatius may be here alluded to. While he was on his way towards Rome, where he expected (or rather hoped) to be put to death as a Christian, he is believed to have written to friends there, imploring them *not* to use influence in high quarters to save him, *lest they deprive him of the crown of martyrdom!* And this conduct has not lessened admiration of him in the Christian Church to this day. Such influence has IMITATIO CHRISTI.

But what of the Jewish elders? That the High Council did accuse Jesus, I suppose no one will doubt; and since they could neither wish nor expect the Roman Governor to make himself judge of their sacred law, it becomes certain that their accusation was purely political, and took such a form as this: "He has accepted tumultuous shouts that he is the legitimate and predicted King of Israel, and in this character has ridden into Jerusalem with the forms of state understood to be royal and sacred; *with what purpose*, we ask, if not to overturn *our* institutions and *your* dominion?" If Jesus spoke, at the crisis which Matthew represents, the virulent speech attributed to him in Matt. xxiii., we may well believe that this gave a new

incentive to the rulers; for it is such as no Government in Europe would overlook or forgive; but they are not likely to have expected Pilate to care for any conduct which might be called an ecclesiastical broil. The assumption of royalty was clearly the point of their attack. Even the mildest man among them may have thought his conduct dangerous and needing repression. How many of them pushed revenge to the bitter end and worked on Pilate's fears, the gospels do not affect to know, nor can we conjecture. Royal jealousy in England has perpetrated so many cruel murders, that Englishmen acquainted with their national history are bound to judge as mildly of those Priests and Teachers of the Law as they judge concerning our Sovereigns and Statesmen who have been confronted with alarm of insurrection.

It is not rare for writers and speakers to call Jesus a *martyr for truth:* they mean, a victim to his proclamation of truth. But this is in violent opposition to the only detailed accounts which have come down to us. In them he makes himself a victim by claiming a mystical title, which, if he had explained it to be *merely* mystical, would no more have frightened or offended Pontius Pilate or Tiberius Cæsar than the claim of a conceited Stoic to be a king, while other men were slaves. Much rather, it was by proclaiming a *half* truth, and refusing so to expound it as to hinder its suggesting an *entire falsehood*, that he made himself a victim: a very slender foundation to build on, in proof that he was a martyr for truth. Most certain it is, that to imitate the silence imputed to Jesus, when brought before a public tribunal for conduct ambiguous and suspicious, would in modern Europe be esteemed fanatical guilt. Paul may have believed nothing of this account: for he lived and died before our gospels were written. His method of sitting loose to historical attestations has at least the advantage, that, in striving to imitate Christ, one is not

led into the ditch by a blind evangelist; but each man aims at his own highest ideal of perfection.

The practical precepts in which Paul, Peter, and James agree, have very noble elements, moral and spiritual, which, having once become acknowledged over the breadth of Europe as our highest ideal of right, will never be forgotten, never will be permanently depreciated. Jews hold to them, as loyally as Christians: if Christian nations *acted* on them, the feud of Moslem and Christian would not be perpetual. This "sacred tradition" has in itself a glorious vitality, which Christians may unblameably entitle immortal. But it certainly will not lose in beauty, grandeur, or truth, if all the details concerning Jesus which are current in the gospels and all the mythology of his person be forgotten or discredited. Christianity will remain without Christ.

This formula has in it nothing paradoxical. Rightly interpreted, it simply means: *All that is best in Judæo-Christian sentiment, moral or spiritual, will survive, without Rabbinical fancies, cultured by perverse logic; without huge piles of fable built upon them; without the Oriental Satan, a formidable rival to the throne of God; without the Pagan invention of Hell and Devils.*

A friend who, on the whole, agrees with the argument of these pages, adds the following "reserve." He jealously insists, that it is *a rational hypothesis* that the *real* Jesus was a man of great spiritual gifts, a sort of St. Francis Assisi; that he may have popularized certain spiritual ideas heretofore existing only in an esoteric form in Palestine, and that the floating tradition of the character may have won Paul to the Nazarene sect. I am not aware that I have here written a word against such hypothesis. To myself indeed, as I have elsewhere insisted,* it is clear that Paul's morality rose *high above* that attributed by Church tradition to Jesus. If we have actually no trustworthy

* Especially in a tract called "Religion, not History."

details of the life and death of the latter, all are at liberty, with perfectly good logic, to attribute hypothetic qualities to him, within the limits of human nature. Yet I cannot see any religious importance in speculations concerning a merely possible past. Men of common cultivation in this nineteenth century—if we except eccentric minds capable of welcoming delusion, novel or ancient—will not try to base an historical religion upon possibilities where facts are unknown. If indeed the gospel according to the Hebrews came suddenly to light, and if therein it appeared that the conduct of Jesus was quite different from that which is imputed to him in our four gospels, and his moral precepts were therein as pure and lofty as those of Aristotle and Paul, instead of the low self-seeking prevalently inculcated by Jesus in Matthew and Luke; if moreover it appeared, that in that earliest narrative no blame whatever could be attached to Jesus by the severest moral criticism, I most sincerely profess that the discovery would give me personal relief. But while conceding that my friend's "hypothesis" is *rational*, I cannot pretend that any known phenomena make it *probable* that the real conduct of Jesus to the rulers of his nation, or his mode of alternately dissembling and claiming Messiahship, or the ground and character of his moral precepts, or his behaviour to Pilate, were more unblameable, wiser, and purer than our evangelists represent. Much rather do I side with the received belief, that out of numerous attempts to record the life of Jesus, the sound moral instinct of the Church selected the noblest and purest. The existing apocryphal gospels give no suggestion that narratives no longer existing depicted a more faultless character. Converts raised under the teaching of Paul—I may add of Peter, if a single document be a sufficient specimen of Peter's moral heart—were *extremely unlikely*, in my opinion, when a nobler and more faultless character of

Jesus was presented to them in an earlier gospel, to reject the better (nay, so trample it into contempt, that it became utterly lost), and then consecrate reverently narratives less truthful, and morally less free from objection. And who can believe that a religion claiming world-wide acceptance was in any sense supernatural, if no guarantees were taken that its Founder and his precepts were truly represented to the world? The "powers of hell," according to this hypothesis, not only dilapidated the Church, but tore up the foundations irreparably in about a century and a-half after the death of the Founder.

I have often been asked, sometimes very sarcastically, how it happens that it is reserved to *my* keenness of sight to discover in Jesus errors and failures which have hitherto escaped notice from the avowed opponents of Christianity. My sufficient reply is, that I know no reason to think that any who at all studied the gospels were less keen-sighted than I am. Catholic enemies of Christianity, like Voltaire, knew the religion through the Church, not through the books which we call the New Testament, which, so far as known, would seem to them, as to the first Protestants, simply a valuable aid against Catholic Sacerdotalism. Their natural process was to flout the pomp of bishops by the poverty of Jesus, and the policy of their warfare led them to disparage the morality of the Church by exalting the virtue of its Founder. I am not aware whether Voltaire was a diligent student of the gospels, but I easily believe that disgust at French Cardinals, and other dignitaries of the Church, made him enjoy the attacks of Jesus on the priests of his day. "*A man of genius*, and of low birth, bravely defying and denouncing a PRIESTHOOD," is an object at once captivating to certain minds, which admire Pagan bravery more than Christian meekness. All "hero-worshippers," perhaps, are of this class. They never pretend that their hero is morally immaculate,

and, in judging of a hero, seldom apply a high moral standard.

But nothing of this is my main and decisive reply to the sarcasm. The certain fact is that the outrageous cruelty of Christians made it unsafe for Deists and other unbelievers or half-believers to speak frankly and fully. Voltaire had grieved over the horrible fate of a Frenchman, whose tongue was judicially torn out of his throat for the offence of speaking irreverently of the Virgin Mary. Was it likely that any criticism on Jesus which the Church rulers of that day could interpret as speaking evil of him (that is, "blaspheming" him) would be treated more gently? I easily believe, that, had I lived in the last century under that French rule with my present mind, I should have concluded reticence, so far as truth allowed, concerning the moral weaknesses of the gospels, to be truer wisdom than utterances too frank for the age to bear. As for our English writers, neither Jews nor other unbelievers had secure toleration here, if their free writing stirred up animosity. Christians complain that Gibbon does not argue openly, but *sneers*—the truth being that, because of Christian intolerance, Gibbon had to avoid whatever might in a court of law have been termed blasphemy. To deny the Trinity or the Deity of Jesus was a penal offence by English law until more than a tenth part of this century was past. Gibbon's history did not carry him to the personal life or precepts of Jesus; but no English Deist in the past was free from terror of the wicked laws. Only in more recent times, through the notorious abounding of extreme unbelief, no attorney-general is eager for the heavy task of prosecuting it. Where scientific Atheism is rife, Jews and other Theists are small game to fly at. Therefore we have now immeasurably more freedom of speech than was enjoyed in past centuries.

But I have something more to add,—a single fact, yet a

very suggestive one. Some years ago I was in a rather large company of strangers, when a gentleman came up to me and gave his name, Dr. ——, a physician; then proceeded to speak as follows:—"Since I read something which you have written, I have wished for an opportunity to tell you in private what I have long believed. I take up the Gospels from a medical point of view. I do not think we have the means of knowing the causes which perverted the mind of Jesus, but I am convinced that he was (at least in the later stage) *insane;* whether from vigils and fastings,* or from agitation of mind and elation concerning Messiahship, I do not pretend to know. But unless I believed him to have been strictly insane, I should have to pass the gravest judgment on his conduct." I have never heard that this thoughtful physician ever imparted to the world the conviction which he opened thus confidentially to me. If the law-courts no longer prosecute for heresy or blasphemy, yet any avowal of total unbelief is apt to damage success in a profession, and to bring on fanatical outcry in a political career. Very few love martyrdom, and those few are fools. Christians have no right to demand much free speaking in adversaries, while Christian zeal punishes in pocket and position those emphatically who speak freely. Moreover, in every family, it is painful to be too frank. Nor have Christians a right to expect that those who think historical Christianity to be manifestly baseless or pernicious, will study the Christian documents carefully enough to be competent for their minute discussion. Surely here is abundant explanation why all free criticism of the character emblazoned in the four gospels now appears new.

All who call themselves Free Christians know the evils inflicted upon us by Christian Mythology. With it the vast

* A friend reminds me that Jesus is represented as *not* fasting. Certainly not in obedience to ecclesiastic routine: but if he worked at expulsion of demons, and believed fasting to be an essential condition of success in difficult cases (Matt. xvii. 21), he is likely to have fasted often and much.

majority of pulpits are so pre-occupied, that *Morals can scarcely be taught.* In the Sunday-schools Jewish and Christian tales are too apt to drive out common and necessary moral teaching; yet most ministers are jealous of other moral teaching than their own, so that our boys grow up disgracefully ill-taught as to daily duty, and constantly are pests to a neighbourhood beyond anything reported even of Islam and Pagans. While the four gospels are nationally revered, Free Christians will always dread, with very good reason, that their children will relapse into the errors which the parents have abandoned; and much time and energy of *their* pulpits will be exerted in fencing off this danger. Until the four gospels are displaced from the sacred position most gratuitously awarded to them, there will be no stable progress of truth. As in the battle with Paganism, Idols must be broken, if Idolatry is to be overthrown.

THE END.

ENGLISH

INSTITUTIONS

AND THEIR MOST

NECESSARY REFORMS.

A CONTRIBUTION OF THOUGHT

BY

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Where materials are vast, conciseness may be accepted by the Reader as a compliment to his intellect, not as a dogmatism. Whatever the colour of his political creed, let him consent for half an hour to suspect fallacy in his customary axioms. No one judges freely who does not think freshly.

ENGLISH INSTITUTIONS

AND THEIR MOST

NECESSARY REFORMS.

THERE are times in national history, at which the urgent business of the classes in power is, to increase the number of citizens loyal to the constitution: then, what seems to be a great democratic move, may be made simply to avoid civil war. Such was the crisis of 1832: such might have been that of 1848. But, in spite of insurrection successful in Sicily, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, the English aristocracy in the latter year judged stiff and total resistance safer than any concession; relied on our hatred of anarchy; and by rallying the middle classes round the standard of legality, quickly dissipated all fear of Insurgent Reform. That lesson has not been lost on Conservatives. Our wealth is more massive, our thriving class reaches lower, in 1865 than in 1848. Education has spoiled political aspirants for revolutionists. Let Reformers therefore take to heart, that they have no chance now of succour from the influences which carried the Reform Act of 1832. If they are to have any organic changes, great or small, they must *persuade* the actual holders of constitutional power, and not forget the House of Lords: otherwise, they do but waste their effort.

For the reforms urged in these pages I would plead with equal simplicity before the House of Lords or before an assembly of Chartists. The

arguments would differ in their relative importance, but would never need to be dissembled. The nuisances which have to be abated, bring evil to every political order and class of the nation, though the weakest part of the nation of course suffers most from them.

Where the object of a great national reform is, to strengthen one Order by lowering another; to humiliate the pride of a dynasty or of a peerage; or to enforce some large sacrifice of pecuniary means :—the nature of the proposed change cannot be disguised. Undoubtedly much strong language is heard among us against aristocracy and in favour of democracy, which, taken to the letter, might seem to imply that aristocracy, in its legitimate sense, is to be depressed and stript of honour. But in fact *bureaucracy* and *centralization* are the real foes, both of them hostile to the genius of the constitution in former days, and in no way closely allied to aristocracy as such. Centralization has come in from Continental Despotism, from the first French Revolutionists, and largely from the writings of Bentham, as I understand. Bureaucracy has been ever on the increase through the enormous extent of the empire, and the immensity of power devolving on the ministry of the day ; while Parliament is too slow in learning facts to be any adequate check. The House of Peers, as an Order, has no interest in bureaucracy, and none in centralization. Hence without a shadow of paradox, and with perfect straightforwardness, I maintain, that from a true Conservative point of view our nation has to retrace many wrong steps and make many right ones, quickly and boldly.

Not that it is paradoxical to hold, that in certain cases it is for the true interest and true honour of a ruling class—just as to a despotic king—to have new checks put on its power. No man is to be congratulated that his baser passions can bear sway over him without restraint ; and no party, no

ministry, no Order of the State, is stronger or more honourable, when its less wise or less virtuous members can assume the guidance of it. Whatever from without bridles them, is a real strength to the party or Order, and will tend to its permanent honour.

In a pamphlet already widely disseminated, I have avowed my conviction, that to extinguish all future creation of *hereditary* peers is the first needful step of reform. But it is equally my conviction that this may be so done, and ought to be so done, as to make us all proud of the House of Lords, strengthen its efficiency, and in no way impair *practically* its hereditary character, which (under rightful modifications) I know how to value.

The course which Whig-Radical Reform has hitherto taken has greatly frightened many reasonable Conservatives: I maintain that it ought also to displease, if not alarm, all sincere and reasonable Radicals,—because *it tends to bring us to the French goal, not to the American goal.* With a Central authority preponderating so enormously over our Local; a Parliament by the side of which every Municipality is a pigmy; a Ministry, wielding an executive so vast, while our Mayors and Lord Mayors have sunk into pageants;—every step of change which merely extends the Parliamentary franchise, is a step towards a system in which it is decided by universal suffrage once in 7 years, what oligarchy shall be our despotic rulers. A Reform in the direction of restoring the essential principles of the old English Constitution ought not to frighten Conservatives: a reform to re-establish what through total change of circumstances is now unsuitable, ought not to be desired by Radicals. I cannot but feel that it is a popular fallacy to say, that because the original Parliament was elected by universal suffrage, therefore the same thing is now proper. Admit for the moment that the fact was as is

asserted: yet the different functions needed from the modern Parliament demand far wider political information and intelligence in its electors. The existing system is confessedly inadequate to the nation: Tories and Whigs have avowed it, nor am I defending things as they are. But before we enter on a course which must become a mere question of strength, and may convulse us—not by civil war, but by bitter discontents and impaired patriotism—more deeply than any one yet knows; let thoughtful men of all sides be willing to reconsider the entire position of things.

§ 1. Before judging what reforms we need, we must consider what grievances exist. I enumerate under six heads the greatest of our organic evils and sorest of our dangers.

1. *Our wars made immorally.**—War is crime on the greatest scale, except when it is a necessary measure of police for a commensurate object of justice. No man can be hanged or deprived of his property without the solemn verdict of men sworn to uphold the right: yet we bombard cities, depose princes, take possession of territory, drive families into beggary, without any previous public hearing or public deliberation; without any verdict of justice; at most by the vote of a secret cabinet, *not* sworn to prefer the just to the convenient; nay, the thing may be done at the will of one or two men in Asia, without orders from England, or by the hot-headedness of a commodore; yet be ratified and followed up, barely because it would hurt our pride to disown it. These wars disgrace our ruling classes

*List of Queen Victoria's wars.—War of Canada,—of Syria,—of Affghanistan,—of Scinde and Moultan,—two Punjaub wars,—two Caffir wars,—war of Assam,—war of Burma,—three Chinese wars,—Persian war,—Russian war,—war of Japan,—New Zealand wars,—war of Bhootan,—besides wars internal to India or Ceylon, little wars in West Africa, and in South America. Of all these wars *only one* (that of Russia) received previous mature consideration and had national approval; and *only one* (the first Punjaub war) was a war of defence against a foreign invader. Even that invasion was caused by our aggression and conquest of Scinde.

to the foreigner and bring upon them diplomatic humiliations. To the poor of this country they are the direst and most incurable of evils, entailing and riveting upon them all their depression. If there be a government of God on earth, no nation can afford to make wars of cupidity or of pride.

This first grievance implies that Parliament is no adequate check on the Ministry, and that the Ministry has no adequate control on its distant subordinates, in the matter of extra European war.

2. *Our administrative inefficiency.*—At the time of the Crimean mismanagements, there was great outcry for administrative reform: it is not needful here to do more than allude to the monstrous and frightful facts which so harrowed the mind of Earl Russell, then in the cabinet as Lord John Russell. But in that great war, our Admiralty postponed to build the gunboats wanted for the Baltic in 1854 and 1855: built in preference great ships which were not needed, and finally completed the gunboats by 1856 after peace was made.—In the last four years, the United States Admiralty, beginning from nothing in their docks and almost nothing on the seas, have built fleets adequate to their vast war; with 2000 miles of coast to blockade and great flotillas on the rivers. It has been done for less cost in gold, than that which our Admiralty has expended in the same four years of peace: yet at this moment we hear the outcry, that our ships and guns are inferior to the American. On such details I cannot pretend to knowledge; but it is needless to prove that the incompetence of the Admiralty is a chronic fact in England. Even the French Admiralty has commented on it.—Now if the Admiralty is inefficient, is the War Office or Civil Service likely to be better, when the Admiralty is precisely the organ on which it is hereditary with all English statesmanship to pride itself?

The second grievance implies that Parliament

has no adequate control over Ministerial incapacity or favouritism.

3. *The state of Ireland.*—Lord Macaulay declared Ireland to be the point at which the empire is always exposed to a vital stab. No one will pretend that Ireland is flourishing, or is loyal, or that the members of the London Parliament have confidence in their own understanding of Irish questions. A population larger than that of some European kingdoms, inhabiting a separate island—yet close to us—predominantly of a foreign race, very many of them still speaking a foreign tongue, differing also in religion; is not easy to govern wisely, and cannot be permanently disaffected without grave mischief to us all. Thirty thousand soldiers to overawe the Irish, are a display to the world, that we still hold the island as a conquest, and cannot trust them as fellow citizens. The prohibition of volunteer soldiers tells the same tale. Meanwhile the prime of the labouring classes emigrate, and propagate hatred against us in America.

This grievance has lasted long enough to make it clear, that the imperial Parliament is an inefficient organ for Ireland, and that the Irish members are inefficient or damaging for English legislation. The Irish Parliament ought to have been reformed, not destroyed.

4. *The state of Established Churches.*—Five-sixths of the population of Ireland are Dissenters: so is a very large fraction of Wales. Half of England is in Dissent, and no effort has ever been made to bring back the most numerous body (the Wesleyans) who on principle approve of a State Church. Scotland is in a wonderful position through the destruction of her Parliament. The articles of Union are expounded to mean, that the Imperial Parliament is bound forever to support the Westminster Confession of Faith, (which never was the faith of England) whether Scotland believe it or not.

Two successive vast schisms have rent away masses of population from the Established Church; the latter in our own day, under Dr. Chalmers, who was a vehement advocate for State Churches.

It is not my part to lay down that State Churches are right or wrong: but I understand two characteristic boasts of "Conservatives" to be,—the House of Lords and the State religion. *Each of these is in secular decline under the existing routine*, and must continue to decline, if it be felt to obstruct, not to invigorate, national life. In the abstract, I do not dissemble my own preference for territorial Churches over Sects; but the example of the United States proves that Sectarianism is less hurtful in the absence than in the presence of a Sectarian Church Establishment. Thus we manage to get at once the worst evils of both systems.

This topic suggests that the attempt at *uniformity* is the wreck of state religion. Indeed, in the case of Scotland uniformity is sacrificed, but in just the most mischievous way,—that of enacting an ever unchangeable creed. Populations in a different mental condition demand diversity in teachers and in religious worship. These need local adjustment by local assemblies, on which, at most, a veto alone should be reserved to the central legislature.

5. *The state of our Peasantry.*—Almost from the beginning, the peasantry have found the Parliament to be an unfriendly organ. Under Edward III. their wages were fixed by law, and they were punished if they refused to work. For four centuries and a half they were forbidden to make their own bargains. Who can imagine that a Parliament of landlords which thus treated them would not make the laws of land unfairly favourable to landlords? Yet such laws are treated as sacred and unchangeable. At present, in Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England, we find the actual cultivators of the soil to be worse off than in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Hungary, or

(at length) than in Russia; nay, in a far less thriving and happy condition than in the little island of Guernsey. In Guernsey and in Belgium land is scarcer than in England, in America it is far more abundant; yet in each extreme the peasantry are better off than with us. We have evidently to adjust the arrears of six centuries' oppression. Who can hope that evils of that antiquity will be cleared off by the old machinery?

6. *The incompetency of Parliament to do its duties to India.*—The English empire is a vast machine of three parts. First, the United Kingdom, with outlying military posts. Secondly, the true English Colonies, which contribute to us neither men nor money, yet have to be defended against dangers real and imaginary. Thirdly, the perilous splendour of India, where 150 millions are subjected to the Queen's direct rule, and thereby to her Parliament. To these add 30 millions at home, and you find 180 millions which have to be watched over by a single supreme legislature. Nor only so: but 50 millions more of Indians, through their princes, are in subordinate alliance to the Queen. These princes are liable to be dethroned by the pen of the Queen's Secretary. To all such, the appeal for justice lies to the British Parliament.

It is but the other day, that an Indian prince appealed against an executive decree which had deprived him of his royalty and thereby ejected all his countrymen and kinsmen from high office. His cause came before Parliament and was voted down by ministers and placemen. Without assuming that the vote was unjust, it may be judged monstrous to eject all natives from high office because their prince has misbehaved. In any case, Indians will never become loyal to British rule, if their appeals against the local executive are heard, not in a court of Law, by judges sworn to do justice, but by men banded as partizans, and virtually judges in their own

cause. An eminent Indian officer recently states, that, though not a shot be fired, 10,000 soldiers are required yearly, merely to keep up in India the existing force of 75,000 British troops. Grant that sanitary arrangements may lower this frightful number: yet how many will be wanted if we make new annexations? if we absorb more and more native principalities? if we develop Indian wealth and mechanism while wounding the native sentiment? All these agencies are going on at this moment. A general insurrection may be surely counted on within thirty years, unless, before that time, we win the loyalty of Indian patriots. Even the movement of 1857 would have been irresistible, if the insurgents had actively extended its area at once, or if certain princes had gone against us. Unless the drain of men for the Indian army be stopped, the sooner we avow ourselves to be, like Switzerland and Belgium, neutral in all European questions, the better for our good fame. We are ourselves cementing India into one country. Another insurrection, an insurrection of collective India,—if successful, would inflict on England an amount of loss, ruin, and disgrace, which could not be recovered in a whole generation;—if unsuccessful, would still multiply our difficulties tenfold, and make it doubtful whether expulsion would not have been better for us.

§ II.

For these six grievances and dangers Reforms are needed. Of what Reforms do we now hear talk? Prominently and solely* of Extended Suffrage and the Ballot. Let me grant to a Radical, that each of these may have its value;—the Ballot for its mechanical convenience, and as a temporary engine to save a limited class from intimidation. Yet unless these are mere steps towards after-reforms, they will leave Parliament overworked and helpless,

* Since this was in type, Triennial Parliaments have been claimed.

the Bureaucracy as despotic as ever, India disloyal, the House of Lords as obstructive as ever to all religious freedom. If after-reforms are intended, they must be avowed at once, or we shall be once more told that the settlement is "final," and is to last for a full generation. That Mr. Bright and the late lamented Mr. Cobden expected changes in the possession of land, with benefit to our peasants, from these two measures of reform, I infer from a celebrated altercation; but the mode in which they are to operate and the length of time before they will bring relief, remain extremely obscure. The artizan class from 1840 to 1846 gave their effort to sustain the Corn Laws; the peasants also, if they had the vote, would probably use it against themselves. To give voting power to ignorant masses, accustomed to abject obedience, is surely no political panacea.

The primary weakness of our organization lies in the enormous over-occupation of the House of Commons. With great talent, knowledge and experience, in more than 600 men,—by tact to divide labour and put each man to his special work;—by standing Committees and Permanent Chairmen, in whom the House could confide, and to whom they could refer for information and counsel; no doubt a vast deal of work might be done, and without very long speeches. But no ministry has ever shown a wish to aid the Legislative body to conduct its work energetically. On matters of administration the ministers must of course take the initiative; but they will never invent an organization which is to control them; which in fact must be devised and maintained strictly as *against* them. New principles are wanted. At present the holders of power and the expectants of power combine to subject the independence of the Legislative to the Bureaucracy; and this usurpation is veiled under the phrase,—prerogative of the Crown. Merely to extend the franchise will not

add to the chance of getting abler members of Parliament, nor a larger number of men resolved to fight against any of the grievances enumerated. The task laid on the Commons House is at present too overwhelming. Without new machinery which shall relieve it of the present intolerable load, no imaginable change in the mode of electing is likely to cure the evil. One supreme legislature for 230 millions! Englishmen who come out of practical life and have been deeply immersed in special and very limited occupations, are to judge on Private Bills innumerable, and on the affairs of people very unlike to us and quite unknown to us! In the United States, for 31 millions of people there are 35 independent local legislatures, each having on an average less than a million; while the Supreme Congress is wholly disembarrassed of all local law, and regulates only a defined number of topics which concern the entire homogeneous Union. Our colonial legislatures legislate only for the home interests of perhaps half a million, two million, or at most three million people. It does not require superhuman wisdom in legislators to do tolerably well work thus limited. But it is a truly barbarous simplicity to put one organ to the frightfully various work of our Commons House. Entirely new organs appear to me an obvious and undeniable necessity, however disagreeable to men of routine.

Nor should it be left out of sight, that in the last century and a half, while our population has been growing in numbers and our affairs in complexity; so far have we been from increasing and developing our organization, that we have destroyed or spoiled the organs which existed. The Parliaments of Ireland and Scotland have been annihilated (one by flagrant, the other by suspected, bribery,) and the power and status of our Municipalities and our County organization have been gravely lowered. The old Municipalities and Counties were the

sources from which Parliament derived its own rights and power: to the new institutions limited rights have been jealously measured out by Parliament. Every Empire needs to be made up of Kingdoms or Governments; every such Government, of Provinces or Counties; and each smaller unit should have complete political life, with as much power over itself as can be exercised without damage to the nation. From these elementary principles we have gone widely astray, working towards a central confusion which always threatens alternate despotism and anarchy.

To invent new organization is not really difficult. California thirteen years ago was infamous as a nest of gamblers and robbers, mixed with gold-diggers; but the instant that a sufficient mass of honest men was poured in, they constructed admirable institutions, and have now among other good things popular colleges which we may envy. The difficulty is, to persuade English aristocrats to adopt anything new, until the old has become quite intolerable. Let wretched Ireland be a witness to that! It means that millions of the nation must go through martyrdom,—that public calamity and disgrace must be incurred,—that disaffection must become dangerous; before the classes which are at ease will consent to the creation of any machinery which they suspect might ultimately undermine their power. This is no true Conservatism. This is the way to ruin an aristocratic order. It is not the able men, the experienced men, who so feel or so reason; it is the meaner members of their party, whom the leaders will not risk offending, until public calamity forces them, or until the nation, *gaining a clear idea of what it wants*, speaks so pointedly, that the real party-leaders come over to it. This I hold to be the right course for the Radicals, who (it seems) must be the movers. Let them make it their business to convince such men as Mr. Gladstone and Lord

Stanley in the two great parties of the State, that the things which they claim are reasonable and right,—and with a view to this, let them impress the same thing on as many members of Parliament as they can,—and the necessary reforms will be carried, however novel in principle. Those who call themselves "practical men"—are apt to snuff out every proposal that goes beyond routine, by the reply,—"There is no use in talking of it; for it is quite impossible:" and until a public opinion has been formed in favour of it, every new thing is of course impossible. But what our colonies and the United States do, is not impossible to Englishmen at home when they resolve upon it.

The inertia of our aristocratic ranks, miscalled Conservatism, has undoubtedly a marvellous resisting force; and this is the great danger of the country. When all the world beside is in rapid movement, and that world is in intimate relations—industrial, political, social, literary,—with England; when moreover our own population is in steady change; organic reforms ought to accommodate themselves easily and quickly,—if possible, spontaneously,—to the changes of society. This would be true Conservatism; for this is vitality. Reform which comes too late, fails to avert political disease. The noblest function of high legislation is to guide and conduct Reform.

Let those who think Inertia to be Conservative, look with a fresh eye on the outer world. Russia has cast off her slave system, and is organizing her Governments into centres of independent political life. She increases her population three times as fast as England every year, and loses none by emigration. In a quarter of a century more she is likely to have 100 millions, not of disfranchised men, or discontented subjects, but of real citizens, under 40 or 50 local Parliaments, combining their strength in one Empire.—Germany may ere long

be involved by her Prussian dynasty in a great civil war, which (even if it do not become a Republican contest) can scarcely fail of ending in a great union of their many local governments: a Union which may chance even to absorb Holland and Switzerland by the good will of these little states. The Germany of the future is resolved to be a power on the high seas, with at least forty millions of people, who will cease to emigrate largely when they are politically better satisfied.—FRANCE will be to us ever a better neighbour, the richer and the more commercial she becomes: yet so much the more certainly is she our rival on the seas.—The ITALIAN fleets, with those of Southern Germany, will supersede our functions as police of the Mediterranean, and therefore might seem our valuable allies: whether our Conservatives will so regard them, is another question.—But the broad fact is, that with the increase of good government on the continent, and still more with the progress of free institutions, the relative power of England must sink and does sink: and we can less than ever afford to have a discontented Ireland, and a peasantry who are nearly at the bottom of the European scale.

Something yet stronger remains to be urged. English and Irish peasants must be compared, not merely to the peasants of Guernsey or of Europe, but to those of America. There, a nation, among whom in every moral and social sense our people find themselves at home,—a nation which, since the death of George III., has absorbed three million British emigrants, — has decided on the overthrow of slavery, and is resolved to people its vast fertile lands by bestowing them freely on cultivators. The Slave States will soon attract emigrants even more than does the far West. America (to say nothing of Canada) might receive ten million new citizens in the next ten years with no result to herself but increased prosperity. An emigrant who

has manly strength, industry, and temperance, landing at New York with a few dollars, can in 3 or 4 years lay by enough to stock a farm, receive public land, and become a freehold cultivator. Should emigration from our counties once commence in earnest, the Irish Exodus teaches that it is like a syphon which sucks the cask dry,—the stream in front attracting that behind. If English landlords desire our problem to work itself out on the Irish pattern ; if they can look complacently on the possibility of a constant dwindling of the English population, with results which need not here be pointed at, they have only to persevere in their past routine.

In this connexion there is yet one more topic which English Whigs and Tories ought not to overlook : (I am unwilling to lay stress on it, yet it is too important wholly to omit ;)—the danger—as they will view it—of Republicanism becoming militant in Europe. *Their folly has prepared the way.* They abandoned Hungary, with its territorial nobility, its old precedents, its rights founded on treaty, when it had no thought of throwing off royalty. By refusing to acknowledge the belligerency of Hungary, and to reassume that place of Mediator, between her and Austria, which (with Holland) we had held in making the peace of 1710,—we connived at Russian invasion, and made Gorgey's treason a possibility. Our *first* punishment was our own Russian war, which came in the train. The *next* is, that the English aristocracy now is isolated, and Hungary (irreconcileable to Austria) will become a Republic on the first opportunity. Hitherto the French dynasty has failed to attain a constitutional position, without which it has no mark of permanence ; nor is Victor Emmanuel's throne the stronger for all the humiliations which the French Emperor has put upon it. Whether in France or in Germany events give the initiative, matters but little. A

civil war may rise in Germany, either from the unendurable encroachments of a prince, or by the contagion of revolutionary spirit. Whatever the cause of German commotion, Republicanism would quickly become an established fact in Hungary; and once successful there, would reanimate the struggle elsewhere. It will not wait to be a second time crushed by the combination of kings. No one can predict what is to come; but no reasonable man will now deny that events of an ordinary kind *may* lead to the establishment of Republics in Hungary, Germany, and France. Would not English Conservatives and the Crown itself then regret, if by obstructing all reforms, and initiating nothing likely to remove the causes of discontent, they had perpetuated a sullen indignation against British Institutions? Even in 1848 Tories rejoiced, that Lord Grey's Reform Bill of 1832 had become law.

§ III.

What steps of Organic Reform do I then desire to recommend to the attention of the reader? I must distinguish between *immediate* and *ultimate* measures.

Five measures appear to me of immediate urgent importance.

1. The establishment of an IMPERIAL COURT in India, to judge all causes between the Queen's Government and the Princes; with power similar to that which the Queen's Bench would put forth, if here the Government were to eject a nobleman from his estates. The mere inauguration of such a Court would send a gush of loyalty through Indian hearts, and would encourage the princes to lessen their native armies. The establishment of one disputed title by it (say, the confirmation of the Rajah of Mysore against Lord Canning's unexpected and harsh decision, which extinguishes his dynasty with his life,) would allow us to reduce the Indian army by one half. Its restitution of a single prince unjustly

deposed, with restoration of his jewels and wardrobe, might bring down the English force to the standard of 1833. The mark of a "tyrant" (according to the old Greeks) was his defence by a foreign body-guard: *we* bear that mark of illegitimate sway at present. To make India loyal, to save the yearly sacrifice of health or life to 10,000 young men, now the miserable victims of our army system, is so urgent an interest, that I put this topic foremost. Too much importance can hardly be given to it. Each soldier is said to cost us £100; hence the pecuniary expense also is vast. But until we restrain ourselves from aggression, all attempts permanently to improve the state of our millions at home must be fruitless.

Nor only so: but considering that 200 millions of Indians would be represented in that Supreme Court, a splendid commencement would be given to "Arbitration instead of War," for which Cobden contended in Europe. English judges would be faithful to their duty; but, by adding natives of India to the Court, we should set a potent example to the whole world, fraught with good will to men, and likely to bring us blessings from God.

The responsibilities of the English Parliament would be greatly lightened by this measure; which would at least relieve them of their arduous *judicial* duties towards the Indian princes.

2. The boon which was solemnly guaranteed to India by Lord Grey's Ministry in Parliament, and by the Parliamentary Charter of 1833, should be at once bestowed, *bona fide*. It was promised that to every office, high or low, *except* that of Gov. Gen. and Commander-in-Chief, native Indians should be admissible on equal terms with British-born subjects. "*An exception corroborates the rule concerning things not excepted.* For twenty years this solemn act was made a dead letter; then in 1853, under pretence of new liberality, the delusive system of competitive examinations was established, subjecting

natives to unjust disadvantage, and forcing them to come to England to be examined. If this system of trickery be kept up by the old influences which Lord Grey threatened with extinction if they dared to resist that important clause in 1833,—all our other good deeds and good intentions may prove inadequate to win Indian loyalty. Our task there is, to rear India into political manhood, train it to English institutions, and rejoice when it can govern itself without our aid. If a part of our aristocracy and middle classes is too narrow-minded to understand how noble is such a function, the rest of Great Britain ought not to remain silent,—to the great and certain mischief of the empire.

3. The Mutiny Act, which is never passed for more than one year, should not be re-enacted in its present barbarous state, but with several important modifications. Of these, I shall here specify but one. No soldier or sailor who kills, wounds, or destroys, should be exempted from the ordinary responsibilities of a civilian, except after the Queen (or her accredited Viceroy) has publicly proclaimed war. Then, and then only, if a soldier attack the country against which war has been proclaimed,—and none another,—should he be able to plead "military command" in his justification. Against violent and sudden attack civilians and soldiers alike may make defence with deadly weapons. Admirals and Consuls will cease to involve us in war of their own initiation, only when they become unable to shield the tools of their will from personal responsibility.—[I suppose that it is the Mutiny Act which here needs modification. If there be some other Act which exempts the soldier from guilt, then it is that which needs repeal.]

4. *Irish Ecclesiasticism has to be reformed with the least possible delay.* The topics are too well known to dwell on. The Lord Morpeth Bill of 1837 and Lord Leveson Gower's of 1825,—both murdered

by the House of Lords,—tell what needs to be done for Ireland.

5. What I mention fifth, might be executed first. — The principle of creating Life Peers, recalled by Lord Palmerston in the case of Lord Wensleydale, should be avowed by the nation, and enforced by the executive, but *with one essential modification of pre-eminent importance.* Let the Commons vote a humble address to her Majesty, representing that the House of Peers needs to be elevated in honour and called to higher and more active functions; and with a view to this implore her that in future she will create none but Life Peers, and such Peers as can be trusted by her faithful Commons to co-operate diligently in the public service; that therefore also she will instruct her ministers to seek a vote from the Commons, commending for *public merit* any individual for whom they are disposed to solicit from her Majesty the honour of a Life Peerage.—The majority of the Peers will be too sensible to resist the nation and the Commons in such a cause, and a vast step onward will have been made.

So much for immediate Reforms: but what are the more distant, yet necessary objects?

We cannot undo in a day the malversations of centuries. Every idea of immediate *final* Reform is a sad delusion. For a century and a half, as above remarked, instead of developing our ancient organs, we have lamed or destroyed them. To remake or invent requires both special knowledge and wisdom. A popular movement cannot possibly dictate details. But I will not shrink from saying my thought in outline, where I have thought a great deal.

1. To stop unjust wars, entangling treaties, and unwise diplomacy, the House of Lords should have supreme controul over Foreign Affairs. The right of advising her Majesty to declare war should be

taken from the Privy Council, (which is in this matter now a wooden machine,) and should be given to the Lords ; every one of whom should have a right, like that of the American Senate, to enter the Foreign Office and read every despatch. No Treaty should be valid unless confirmed by the Lords, and by the Commons also, if it involve pecuniary contingencies, and the House should have a right to order the unmutilated publication of whatever diplomatic document it pleases.

2. Every appointment to office should be made out in the words, that her Majesty appoints the person, "by the consent of the House of Peers." Then the House would have a veto on every appointment. The Ministry would not dare to appoint through mere favouritism, and would gain power to resist importunate claimants of their own party, whom they now reluctantly gratify.

Of course these new and high functions could not be given to the Lords, until the nation trusts them : and perhaps no Conservative, no peer, would wish the Upper House to have this prominence in the empire without some change in the present constitution. Sismondi,—a writer who energetically combines an aristocratical creed with zeal for a free-holding peasantry,—declares as a historical induction, that the essence and energy of aristocracy is corrupted from the day that it becomes formally hereditary. In England it has been saved by the dying out of so many old peerages, and by the incessant creation of new ones. The sole innovation of *principle* which I propose, is, that the creation shall be made, not to reward partizanship, or to stock the house with wealthy men ; but that shall be voted *(optimus cuique,* as the Romans have it) by the representatives of the nation, and thus made a true Aristocracy, a rule of *the Best.*

3. *We want safety for our food which is on the high seas.*—The mischief of Bureaucracy is strikingly

illustrated in the recent history of this topic. In 1860 the United States Government sent a circular to all its ministers in Europe, requesting them to propose neutral privileges for all merchant ships in time of war: and Earl Russell gave a decided refusal, without letting Parliament know that the offer had been made. Three years later, Mr. Cobden revealed the fact, having got information of it from America; and asserted of his own personal knowledge that every Court of Europe would have gladly acceded to the measure, if Earl Russell had accepted it. The American Government did not expect refusal from this quarter; for Lord Palmerston in a public speech at Liverpool had declared his desire of such an arrangement. More recently indeed, he has tried to back out of what he then said; but, as is believed, solely because he had found Earl Russell unconvinceable. Such is the power of one man, secretly to obstruct a matter of vital interest to the nation. The doings of that one ship, the Alabama, in spite of all the efforts of the Federal navy, are a sufficient warning of what England would suffer in a war with a power quite third-rate on the seas. In fact, it is probable that either Austria or Prussia could annihilate our merchant navy. To compute the misery which would be endured by the middle and lower classes of England from the stagnation of foreign trade and the cutting off of foreign food,—is impossible. It is not yet too late to repair Earl Russell's grave error; but if war once come upon us, we then shall repent too late.

4. I believe that Ireland ought to be divided into four Provinces, England into (perhaps) six, Scotland into two; Wales would remain "the Principality:" hence might be thirteen Provincial Councils with free power of local taxation and local legislation, subject only to a *veto* from Parliament, which in most cases would gradually become a formality. Time and trial, or lawyer's skill, would discover in

what cases the veto might be definitely renounced. *The Councils should be elected by a very extended suffrage*, which in two generations might reach to every adult who is ostensibly independent. The more the Councils should relieve the Parliament of all business except that in which the empire is necessarily *a unit*, the better. To controul the Executive —to arrange all that is general to the United Kingdom,—to look after India and the Colonies; will remain a more than sufficient task, if not only all Private Bills are stript away, but also all business concerning Education, Churches, the Poor, the Law Courts, and Militia or Volunteers. If we had thus many centres of national life, of high cultivation and refinement, the unhealthy and threatening growth of London would be arrested. We should soon have many Universities, Free Education for all ranks, and many small Army-systems, in wholesome emulation. The Counties and the large Towns would no longer be isolated, as strongholds of aristocracy and democracy; but the country gentlemen and nobility would seek and find their places in the local Executive and in the Provincial Councils, without being able to block out meritorious men of every rank. The poor would have a chance of rising to the top of the scale. Instead of society being mischievously divided, as now, into horizontal strata, its relations would be local and territorial; for every Council in England and its Executive would have a power and dignity equivalent to that of a kingdom such as Belgium or Holland. Each would regulate its local Religious Establishments: one would vie with another in diffusing education: experimental legislation might become fruitful; and whatever manifest benefit one part had devised, would be initiated without the ordeal of long Parliamentary campaigns.

The decay of English institutions from the accession of William III to the death of George III was

mainly due to the fact, that during European war an English Parliament can ill attend to anything else. Just so, Parliamentary Reform was abandoned, *because* Russian war came upon us. This is an evidently defective and barbarous condition; and puts us into melancholy contrast to the United States, in which no intensity of war lessens the domestic energy of the State Governments.

5. The question of Parliamentary suffrage cannot be properly argued here. It is now complicated by Mr. Hare's ingenious proposals, of which I would gladly see *experiment* in a single district, as in that of the metropolis. To discuss his scheme fully would require much space; to give an opinion shortly would be arrogant. But to many reasoners on the subject of the suffrage, a few general remarks may be not superfluous.

Representative Legislators are an artificial system. Many men say to me: "I am not bound to obey laws, unless I have consented to them *by my representative*." What if another say: "I am not bound to obey laws, unless I have consented to them *myself?*" I think, that of the two, the latter statement has more reason. The former is every way absurd. My representative may have voted *against* the law; then, I am not bound! Women also are free from all statute laws, by this argument. Moreover, I never consented to be bound by my representative. Representation is a mere *means to an end.* JUSTICE to all orders and persons is the end. Inasmuch as injustice in legislation generally proceeds from one-sidedness of mind, a legislature which does not contain men *from all ranks* is almost certain to be unjust to the ranks excluded. But merely to admit a right of voting, does not ensure the object aimed at. The English farmers have always had votes, but never in our days have had representatives of their interest in Parliament. Nor is the vote a natural right of *individuals.*

If convenience suggested to cast lots in each rank, and pick out a sort of jury from it as an electoral college, no class would be injured, and no individual could complain, as long as the results proved good. Nor is it true that the men called "potwallopers" in old days were in any moral sense "elevated" by the Parliamentary vote. That small shopkeepers, artizans, farmers, peasants, and the entire female sex, are wholly unrepresented in Parliament, seems to me a great defect, apt to involve injustice to each class, whenever it happens to have some special interest and rights. But to remedy the evil is a matter of extreme difficulty. Neither extended suffrage, nor universal suffrage seems to me likely to bring an alleviation, until a distant date, after living men are in their graves.

That persons may be "elevated" by possessing the suffrage, they must be able to meet, and discuss, and form definite opinions; and not merely vote once in seven years, but wait upon their representative and press their judgments upon him, and be able to call him to account, or be enlightened by his explanation. A man who needs the Ballot to shield him, and dares not allow the colour of his political opinions to be known,—can do none of these things; cannot fulfil the cardinal duties of a constituent, and is degraded, not elevated, by possessing the vote. Men who are too numerous or too distant to meet and confer, are generally a mischievous constituency. Cliques and "caucuses," or other Clubs, unknown to the Constitution, generally snatch power out of their hands. I cannot convince myself that the workmen who have "Unions" are not often in miserable subjection to the power of a clique. The "caucuses" of the United States have constantly enabled those who are called "trading politicians" to dictate the course of public events, owing to the President being elected by suffrage on too vast a scale. A nation which enjoys very

vigorous local institutions,—where the Parish, as well as the State, is in high energy, and education is not only free to all, but accepted by all,—may bear the occasional exercise of such a vote,—and will use it well in a time of great national tension. But to introduce those who have no daily political duties, no local activity, no wide political thought, into the responsibility of voting in huge masses once in seven years, for a Parliament which is to be "omnipotent;" and to expect that this will promote liberty ;—seems to me a lamentable and wild mistake. Electors ought to have clear opinions as to the competence of the elected for *the highest and most difficult* of the tasks which will befal him. The welfare of our millions is sacrificed by mismanagement of remote affairs, as to which they have little knowledge and no care. They should be able, not only to confer and advise one another publicly, but to keep up active personal relations with their representative. Any enlargement of the franchise which impedes these processes, or makes elections more expensive, and leaves the expense on the candidate, must (I fear) be a change greatly for the worse. At present, the power of a minister to threaten a dissolution,—which means, to threaten a *fine* of some hundreds or even thousands of pounds on single members, if the voting be not to the minister's taste, is a disgrace and a grave mischief.

The French Reformers in the last century, who first inEurope conceived generous and noble ideas of popular power, were aware that nothing but confusion could come of Universal Suffrage acting directly on a central system in a populous nation. They devised the system of Double Election ; and in my belief were fundamentally right. But on a sound foundation they built unsoundly. The bodies which thus elect, *ought not to exist merely for the sake of electing*. They should elect because they are a substantive power, trusted for *other* high duties,

and *therefore* trustworthy for this function also. I will not conceal my opinion, that if the United Kingdom were divided into Provinces, every member of the Imperial Parliament ought ultimately to be an *ambassador* delegated by the direct vote of his Provincial Council; delegated with instructions, and each *liable to be separately recalled*, and replaced at the will of the Council. Such a system, I think, would be a virtual return to the original idea, in which the Knights and Burgesses certainly never represented individuals, but represented *corporate bodies*. There is the very same reason for electing the central Parliament by representative Councils, as there is for legislating by representatives, and not by a folkmote, when a nation is counted by millions. From every Council, on an average, seven might every year be appointed, to sit for seven years, unless recalled. Some of the seven every year would be selected to gratify the petition of every order of men: thus every class would have virtual representatives in Parliament. Every delegate should have an honourable stipend from his own Council, and never be permitted to incur any election expenses. In this way, from a humble origin, merit might rise, first into the local legislature or local executive, next into central posts of honour. And there is no such security for the welfare of the lowest ranks, as when a sensible fraction of the *Executive* Government is ordinarily filled by men who have risen from below. At present no such men rise, nor can rise, even into the *Legislature*, extend the suffrage as you may.

After sons of peasants and of artizans shall be found in high places,—after the House of Peers is popularized,—no one would despair of changes in the tenure of landed property, such as may elevate the entire order of the peasantry; but if it is to be delayed so long, the problem will be solved by Emigration in a mode far less satisfactory to the

landlord class. If landlords are wise, they will understand their danger; and will prefer to have a House of Peers which shall deal with it. Surely it is happy for the Russian nobility that the Emperor has taken in hand the removal of serfdom, instead of awaiting the chances of revolution.

6. That pernicious system of Centralization which makes French legal liberty impossible, and has gravely damaged England, in India has run riot without controul. When the East Indian Company overthrew local treasuries in India, and put into their central exchequer at Calcutta the tolls of roads and ferries of the most remote South, they perpetrated a deed which doomed their rule to be a blight upon the land, even if the virtue of their lowest servants had been on a par with the best. We know by positive official statement that in consequence of this diversion of moneys from their local purpose, the roads of whole kingdoms became overgrown, and so lost, that their old course was matter for official inquiry. This hideous blunder remains unreversed. India has no local treasuries. Every coin in every province is liable to be spent in some war against Nepaul, Affghanistan, or Thibet. War is made with the very life-blood of material prosperity: roads and bridges, canals and tanks, cannot be repaired during war, while their funds are mixed with the war funds. Many have of late been finding out, that colonists will involve us in wars with barbarian neighbours as long as they can support their wars out of the resources of the Home Government. Not less true is it, that India will never be without a war, as long as there is a centralized treasure to support it and no Parliament to refuse supplies. Mr. Bright many years since made an elaborate speech in Parliament, which was heard by all sides with very respectful attention:—if he had followed it up, and claimed inviolable local treasuries, he would have said all that I am here

pressing. He urged that every Indian Presidency should be independent of the rest, and that each should be in direct relation to the Home Government. India, it is often said, is a continent, not a country, The diversities of its inhabitants are enormous. No one proposes for it uniform legislation. If an English ministry could be *at once* convinced that India ought to be divided into many coordinate governments, it might be a reform not of the distant, but of the near future. Parliament would acquiesce in any thing proposed by the ministry. There is evidently no reason in doubting that a Government of 10 million people could defend its own frontiers against any rude neighbours or half barbarous potentates: and a Government thus limited, would have far less tendency to aggression than the powerful and proud Executive of 150 millions. A VICEROY is wanted in India, *not to govern but to reign.* Take away the Governor General, and send a prince of the blood royal, to represent the Empress Queen to the Indian princes; —to receive their occasional homage and their formal applications :—to be the medium of transmitting their diplomacy to England, or their suits to that Imperial Court which I imagine. The Central Executive should be a mere "Board of Works" for Railways, Canals, Rivers, Harbours, Post, and Mint, without a Foreign Office, an Army, or a Navy. India will not cease to be drained by war expenses, and thereby to be misgoverned, until ambitious central despotism is destroyed.

Every point above proposed by me, (except the neutralization of merchant vessels in time of war, to which Lord Palmerston once gave voluntary assent) is developed out of the single principle, that *Centralization*, and the *Bureaucracy* which it nourishes, must be severely abated. If Bureaucracy is to be depressed, something else must be elevated. What must that be? I say, the House of Peers

and an Imperial Court of Law. This ought not to frighten a Conservative. But the House cannot get or keep public support,—it cannot really lead the nation,—without a Reform. What milder reform is possible, than is above suggested? What more honourable to Peerage? The strongest Democrats rejoice to be presided over by a popular nobleman. To a Reformed House of Peers the warmest lovers of liberty among us would shortly rally. A popular movement can only dictate *principles;* such as are these: let us have true Aristocracy, not Bureaucracy: let us have political vitality every where, restricting Centralization to its true functions: let every class be represented in the Legislature, and be admissible into the Executive.

Such principles are broad enough to be popular. Details must be directed by cultivated intelligence, independent of the ministry of the day. Every ministry, like a Turkish Pasha, has an intense interest in the present, and a very feeble interest in the future. To allow a ministry to dictate permanent policy is a truly grave mistake, tending to Turkish ruin. The ministry has a task to execute; but a power which has a more permanent stake in the country should prescribe *what* task. When the House of Commons looks to the ministry to lead it, and the Lords have no popular support, what else can be expected but short-sighted policy?

I have said enough, yet I wish to add, that I regard our system of voluntary political societies, made for special objects, as a wretched crutch, and an enormous waste of time and money. The argumentations which they carry on ought to be heard on the floor of a local constitutional assembly,—of a parish or municipality first,—thence by transference to a Provincial Council, *through which* any petitions should ordinarily go to Parliament. Then both sides would hear one another from the beginning; whereas now, an elaborate process is needed, before

even the best cause can get a hearing from adversaries, while foolish schemes linger without effective refutation.—The case of our peasants is sad and disgraceful; but it needs wisdom still more than sympathy. To abolish the Law of Primogeniture might bring no immediate visible result; but it would excellently inaugurate a new principle, and give some hope for the future.

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THE

RELATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL TO LIBERAL KNOWLEDGE.

A LECTURE

DELIVERED IN

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON, OCTOBER 12, 1859,

INTRODUCTORY TO THE SESSION OF THE FACULTY OF ARTS AND LAWS, 1859—60.

BY FRANCIS W. NEWMAN,

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RELATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL TO LIBERAL KNOWLEDGE.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE,

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Professions rise with the division of labour, whether the labour be mental or manual. In the great organized monarchies of the oldest time,—in Egypt, India, and China, the separation of professions was established most sharply; but how far they simultaneously aimed at liberal culture, we cannot say; or at least concerning India, I must look to a learned colleague for information. Aristocracies, no doubt, everywhere aim at *refinement*, which is perhaps the essence of that which we call Liberal Art,—the *Artes Humaniores:* and in a less advanced people the refinement aimed at is that of bodily grace and courtly manners, rather than accomplishments properly intellectual. The Persians of the great Cyrus, as the aristocracy of their empire, are said to have placed noble education in learning to ride, to draw the bow, and

to speak truth. The Lacedæmonians placed it in attaining grace in wrestling and skill in all martial exercises. To speak generally, Aristotle defines "Aristocracy" as that form of government in which the *educated* bear rule; and we know that the education of Greek aristocracies was that of the public palæstra. It does not appear that they incorporated into their idea of gentlemanly refinement anything more severely intellectual than simple music, with singing of poetry and dancing; and according to Polybius the neglect of these softening accomplishments precipitated one small people of Arcadia into horrible atrocity. I suppose that the old Athenian phrase, οἱ καλοκαγαθοὶ (the fine gentry), may be freely translated into the Latin of a certain Oxford Foundation Statute, *bene nati, bene vestiti, [illegible] docti in arte musicâ.* But, as far as I am aware, the systematic attempt at properly *intellectual* cultivation, which should be liberal, as distinguished from professional, began with that miscellaneous body of accomplished men, whom the Greeks called *Sophists;* and it is probable that democratic institutions gave the immediate impulse to their activity. Whatever introduces a large number of citizens into political importance, generates a demand for very miscellaneous information and very various powers of mind. There is no Jack-of-all-trades so versatile as a statesman, especially in a young and growing community; pre-eminently if, as Athens, and afterwards Rome, it is gaining imperial authority. A statesman needs that which is strictly

called *capacity*, or the power of taking in much and quickly. He needs a strong and broad grasp of every question that he touches. Profound knowledge in any one science is superfluous to him; but he must know enough of each to be able to use wisely the skill of other men, to receive their information intelligently, appreciate their relative abilities, selecting and digesting for practical use so much as the public exigency requires or admits. In a democratic state some power of exposition is also necessary; and young Athenians, who were ambitious of political leadership, aspired to be eloquent on any and every subject. The teachers who undertook to assist them in gaining the much coveted power of fluent speech, were of course aware that their instruction was very superficial; but this was unavoidable. Political History had scarcely begun to exist. Force ruled without disguise in every known empire. Politics, as the science of the organization of states, founded upon the associative instinct in man and on the internal relations of society, was perhaps first imagined by Aristotle. Political Economy was at least as superficial with Aristotle himself as with the most flippant of the Sophists. Jurisprudence had no professors, though all the materials of it probably existed from the great activity of the law-courts. Morality, as a science, was quite in chaos. The Sophists (as we call them, though the collective term, as Mr. Grote has usefully warned us, is one of convenience only) probably understood as well as Plato, that the liberal

culture at which they ought to aim was a harmonious development of the whole mind; and they did aim at this, according to their abilities, though with most imperfect aids. The gymnastic exercises of the Greeks which promoted a noble development of the body, bore an analogy to the cultivation of the *mind*, too obvious to be overlooked. It was observed that professional runners and dancers were strong in the legs, but disproportionately so, being too feeble in the arms; professional pugilists were powerful in the arms, and deficient in the legs. A skilful wrestling and fencing master would secure that each part had its commensurate exertion, so as to attain symmetry; in which was found alike beauty and service for war. So, for the functions of society, whether in the strictly political arena, or in social and neighbourly co-operation, we need well balanced faculties (on which Good Sense seems to depend), —miscellaneous information, which of course is everywhere superficial,—delicate sensibility, which will wound no one needlessly or unawares,—and an expansive mind, open to learn from every side, and ready to impart. Aristotle everywhere, I believe, shows a very clear discrimination of Professional from Liberal cultivation. As one instance, in speaking of music, he says, that it should be practised up to the point which will develope the feeling for good music, but not so far as to attain professional skill, which (says he) is vulgar. In short, while professional knowledge consists in the deepening, sharpening, and completing the study of *one* subject or *one* branch of

thought, and generally for *immediate* practical ends, liberal knowledge is first conceived of as the culture of *all* the faculties proportionably by very various exercise, and by the supply of very miscellaneous material, for *indirect* and *unforeseen* practical ends, the mind itself being more thought of than any outward result.

It would be out of place here to dilate on the causes which made Athenian greatness transitory, and Athenian eloquence the art of plausibility. Neither Socrates nor Plato, however desirous of deepening liberal study, could effect it, while the special sciences themselves, and especially Political Morality, were in so crude a state. It is probable that Socrates wished all political power to be confined to those who had been trained to statesmanship; which he conceived of as a specific art, like that of a pilot or a shipbuilder; and Plato deliberately desired that the state should be despotically governed by an oligarchy of permanent functionaries. But political speculation could not become comprehensively human by disdaining experience: and by committing himself to write an elaborate scheme on a Utopian Republic, this most celebrated of philosophers gave to the Sophists a splendid revenge for his attacks on them.

Two centuries—three centuries past, and ROME in her turn demanded liberal culture, and looked to Greece to supply it. Eloquence at the bar, in the senate, and before the people, was still the desideratum, as at Athens; but many things combined to give Roman accomplishment

a more manly cast: indeed the Athenian was now stigmatized by the diminutive term *homo Græculus*, even when profoundly learned. The young Roman had to begin by acquiring the Greek language, a process which we know to be of great value to the mind itself, especially to those acute intellects which delight in reasoning for reasoning's sake, and are bold to pursue principles into all their consequences. Such minds are liable to be entangled by the subtlety of language, unless forced to study every imperfection of the tool with which they work. No national mind open to our study was perhaps more acute than that of Athenian Greece, yet none was more egregiously guilty of verbal controversy; from a large part of which they might, I think, have been saved, if Greece had not too much disdained barbarians to make the learning of any foreign language a part of elementary education.

But in truth, there were besides plentiful reasons which saved the young Roman from the mental dangers of the young Athenians, whom Socrates accosted. At home he inherited traditional systems which forced all his energies to work under pressure, and forbad flighty and fanciful schemes of thought. Politics with him was not indeed a *science*, but it was an hereditary *art*, the rules of which were so transmitted in the senate, by the study of the *mos majorum*, that every possible political problem was presented to him with very narrow practical limits. At the same time Roman jurisprudence, pursued continuously

for several centuries by a succession of acute minds, furnished a mass of raw materials for science which in many parts had crystallized into coherent order. Eloquence at Rome was not addressed prevailingly to the ignorant and to the young, who always had the majority of votes at Athens. The senate and the high juries were men of noble rank, of middle age and upwards, and contained the most accomplished men of the nation. The popular assembly generally listened with most deference to the speakers who were highly esteemed in senatorial circles. At the same time, in the three centuries between the days of Pericles and the Gracchi, great accessions had been made to literature and science. Not only had Thucydides written Political History, and Aristotle amassed political information; but Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Macedon had risen and fallen. The great Persian empire and the military dynasties which succeeded it, equally with the astute and violent tyrannies of Sicily, had run their course, and had instructively shown the self-ruin of dynastic injustice. A diligent Greek literature had registered all the facts in detail; and even the native Phœnician histories had been translated. Carthage had left to Rome the lesson, not to risk national existence on armies of foreign mercenaries. To Cicero, Politics was a study based on multifarious experience, and pervaded by the deepest moral analogies. So also Morals itself, in the hands of the successors of Socrates, had attained, as *science*, a stability which will

never be surpassed. Acute metaphysicians, then as now, disputed concerning certain foundations of moral thought, as indeed they do concerning the axioms of Geometry; but the reality of Duty was not seriously impugned by the most sceptical of the Academicians; and the two great schools of Zeno and of Aristotle had worked out a scheme of human morality in all main points agreeable to one another and to that which we now recognize as right and obligatory. It was impossible for a Roman to follow Aristotle on the weakest side of his moral system,—that of denying barbarians to have the rights of men; for the Roman was himself one of these barbarians. Altogether, whatever the violence of Roman political dealing, scientific morals became more comprehensively *human*, and thus more humane, in Cicero than in Aristotle. In more abstract science, the Stoics had elaborated Grammar, which had no existence in the days of Pericles. To all modern students of Greek the abrupt change of style from Sophocles and Thucydides to Euripides and Xenophon shows strikingly how quickly the practical lessons of the "Sophists" cleared the muddy stream of Attic composition. But even to Aristotle grammar was at most an Art. Whether the Stoical cultivation of it as a Science was of any benefit to Greece, I am not competent to say: but I presume that it facilitated the application of grammar to foreign languages, as, to Latin. Again, Greek mathematics had culminated into astronomy at Alexandria, and gave to the later Roman republicans far

firmer conceptions of the order and even of the magnitude of the universe than were attainable to Socrates. In fact the accuracy of the Alexandrian astronomers made the objections of Socrates to physical science quite untenable, while they equally exploded the gratuitous assumption of the Epicureans that a *disorderly* and not an *orderly* chance domineers in the whole structure of the heavens and earth. I think even a casual reader of Aristotle and of Cicero must be struck by the contrast of tone between the two, whenever the subject of *Chance* is touched. Such a remark as the following, which to Aristotle was natural and plausible, would be quite out of date in Cicero. "There are four causes of events, Mind, Nature, Force, and Chance." Not even in modern days, can one find a more decisive conviction that *order* reigns in the universe, and that Nature and God are one cause, not two, than is frequently to be discerned in the writings of Cicero. I think the change must be imputed to the development of astronomy in the course of three centuries. And the history of this science is so valuable an illustration of my present subject, that I must dwell on it for a moment.

Rightly to conceive the vast importance of the perfecting of one physical science in ancient times, and especially the science of the Sun and Planets, we must remember that ancient religion was developed out of Physics, not out of Morals. It did not at all startle a Greek, to reflect that divine action (according to the

religion of his country) was not agreeable to human morality. Poetical speculators had taught him that the earliest gods were Titans, the personification of brute force and hugeness. These had been displaced by the higher intelligence of Zeus or Jupiter; yet even this nobler divinity was conceived of rather as a sagacious despot, living in majestic self-enjoyment, than as a Creator or benevolent Ruler. In the *irregular* action of the elements, chiefly or even alone, the power of Jupiter was supposed to be manifested; so that to an Aristophanes it seemed nothing but a concealed atheism to refer thunder and lightning to the operation of orderly physical causes. Even the Stoical school of Greece struggled to the last to maintain the godhead of the separate planets, while rationalizing the local religions into a general Providence. But, in spite of partial inconsistencies, Alexandrian astronomy enlightened the most open minds as to the unity of God, the harmony of his universe, and the fixed character of his laws. Thoughtful men had previously well discerned, that to admit a divine mind at all, is, to believe its serene superiority to those perturbations which make men vicious. Then, as now, there was plenty of room for Pantheism,—and even for Atheism in some intellects; but if these doctrines were to command any respect, they needed to put on a nobler form, and to recognize Order, Law, Rule, where formerly Disorder had been imagined. Epicureanism at Rome was no longer a philosophy, but in general a mere decent cover for

unpatriotic indifference or mean self-indulgence, with apathy to all progressive knowledge which went beyond Epicurus: hence not even the genius of a Lucretius could commend it to any earnest mind. All the highest thought of the Roman intellect took a form akin to Stoicism, and erred rather on the side of changing Providence into Fate, than of admitting the theory of Chance. Of course a host of superstitions vanished of themselves from the minds of cultivated men, as soon as a belief in fixed Order pervading all things was attained. Here (if I rightly connect cause and effect) we see a striking instance of the consequences to general Liberal culture entailed by the advance of the single science of Astronomy.

Equally striking is the weakness displayed by the professors of Astronomy itself, when isolated in a land bereft of moral science. Egypt, from the earliest to the latest days, has been the country of magic; and we may safely infer a general weakness of mind in such a community. A public which from childhood has believed in every kind of divination, and looks with mysterious fear on the powers of the conjuror, is so open to believe in the occult influence of planetary conjunctions, that astronomy was sure to supply materials for astrology; and the astrologers themselves, while practising on public credulity for their own gain, cannot always have attained to a disbelief of their own science. It is a specious caricature of the doctrine of Universal Order, to represent

human actions and accidents as determined by planetary movements: and the universal tendency of each science, as of every kingdom, is to overstep its own limits and encroach on its neighbour's domain. We need not here insist on the fact, that the arguments of abstract mathematics are inapplicable to practical life, nor advert to the opinion so strongly pressed by some, that mere mathematicians are peculiarly liable to credulity in subjects not mathematical. Whatever weight may be assigned to such topics, it is more to my purpose to press, that (it would seem) *no science can be perfected in isolation.* For it takes up but one part of the human mind, and cultivates that peculiarly; but as it cannot really subdivide the mind, or get rid of its weak sides, that weakness will be felt, the moment the science attempts to deepen its own roots, to enlarge its basis and strengthen its vitality. A single science, thus isolated, must probably soon attain its fullest growth, and become a dead system, to be transmitted by routine. In fact, we may well believe that those in whose hands astronomy turned into astrology were seldom men who had reflected deeply and fruitfully on the great principles and essential logic of astronomy. To them it was probably less of a Science than an Art—a curious fabric of rules for practical calculation—which could of course be used for superstitious divination as readily as a pack of cards. Thus, while each separate development of sharply defined truth yields a contribution of the highest value to general

cultivation, we need the simultaneous activity of several branches of truth to sustain the healthy operation of the whole mind. We need also a diffused knowledge of these in the community to sustain soundness in public opinion, and prevent the perversion of the separate sciences into Black Arts and Professional Secrets.

Nor is this all. We may here, without becoming fantastic, press a political analogy. An empire surrounded by feeble neighbours, which cannot resist its ambition, generally wastes its force on unsated conquest, and neglects that internal development out of which alone permanent strength can proceed. So a science which has already performed some great exploits, if it stand alone, unchecked by other sciences, conceives the ambition of conquering domains which cannot belong to it, and exhausts its own energies on futile schemes,—as astronomy in divining the secrets of future human events—whereby the real development of the science from within is naturally, if not necessarily, checked; and, of course, the public reverence for it is gravely impaired in the minds of the most thoughtful. Thus, as each state, and each man, finds a healthy control in the association of fellows and equals, so also does each branch of study, each profession.

After the overthrow of the Roman empire, when society had to be reconstructed from its first elements, education went through phases substantially like to those which I have recounted. As fast as baronial or royal splendours developed an aristocratic associated order, the demand for

a certain *refinement* established itself — they called it chivalry — consisting chiefly in bodily skill and grace, and courtesy towards men and women of their own order. The accomplishment of the knight and the gentleman was in large measure such as we now think frivolous ; the knowledge expected of him was perhaps an acquaintance with heraldry, with etiquette, and with fashionable forms of speech ; nearly as now, I believe, in Persia, in Siam, and many parts of the East. In general, we must admit that in a certain stage the cultivation esteemed liberal, is apt to be factitious and conventional. Mussulman Viziers have been highly celebrated for the beauty of their Arabic handwriting, which does not seem to us more important for a statesman than to fence well or to dance well. But here let me put in a word of apology for the pursuit of refinement and elegance. True gracefulness generally results out of *strength economizing itself.* This is manifest in the case of the graceful rower, runner, swimmer, in the movements of the cat or of the horse ; and, if time allowed, it might be shown how the analogy extends to high art and to science. I fearlessly appeal to my mathematical colleagues, whether in their most abstract researches the cultivation of symmetry and elegance does not tend to the advance at once of the study and of the student. Strength and simplicity being at the bottom of all true beauty in action, far more faculties are cultivated in the study of elegance, than at a superficial view is imagined. I never have approved, and I do not approve

of the exclusive, overstrained and generally premature effort after the composition of Latin verses, in many of our public schools; yet I think it an entire mistake on the part of the utilitarian public to overlook the faculties usefully cultivated by those youths who, going beyond mere imitative trick, attain vigour in the art. The prevalent fault everywhere is, to set up some artificial and narrow standard of beauty, which sometimes is no more like to the true and natural beauty, than the court-dresses which we may all see upon Madame Tussaud's waxwork are like to the draperies of Flaxman; or, I will add, no more like, than the phraseology once called *Euphuism* in the English Court, resembles the manly periods of Shakespeare.

But I must farther admit, in partial defence of the Middle Age accomplishments, that sometimes the course of history itself forces factitious knowledge into accidental importance; and liberal culture becomes temporarily artificial, precisely because it ought to be, in the best sense, popular. For instance, to have a certain acquaintance with the religion, or it may be the mythology, of the nation in which we dwell, belongs to liberal knowledge, because ignorance of it unduly cuts us off from understanding our neighbours' minds. Hence, an Englishman in India may find it desirable to learn something of Indian religious fancies, which here seem very superfluous. When we go to the bottom of this, we may perhaps find it to involve the very same principle on which we cultivate

our old classics in Europe, while no one will recommend the Latin language or the Greek mythology as a general study to Hindoos.

It seems to me, that any excessive leaning of liberal culture to conventional refinement is naturally corrected by the rise of positive science with professional aims. If the science deals in realities and can be appreciated by the popular mind, it quickly rebukes empty fantasies and recals liberal impulses to more practical ends. In the Middle Ages of Europe, of which I was beginning to speak, there was a long attempt on the part of abstract science (whether to be called logical or metaphysical, I do not precisely know), to assume the monarchy of the human mind. The few who in recent times have given themselves to a profound study of those writers whom we call collectively the Schoolmen, generally agree in high praise of their acuteness. Yet the history of Europe appears to testify that, as in their own science they were unable to establish any agreement in results or methods, so too they failed to infuse any valuable corrective into the flimsiness of courtly education. At the latter fact perhaps no one will wonder, who observes of how little importance the Schoolmen made elegance and beauty—how they barbarized every language the moment they touched it, and became unintelligible to all beyond the professional circle, even when treating subjects in their own nature popular —I mean, the deeply moving questions of theology and morals. It is notorious, that even the Reformers of the

fifteenth and sixteenth century, in proportion as they were learned, partook of the same defect. I suppose it will be admitted, even by those who attribute most to the religious struggle of the Reformation, that, at least for a full century past, the more solid tendency of the *Artes Humaniores*, in modern Europe, is due chiefly to the corrective power exercised by the disciples of Galileo, Newton, and Adam Smith.

But some of my hearers may ask, whether, in contrasting professional to liberal culture, I do not imply that that which is professional is not liberal. This needs a distinct answer :—and here it is. Professions are not originally and inherently liberal; but they may be, and ought to be, liberalized in their advancement. And they seem to me to become liberal, (1) by calling in the resources of the whole mind : (2) in particular, by infusing into their own work some sense of order and of beauty ; (3) as either result or cause, inspiring the student with enthusiasm and love ; (4) by nourishing sympathy and reverence for *all* Truth and *all* Beauty found in other collateral pursuits. I must dwell for a moment on each of these points.

I said, " First, by calling in the resources of the whole mind." This phrase is somewhat overstrained ; and yet not so much as might at first appear. While a science is in embryo, as a mere empirical or hereditary art, it probably makes very narrow demands on the faculties ; it may be even a manual art. This is extremely obvious in the case of the surgeon, or, I will say, the dentist ; yet

it is not less true of the navigator, nay, nor of the primitive priest, whether he was a North American medicine-man, an Etruscan soothsayer, a Sabine *augur*, an Oscan *popa*, a Greek ἱερεὺς or μάντις,—in short, a sacrificer of cattle or observer of birds, interpreting omens by routine. When embryo knowledge first endeavours to break the shell which confines it, and expand into a nobler life, we may discern two different lines of development. In the one case, the chrysalis bursts into a butterfly, and flutters through an elegant, gaudy, short life of premature and baseless speculation, of which the earliest Greek philosophy is a type. In the other case, the art, knowledge, or skill struggles into a professional science, as was the case with Greek surgery, or English law, or the European military art. Its end being then as directly practical as in the case of shoemaking, to effect the end satisfactorily on each separate occasion is its only paramount aim. To cure the patient, to save the interests of the client, to attain the victory, are, in the several cases, of more importance than any general principles or sentiments. Practical success being the object, and utility the highest praise of the profession, all theory is justly regarded as superfluous which does not tend to success. Those practitioners who command what is thought success in their own day, are then generally slow to believe that this much coveted success will ultimately be promoted by investigations which seem to them highly remote from the practical object. It seems to be of necessity, and not

to be censurable, that in each practical profession a large part of the successful and able men are so conservative of the past, and so suspicious of mere theory, as to weigh with a heavy force of inertia against all novelty of principle. In the military art, there is many an old Fabius to oppose a young Scipio. But, to cast our eyes back on either of the professions, which I have named—who, five hundred years ago, could have dreamed of the amount of science which now enters into each? The most able practical navigator is no longer the mere skilful pilot and shipmaster, but is a man on whom the various accomplishments of a Humboldt, if they could be attained, would not be practically thrown away. The surgeon is still an operator; but his action is guided by a cultivation of faculties once thought wholly unpractical. I say then, that a profession becomes more and more liberal, in proportion as it is less and less narrowed to certain lines of thought, and more and more needs every side of the mind.

Secondly, with every practical development a vast mass of experience and information accrues; to remember which, and turn it to use, a certain *digestion* of the same into an orderly form is almost essential. In nothing, I believe, is the academic teacher of a practical profession of more service, than when he fuses into *order*, perhaps even into *beauty*, the crude heaps of ever-accumulating facts which seem ready to swallow up and choke the student, not less in medicine or in chemistry than in law. The human memory does sometimes show a wonderful tenacity even

of unconnected fact ; but its task is exceedingly lightened when order, proportion, and grace arise out of chaos : and the same fusing power of genius which invests ugliness with beauty, not only refines and liberalizes its own art and the student, but also facilitates acquisition and deepens practical knowledge.

Thirdly, I say, a profession is liberalized when it inspires the student with enthusiasm and love for itself. This is true of the meanest occupations. It is a fundamental fact of the human mind, solacing the toil of the plodding millions, that Love is the great refiner of the soul, ennobling no less than purifying. The old domestic, who lives to serve and loves the service, throws beauty into the humblest actions, and performs every function the better for loving to perform them ; and while mere mercenary self-abasement is often humiliating, and even servile, the ministrations of love are inherently liberal. Some indeed have said, that this is the difference of the Artist and of the Artizan, that the Artist is an Artizan who loves his work for the work's own sake. If any of you desire to excel in any branch of knowledge, the first matter is, that you pursue it for its own sake, as loving it. Of course, as soon as any one throws his *heart* into his work, he will throw into it all the faculties of his mind also ; and this may in itself sometimes fulfil the intellectual conditions which tend to make it liberal—namely, if he be a man of much capacity and wide knowledge. But, it must be admitted, it more frequently is otherwise. The cultivator of some

special branch of knowledge or of art may have an enthusiasm for his own pursuit which makes it honourable ; and yet, from the limited range of his thought, his mind may be narrowed by its very devotion ; and its action will then become less fruitful from losing not only the guiding analogies of kindred subjects, but also the suggestive stimulus which experience of very opposite character might have applied.

Fourthly therefore, we desire in the Professional man a sympathy and reverence for other pursuits besides his own. It is *il*liberal, when one science is positively jealous of the advance of another, and has a secret suspicion that the two are natural enemies. But neither is it liberal, when mutual sympathies are deficient. In fact this absence of sympathy, even when partial, is generally a mark of ignorance ; and when it is pervading, it constitutes narrowness of mind and ensures some form of bigotry.

Such narrowness, such bigotry are counteracted mainly in two ways ; by a wide basis of education in youth, and by a wide contact with human affairs in adult life. The man enthusiastically devoted to his special profession, and even absorbed by it, is apt by the very fact to meet only that side of human life which touches his profession : hence for him in particular it is important not to have had an originally narrow range of study. Herein lies the great difficulty, and the source of the prevalent defect, of self-educated geniuses. They revolve in their own too

narrow circle, and persuade themselves that the interests of the universe are comprized within their own horizon. Such men may have the kindling element of liberal study, and a part of its refinement ; but they have not the expansiveness nor the symmetry of mind which it imparts.

Peculiarly, as I suppose, to obviate this narrowness— to ensure some breadth and variety of solid knowledge, and impart some versatility of taste and power, Collegiate Instruction is valued. So strong has the popular feeling been, as to the essential dependence of its benefit on the cultivation of *all* the sciences within the same walls, that it seems impossible to get rid of the erroneous etymology, which deduces the title University from its teaching Universal science. I confess I think that this etymology, however erroneous, is prompted by a sound instinct. At the risk of seeming myself to be illiberal, I will say, that (looking to the modern acceptation of the word *College*, and all the associations it has assumed) I think it an abuse of words to entitle an institution a College, where the time allowed for study is so short, that hardly can the elements of even one subject be thoroughly acquired, and much less is it possible to cultivate all sides of the mind. We have ourselves been attacked upon the very same grounds. Many who hear me must well remember, that when these walls were first erected, it was a favourite objection from Oxford and Cambridge that this institution could not be a University (a name which it then accepted), since, by

omitting the study of Theology, it disavowed the claim to teach Universal Science. I do not wish now to reopen a controversy which may be thought exhausted and dead; but my argument itself leads me to make one remark in its own justification. It is this. While I believe that Theology is destined to be a true science, and (one may add) the highest of sciences, it is at present deficient in one important practical condition of academical science—namely, the fundamental concord of its professors. Notoriously, it was this which forced the founders of this institution to resolve not to have any Chair of Theology, lest it involve the claim to have several hostile chairs, and the right of dictating to the several holders what they should teach. But such dictation subverts the very basis of science, and makes all pretence to fundamental inquiry a pernicious illusion. Hence Theology was excluded, not by the nature of the subject, but because the chaotic state of the public mind concerning it refused freedom to the teacher. If ever the religious atmosphere of England shall be pure enough and calm enough to allow, without jealousy and panic, a Professor of Theology in Oxford, who is neither directly nor indirectly subjected to any imposed creed, all the original reasons, and (I suppose) every just reason, against the teaching of Theology within these walls also, will have vanished.

To teach or learn *universal* knowledge is of course an absurdity. All that can be meant is, that it conduces to largeness of mind to have studied the foundations of

knowledge in the most important branches, especially such as are in their nature peculiarly contrasted. To have studied one foreign language remarkably unlike our own; one branch of pure mathematics, one physical science, one moral science, must better conduce to versatility and expansiveness, as also to symmetry of mind and to real power, than to have been always absorbed in a single subject. But, that a young man may be able to take in and digest a variety of knowledge in a moderate time, it is almost essential that the knowledge be presented in a didactic—that is, in a dogmatic form; and this may rather narrow, than enlarge the mind, if *results*, instead of *processes* and *lines of thought* be submitted to it. In proportion as each professional science attains its own perfection, its elementary parts assume a form adapted for general and liberal instruction. Its high practical results may be pre-eminently popular, exciting the applause of the crowd like magical performances, or divination, or fireworks; but the benefit to the mind is not from these, but from insight into its *ways and means*. From this quarter it is that the special professions,—having been liberalized by the love of truth, by well-ordered digestion, by contact and sympathy with one another, and having been duly restrained to cultivate their own domain by mutual respect,—contribute each their important quota towards a broad and solid basis of liberal education, and towards that sound state of public opinion which refuses to become the dupe of

quackery, whether it assume the old form of astrology and magic, or that of some modern delusion. There is indeed a natural sympathy and mutual support among sham sciences, equally as among the genuine; for when the barrier against unwise credulity is once thrown down, the mind which has received one system of error is generally greedy to embrace a second. But though an entire soundness of public opinion is not yet attained, we are happily in that stage in which we may hope that at least the raw materials of future science are being accumulated by those who, like the astrologers or alchemists of past days, pursue some futile object.

Great progress has already been made towards breaking down what is in most nations the commonest of illiberal errors,—the disparaging of knowledge which does not instantly and visibly bear practical fruit. If metaphysical science is still undervalued among us, it is *not* (I am persuaded) on this mean and untenable ground; but because of the lamentable fact, that its professors, like the theologians, have so long appeared to the public as engaged in civil war: hence a general distrust of its scientific pretensions, which can only be dispelled gradually. But the splendid instance of astronomy and pure mathematics has for ever established the wisdom of valuing general truth for its own sake, long before we know of any practical applications. It might even seem, that the deeper the root and the richer the produce, the more hidden is the relation likely to be between the two.

That the noblest growths ripen their fruit slowest, is a truth long ago familiar; and if there is a backward part of the public which ill appreciates this, at any rate it has established itself well in the minds of all our academic men of science.

Perhaps this may suggest to me the topic of most importance now to press on young men who are about to study for a professional career. Liberal cultivation no longer seeks for refinement exclusively, but to develop and strengthen all the faculties of the mind. Erudition without force of understanding, is a real embarrassment. No one is so dull, so feeble, so unpractical, as a man who has more learning than good sense. What shall I call him? a David in Saul's armour? Nay, but rather, a Claudius on the throne of the Cæsars. To apply ample materials wisely, requires not merely good common sense, but uncommon sense; which, if with a few it be a gift of nature, yet is either earned or perfected not by specific professional study, but by general equable development. As a general at Balaklava, poor in the midst of abundance, choked with his own stores, helpless to use his resources; such is the student who crams his memory with the discoveries of great minds, but neglects to develop in himself those powers by which the discoveries were made. Farther, if he would use his treasures, he must attain the art of order and arrangement, so as to have them always at command; and above all, he must be able to bring into one focus all the scattered light which may conduce to a sound judg-

ment on each practical question. It is perhaps the same power of mind which looks through the varying symbols of abstract science, and seizes the thing signified behind, and that which looks through the superficial symptoms into the fundamental points of any practical case. I will not dogmatize on this. But I do say, that in an arduous profession, where effort must be sustained for many years before any great success is won, to be a few years behind in knowledge of a specific and technical kind, is of small importance, in comparison with the advantage of possessing higher mental qualifications. And here let me remark, that as Oxford and Cambridge have taken some lesson from us, it may be time that we learn a lesson from them. They have discovered that fair play must be given to the various branches of knowledge, and that the effort to force all minds to march through a single narrow path, leads to straggling, desertion, and terrible losses in the rear. They have greatly enlarged the choice of sciences and subjects ; and no young man can now excuse his idleness by saying that he has no taste for the particular study forced on him, and he will never be able to excel in it. But they have *not* enticed their students to commence strictly professional study at an earlier age. They are doubtless aware that variety of thought and versatile ability are best gained by a broad culture, fitly called liberal ; and that the mind thus prepared will afterwards show increased energy, when concentrated on some practical profession. The educated public, more-

over, is not blind nor unjust. It sees that refined accomplishment not only is no hindrance, but is an aid to professional success, if specific professional study follow it; hence the favour shown to academic distinction; hence also, a prevalent desire in our barristers, physicians, and clergy, that a previous literary degree should be even artificially encouraged. But the object is frustrated, if purely professional study is allowed to begin too early. Finally, I may add: the young man who is enabled to prolong his general education, and to cultivate knowledge and talent less obviously essential to the profession which he will ultimately embrace, not only provides best for professional success in the end, but becomes a more accomplished *man*, better furnished for his duties as a citizen and as a member of society. He finds no chasm to separate his lines of thought from those of the liberally educated, but is able to sympathize with all the forms of science, to understand and to learn from the most opposite quarters. This is a principal fruit of a well-chosen and persevering collegiate course; and in it we may find liberal and professional knowledge harmoniously combined.

THE END.

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Europa thus on bullock's semblance
Her snowy side repos'd; and pallid
Defied the deep with monsters swarming,
And midway mischiefs.

In flowery meads of late delighting,
Garlands she twin'd, the Nymphs to honour;
But now in glimmering night saw nothing
But stars and waters.

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AN APPEAL

TO

THE MIDDLE CLASSES

ON THE URGENT NECESSITY OF

NUMEROUS RADICAL REFORMS,

FINANCIAL AND ORGANIC.

By FRANCIS W. NEWMAN,

PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON, AND FORMERLY FELLOW OF BALIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

LONDON:
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1848.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since this Pamphlet was in the Printer's hands, the 10th of April has happily past without bloodshed. The Middle Classes have given a sample of their determinate aversion to violent measures, and have a better right than ever to demand that their voice shall be heard for peaceful reform.

AN APPEAL,

&c.

In times like these no apology is needed from any one for appealing to his fellow-countrymen on matters of the deepest common interest. That I do not address the highest classes, arises from no want of respect, but because I have no right to suppose that my superiors in rank will give attention to me. Nevertheless, if any of them are led by curiosity or any other motive to peruse these pages, I engage to let them see that I desire as long as possible to uphold reverence to the Throne, honour to the Peerage, and at all events, and at any price, to secure supremacy for Order, Wisdom and Equity.

There are many who account for the present tranquillity of England, while the whole continent is convulsed, by the comfortable remark that *we have no grievances to redress.* Oh that this were true! The present tranquillity is partly from awe, while we gaze with interest and wonder, hope and fear, on the sublime and terrible scene before us; partly also from a dread of stirring popular passions, if we move while excitement is too fresh. Our grievances are old sores, too deep-seated to be removed by superficial treatment, and certainly not wanting the same remedies as those of Germany and Italy; while as for France, our prayer is, *not* to be driven into the same cruel position by the same cause which has afflicted her with her *First* and her *Third* revolution;—namely, extravagant government-expenditure, and unprincipled tax-

ation, alienating the heart of the masses. Our grievances, in short, are,—Enormous Debt, and habitual Extravagance disabling us from paying it: or, to go into detail, that the process may be more clearly traced,—

1st. We have a frightful and disgraceful amount of liabilities.

2nd. While we are the richest nation of the world, the national exchequer suffers annual anxiety.

3rd. The interest of the Debt is defrayed by heavy taxes laid on the poor, who have no moral responsibility whatever for its having been contracted, and who have never had any benefit from it.

4th. Every possible ministry is so fast bound to extravagant and vain-glorious *precedent*, that no relief is to be hoped in the existing routine.

5th. There not only is no security against farther growth of the Debt, but it actually has been increased during the times of the Reformed Parliament.

6th. Both Ministers and Parliament have too much to do. Hence Colonial discontent is perpetually gathering in consequence of our mistakes.

Our national position is exceedingly changed, our dangers alarmingly increased, by late events on the continent, because *they shorten the time* allotted to our rulers for administrative reforms imperiously demanded by right and justice. If the rest of Europe had remained behind us in national development, we might have worked on in our habitual factious way, and in another half century might have obviated the danger of civil collisions,—always supposing that we did not get entangled in new European war. But now, many of the lower classes are puffed into a high estimate of their own military strength, not knowing how much stronger are the elements of resistance to them in England than any which exist in France or Germany, and the extended Suffrage in both those countries will redouble impatience here. While we tarry to reform what ought to be reformed, we add force to revolutionary impulse.

That which I have noted as Grievance No. 3, on which all the rest turns, deserves the deepest attention from men of property. As long as it exists, it is morally certain that poor men will become disaffected to the existing constitution as fast as they gain political information. Since to keep them in the dark is quite impossible, we must calmly consider the future results of their knowledge. Some politicians may offer proof that the English poor are the better off for the great expenditure which caused the Debt, and for our colonial empire which swells the taxation; but if these reasoners are really correct, they still cannot hope to convince the masses of the people that they are. The latter will always read our financial history, to the effect, that our aristocracy have treated *them*, as the rabble of Paris are treating the higher ranks of the French;—namely, have taxed the nation for their personal whims or benefit. They will interpret the past to mean,—that the king and the landed proprietors involved us in wars and enormous expenses for their own pleasure or vainglory; that the aristocracy took for itself all the gains of public employment, and shifted the burden of taxation on to the shoulders of the poor, and of *their children for ever*. How large and unjust a share of it the middle and commercial classes have borne and bear, the poor do not reflect; and too often even smart the more, because the Corn Laws have been removed.

But let us try to divest ourselves of habitual thoughts, and come with fresh eyes to consider the National Debt, which it is possible that the poor have long understood better even than the Middle Classes. A wealthy man embarrassed in his circumstances, who desires a loan, may grant a mortgage on his property;—but not on his son. He may make every piece of metal or wood, every head of cattle answerable for his debt; but to make his children or his servants responsible would be outright like selling them into slavery, and would not be ratified in a State which acknowledged the rights of men in the barest form of freedom. If this be admitted, it seems indisputable that Lord North, Mr. Pitt and his succes-

sors, with all the men of their day, if all had been unanimous, if all had been in full proportion represented in Parliament, still had no power to bind anything but *the then existing property* of England with liability for the debts they contracted; and that the national creditor, whatever he may ask in equity, can ask nothing in justice, except from *hereditary wealth*; while on the other hand, from hereditary wealth he has a right to exact every penny, though all the dukes and marquesses of the land had to yield up their estates for it. How much more, when the ancestors of the present possessors enjoyed, at the time when the loans were made, the undivided power over both legislature and administration, and used to punish in various ways all who dared to remonstrate too openly against their proceedings!

Nor is this view sensibly affected by taking Government property into consideration. For first, it is certain that if the lender had understood that Property only, not Industry, could be mortgaged, he would have refused to lend unless the bond were made out upon the rents of private buildings and land, and not only on unsaleable Government-possessions. Secondly, it is unimaginable that forts, palaces, arsenals, government-offices, ships, docks, materials of war,—if sold in 1815 to the Chinese, as those in India were sold to the British Government at the last Charter,—could have been valued at more than 200 millions, or a quarter of the Debt. Thirdly, supposing that the Government had started in 1815 without a shed or a boat, a musket or a desk; yet the annual thirty-two millions (nine-tenths at least of which was paid by the industrious) as interest for the Debt, was prodigiously more than enough in ten years' time to reinstate a ruined Government in all that it could reasonably ask. From the mixing up of accounts, it is impossible to make any estimate that is worth its pains; but it seems evident that industry has *already* paid enormously more than its share, while hereditary wealth, as such, has never paid anything at all.

In no times could we make light of such facts; but other times might afford more excuse for inactive "trusting in Pro-

vidence." I do not indeed forget what has been done already. Great improvements in taxation have been made; more (it might be said) are to be hoped for; and the people will gradually learn a better temper, as we work into a juster position. But our case is now grievously similar to that of France before her First Revolution. The nobility would then neither consent to be taxed, nor combine to lower the public expenses. So have we lately seen that the Minister of the day,—as popular, honest and independent a one as we are likely to have with our present organization,—does not dare *even* to subject the landed gentry and nobility to the same Legacy and Probate Duties as the rest of the community! In regard to this tax (of which it is not too strong a phrase to say that the aristocracy have *defrauded* the nation), if the arrears for the last hundred years were paid up, they would suffice to discharge a very large fraction of the whole national debt. Yet in the light of the nineteenth century, in the face of Europe, when the public revenue is deficient, and when an independent member of the House of Commons calls attention to the fact that Freehold Land has no right to this exemption, the Minister dares not open his ears to the remark, and the idea is dropt as of a thing impossible. This too, after a Third French Revolution! Again, when a bill was lately brought forward to abolish the Game Laws as unjust to farmers, wasteful to the public, and demoralizing to the peasants, not only did a majority of the House display a tender sympathy with aristocratic amusements, and with what is called "property" in wild animals, without any commensurate feeling for the industry and morals of the people;—but the Home Secretary, as mouthpiece of a quasi-popular ministry, while by his arguments condemning the law, defended it by his vote, and merely recommended the landlords not to preserve *so much* game. This likewise after a *third* French Revolution, and when Prussia is establishing Universal Suffrage!

It is now for the Middle Classes to consider whether there is the slightest chance of either of two events: 1st, that the

landed aristocracy, who will not yet submit to Legacy and Probate Duties, will ever voluntarily subject themselves to any large additional taxation in order to lessen those which fall on the industrious: 2ndly, that they will allow such a reduction of the public expenses, as would make it possible to administer the Queen's government at all without perpetuating, extending and deepening in the mass of the industrious classes that disaffection which is sapping the foundations of Peerage and Throne. Chartists no longer cry out merely because, or when, they are suffering, but much rather because they feel (strongly, however dimly) that the present system is unjust to them. Yet what are we to do? The interest of the Debt is twenty-seven millions and a half. To lay this upon *New* Property, and upon the Incomes earned by labour of mind or hand, is a part of the same injustice as to lay it on the poor working man; and the middle classes already have a full share of it. If, in order to be strictly just, we were to make a separate account of the National Mortgage, and charge it upon the Landed proprietors alone (assuming for the moment that *all* such property must be treated as old, or as bought liable to the Debt, though that was not known at the time), it will be found that from 40 to 50 per cent. of all the rent of England would be at once condemned to the public Creditor. If this could be levied, it would be impossible to foresee what portion of it the landlords would succeed in throwing on their farmers in the form of rent, especially if they combined, as they would combine, in fact, if not consciously. But we have already seen that they refuse to pay even the common Legacy Duties; and there is certainly no constitutional power that can compel them to pay twenty-seven millions and a half annually from their separate funds. Nothing but a violent revolution will extort this; and it need not here be argued that a compromise is infinitely preferable. To do strict justice, in our present entanglements, is physically impossible. We are then virtually in the position of a *bankrupt State*, with this important qualification, that we are a *wealthy people*. Let us look steadily into our real condition,

and it will be clear that nothing but totally new principles of public expenditure and taxation can permanently ward off a collision between Property and Labour, with results not to be foreseen.

The aristocracy know the growing hostility of the working classes to our institutions; but they know also how staunch the middle classes are to the cause of Order, and how great their dread of the crude political economy which "a working man's parliament" would believe in and enforce. While they have the middle classes on their side, they believe that they can put down by violence any attempts at violence, and will probably signalize the very first serious outbreak by a fierce and unsparing slaughter, as the most merciful way of stopping lawlessness. But whether the innovators remain at rest, or move and are crushed, (a third possibility I cannot imagine at present,) in either case the aristocracy will be emboldened to hold on their present way; which is,—to concede nothing, however just, until compelled by pressure from without. They may seem to be arguing with themselves, that the more they yield, the more they will have to yield; and that by holding fast what they have got, as long as they can, they will on the whole best perform the function of *conservatives*.

It is probably as vain to try to reason them collectively out of this idea, as to convince the masses. Indeed, if conservatism be defined as the keeping of power in its present hands, perhaps the self-named conservatives are correct in their calculations. But if it mean the conservation of Law and Order, of Justice and Right, of Peace and Wise Counsel, then I must deny that these men are Conservatives, whatever their personal virtue or talents. The history of the mind of England since the Reform Bill is full of instruction. From the day that the Bill became an Act, those who had opposed endeavoured to countermine it; and succeeded, partly by means of an ecclesiastical agitation and by a No-Popery cry (which, coming at a most critical moment, has for ever alienated Ireland from us); partly by help of the Chandos

clause of the Reform Act; but principally by means of the House of Lords: which has ruined the popularity of the ministries that might have been popular, and has cast into the ranks of the discontented tens of thousands of energetic minds. If now the middle classes continue,—from love of quiet, from dread of confusion, from fear of going *too far*,—to shrink from demanding Organic Reform, let them consider the only probable result. They will virtually become tools of the present Whig-Tory body, to uphold *it* and *its connections* in power for ten, twenty, thirty years, until the moment comes when the lowest classes, swelled by perpetual accession from despairing Reformers in the middle ranks, will flame into rebellion with a fury proportioned to the enmity which the long feud shall have engendered. What ease or security will then the Middle Class enjoy?

It is the opinion of politicians who have great insight into national feeling, that the craving for Equality of Suffrage, which the deep disappointment of hopes from the Reform Act has excited, must defeat every attempt at winning popular satisfaction in any smaller change. If this be true, as I fear it is, and *if those who already possess the franchise do not take the matter into their own hands*, we may try to trace out the future course of things: it does not appear difficult.

No organic Reform will ensue. Every ministry has too much to do, and will not encounter opposition where no popularity is to reward them; nor is it probable that they would be able to carry anything of importance. Embarrassments about revenue may not always be as severe as now; yet Entails will not be abolished, nor Agriculture advance rapidly: Ireland will neither be well cultivated nor peaceable until it has either *more* or *less* liberty than at present; and it is to be feared that our ministers, Whigs and Tories, have too deeply committed themselves against either extreme, to adopt it until after a civil war, which will not improve the state of our Exchequer. The landowners will not submit to any taxation which can possibly be warded off; the middle classes will justly refuse to pay *for others*; and the working men

are already determined to repudiate the Debt, as soon as possible. Meanwhile our present scale of expense will continue, or something very close upon it; and even if no new debt is incurred, yet the old will remain without a term of payment.

How long this is to continue, I say not; whether a half or a whole generation, or even half a century. But the time must come, which the children now living will see, when the workmen, pike or musket in hand, will demand Equality of Suffrage, *the Debt remaining as it is*! If they get it, either the fundholder will forthwith lose his rights, or an enormous mass of taxation will be suddenly cast upon the rich by the new régime. A third possibility may be named. A fancy may take some disciples of the Birmingham school to pay the Debt in Paper, instead of Gold. It matters not, for the present argument, which of these courses we imagine. In any case a tremendous overthrow of mercantile confidence must ensue, which would plunge England into convulsions to which France is as yet happily a stranger. Every great manufacturing town would be not merely a little Paris, but a thousand times worse. There would be the same inability of the master to find capital and wages, the same necessity of feeding the men on public funds, but neither the same public revenue to feed them, nor the same military habits in the citizens to control them. Why need we try to trace the consequences farther?

But still, this is not all. The foresight of such dangers would lead to an intense unflinching refusal of Uniform Suffrage. The aristocracy and a vast mass of the middle classes (unless England shall have changed beyond imagination) will resist popular violence, not with the mere supercilious airs of a French nobility, but with the determined desperate bravery of men who are ready to lose all that is dearest for Honour, for their Rank and possessions, for the Throne, for the name of England, for the cause of Order, and against universal lawlessness. Skilful, resolute, experienced military officers abound among them;—no mere court-sol-

diers for show-days. Few wars of history would compare in deadly stubbornness to that which great England could wage against herself. What might be its result, would depend on its distance in time, and on its first stages. Unless it were instantly crushed, Ireland, Canada, perhaps India, would be convulsed. If the Democrats were to move prematurely, they would of course rush into ruin. But if there had been any imminent danger from their attempt, a violent reaction towards Toryism would follow; high aristocracy, untempered by popular feeling, would long rule. Even if *no* Irish rebellion or colonial insurrections or foreign hostilities followed on our civil war, we should be immensely thrown back in all respects, and might become assimilated to Ireland. Vast capital would have been lost, more debt incurred, confidence (domestic and foreign) impaired; and new fuel stored up to kindle a fire in the generation following. Over what a volcano are we slumbering, with such an empire!

Call me not an alarmist. I do not say there is any immediate danger *yet*. But there never was a civil war in any nation possessed of fixed institutions, the source of which did not lie in a preceding generation. There have been few intestine struggles (except against despotic princes) in which wisdom did not come too late when the conflict impended. He who accumulates combustibles for the incendiary, has a principal guilt in a conflagration. We, if we nourish in our institutions unrighteous principles which alienate the masses, shall have the guilt of all the confusion and misery which may come on the following periods. Modern Civilization, as developed in England, is sustained upon Mercantile Credit: and therefore, is exposed to sudden enormous ruin, wherever a great Debt exists. This is our danger, as our shame. If ever there was a time when the future of England depended on the wisdom of one generation,—perhaps during a very few years,—it is now: for opportunity now lost may prove irrevocable. The fear of seeming to be afraid makes our Parliament the more disdainful of the Unfranchised; and under this state of things discontent must take deeper and deeper

root (and who can recover a nation's heart, once lost ?) unless the Franchised interfere, with all constitutional formality, calling upon Parliament to do justice, without respect to Privileged Orders.

There is no use in mincing the matter. Our present taxation is UNJUST. This is our weakness: this is the strength of disaffection. There can be no safety and no peace for us, *until the interest of the Debt ceases to be felt by industry; nor until the expenses of our colonies are borne by the colonies themselves,* and not by the industrious Englishman. The empire, with its armies and navies, which is the glory of our Crown and Aristocracy, is the curse and hatred of the Birmingham operative. What sort of a united nation can we be, while this contrast remains?

It must be added, that there can be no security for us against future tamperings in Debt, unless a final settlement is now made, and great principles are solemnly laid down, fettering the action of all future ministries. Such are these:—that a year be appointed, before which the entire Debt shall be discharged:—that no future loan shall ever lay the nation under pecuniary engagements which are to continue longer than ten years:—that the fund for defraying every future debt shall be kept separate from the general revenue, and shall be replenished by taxes specifically appropriated to it. When those whose indiscretion may so easily force us to forestal our revenue are made to understand that their deed will be prominent in every schedule of taxation until defrayed,—a far stronger sense of responsibility will grow up.

If once we are secured from new debts, the nation will be able to brace itself to the effort of getting clear from its present entanglement. But, for this, *we must not ignore our insolvency*; else, *we cannot get necessary retrenchments*; then farther, we cannot ask the public creditor to remit a prospective shilling; we cannot expect either the industrious poor or the industrious rich man to vote to tax himself for the public creditor, nor indeed for the Queen's service. At present, our ministries talk high about the influence and honour of England,

her rank in the world, the necessity of sustaining her position by commanding and generous conduct, *exactly as if we had no debt at all.* What more indeed could they do, if, instead, they had an accumulated store of hundreds of millions?

But suppose us all to recognize (in heart, at least, if we are too proud to use the words) that our State has gone on, for forty years at least, as so many great mercantile houses of late; hiding her insolvency by expensive show;—a system which must ultimately be ruinous;—what in that case might we do? I apprehend that we might address the public creditors as follows:—"Your predecessors lent their money to "North, Pitt, Perceval and Co., who unfortunately promised "more than they legitimately could. Upon the estates of the "landed proprietors you have a clear right; but it is a right, "the attempt to enforce which, would risk your entire claims. "Be therefore satisfied with our compromise. The payments "to you *shall terminate sixty years hence,* say, two generations. "You yourselves cannot seriously think that in any case they "will last longer, if no settlement is made. A violent break-"up, if not now forestalled, will take place in less time; so "that possibly the present value of your stock will scarcely "sink by this measure. Others also are about to make sacri-"fices; we ask therefore this moderate sacrifice of you."

Such a measure would bring no immediate relief to the revenue, but it would immediately give heart to the nation to aid in the good work of clearing itself. A State free from debt is in the present stage of our civilization a far better legacy to children than private fortune: and the duty of our statesmen is by every means to excite a sense of this in our people. But they do not, they will not. They dare not attempt to be frugal on any great and fruitful scale. The Middle Classes must take the matter into their own hands, and terminate the present unprincipled proceedings. The same age which contracted the debt, instead of being stoically frugal in order that they might pay it, were as lavish and wasteful as men generally are who mean others to pay for them. *Their precedent,* as to our whole style of public ex-

penditure, *has come down to this day*; and is now the clinging vice which threatens to eat away our vitals. Splendour, generosity, liberality, are to us deadly sins, while the Debt hangs about us, and its interest has to be defrayed by the industrious.

The moment frugality is urged, the moment public retrenchments are recommended, we are told of *the glory of this empire*, on which the sun never sets; and perhaps, that *its sun will set*, if we dare to become prudent and just. I am not inclined to speak in quakerish tone against military greatness. There is undoubtedly a certain grand and heroic glory in encountering cruel odds for honour and for duty; and England has acted her full part in such virtues:—nay, more than her part; for our fathers have robbed us of our right, if a right it be, to aid oppressed nations. Yet not all men have the same sort of glory. The glory of a servant and of a tradesman is not the same as of a general; nor that of a woman the same as of a man. The glory of an unembarrassed landowner is, to be generous; the glory of a bankrupt is, by all self-denial to pay his debt. We are a mortgaged nation; our first glory would be to redeem the mortgage,—for the sake of England's prospects, and for the sake of our fathers' honour; I will add, for an example of good faith, self-denial and energetic wisdom to all the world. If that however (as I fear) is quite impossible without adding injustice to injustice, our second-best glory is the humbler one of so compromising the difficulty as to set our grandchildren free, meanwhile exercising a rigid parsimony such as becomes the insolvent. We value influence over foreigners: true influence is gained unsought by such examples as this, and in the present commercial age it would be peculiarly appreciated. On the contrary, every ostentation of public wealth, in those who are 750 millions in debt, is a mournful folly and a dangerous iniquity.

But what, moreover, is the colonial glory, which we dread to lose? Is it a glory to rule colonies against their will?—to alienate their hearts, constrain their submission, and drive

them into rebellion when they grow strong; and then, either lose them, as we have lost the United States, or give to them ignominiously, *after* a war, all that they asked *before* it;—which is what we have done to Canada? Is it a glory to have an overworked Colonial Office mismanaging distant realms, to the equal discontent of the overtaxed Englishman and the hampered colonist? If our colonies had always been free, just as Canada in fact now is, all would rejoice in their relation to us, and from England as a centre our moral influence would circulate through the world. Our aristocracy and gentry, if they wished to serve in the colonies, have qualities that would make them coveted, wherever they chose to settle; and *our Peerage might take root abroad,* which now is impossible.

An individual possessed of large but mortgaged property always finds *large* retrenchments easier than *little* ones. A drunkard cannot break through his vice gradually, nor can a prodigal nation. A sudden, enthusiastic, universal effort on the part of the wealthy would, in result, be to us as no effort at all. All public frugality would positively enrich, not the Exchequer only, but the national capital; for Government expenditure does not replace itself; while a very large part of that liberated from the annual service would be reproductive in the hands of individuals. As long as the national capital and national confidence remain undiminished, no retrenchments of expense on the part of the wealthy in order to meet new taxation can tend to stop general* industry. On the other hand, the more universal the infliction on the higher classes, the less any would feel it. Aristocratic frugality would become as good-humoured as in the case of fellow-

* I fear it must be admitted that the arts of luxury will suffer by anything which lessens the enormous disparity of wealth fostered by our present system; which is *economically* the same as if twenty millions a-year were exacted from the poor, and *given as a free present* to the higher classes. The jeweller's goods do not lose much by exportation; but to the confectioners I have no comfort to offer, nor much to the jockey.

travellers or fellow-soldiers; and all would have the cheerful feeling that brighter days were before them.

But in order to produce any great result, to call out any patriotism in our people, England should be called *to bear her own burden only*. Canada, and every colony, except those in an infantine stage, must have its own House of Assembly, and sustain its own charges*. The Ionian Isles must have a free press, and a constitution in fact, not in name, and be of no more expense to us. Such military and naval posts as Malta, Aden, Labuan, Hong Kong, St. Helena, the Bermudas, must of course remain upon the imperial treasury; but their number must be severely restricted to that which justice or profitable considerations suggest. If merchants petition for stations to promote trade, they should be required to furnish plans for making them self-remunerative.

I may not pass over, though I will only slightly touch, points which have of late been discussed in Parliament. That our fleets on the coast of Africa and in the Mediterranean ought to be withdrawn, and Gibraltar given back to the Spaniards, would seem plain to all, if they duly considered that WE have at present *no right* to be generous or grand. At the same time, I believe that no one has shown, or ever will show, what good any of these establishments have done; while the evil that they do (besides their expense) is exceedingly manifest.

To the details of our home-expenditure it would be absurd to attempt to allude. No one knows what it is, nor can the public reform it. If we of the Middle Class were all of one mind, still all that we could do would be to insist on paying the dues on the debt *first*, and administering the State with *the residue*: ministers would then learn to economize. Ireland nevertheless needs a few words in this connexion.

* It may seem presumptuous to speak with any confidence on details. —Whether the Cape can, for a long time yet, support itself, may be doubted; now that the frontier is so extended. But if that colony had been cast on its own resources twenty-five years ago, it would never have grasped at sovereignty over the emigrating Boors, nor have involved itself with the Caffres till strong enough to meet them.—The West Indies seem to need Federation.

There seem to be two opposite ways of proceeding towards Ireland, either of which might succeed; that of preparing to acknowledge her separate nationality, or that of resolutely undermining it. Our present plan is, in word (and indeed in very haughty parliamentary style) to refuse it, but in fact to give them every facility for extorting it by agitation. Our halting between two extremes, and the vacillation of purpose, which our parties have caused, hitherto have been ruinous to Ireland: and it certainly looks as if we should at last give them Repeal in disgust. If our statesmen really foresee this termination, they cannot be too quick in preparing Ireland for it by putting her on the footing of Canada, with a House of Assembly subordinated to our Parliament; then, after a generation of native statesmen has grown up, we should be able gradually to increase the powers of the House of Assembly into those of an Irish Parliament; *and meanwhile*, so settle the Irish Church question, that it might not afflict them with civil war, when they became competent to discuss it.—Of course a thousand difficulties and objections to all this will be started: but they are much fewer and lighter to Ireland than the evils of giving Repeal all at once, if at length it is to come to that. To England, immediate and total Repeal would be, no doubt, an excellent riddance; but in common humanity, we cannot at present expose Ireland to the struggle, if we can save her from it.—An opposite system would be, to break the country up into provinces, say *one* in the North, and *two* in the South; and govern the two southern ones as we govern India; but give to the northern province a colonial legislature. The south is not yet fit for constitutional government, and apparently cannot become fit until its social condition is improved; to effect which, England needs a greater despotic power over both landlords and peasants. In the southern provinces the Protestant Irish Church would be of course extinguished; and more suitable national institutions be organized, yet without alienating public revenues to the see of Rome. Under such a system, Ireland might perhaps be trained to union with England.

Which of these opposite plans is the better, I will not presume to decide; but we have a right to claim of our rulers to do one thing or other: to lay fixed plans, and persevere in them in spite of changes of ministry; whether to allow to the Irish a peaceable separation from us, or take from them the power of demanding one by violence. Mere Arms' Bills are not sufficient for the latter; Ireland must not have any single centre, or look on herself as One. *If indeed she were One*, there might be no valid objection to Repeal; but the northern Protestants and the southern Catholics are two nations: and just in so far as this is a reason against Repeal, it is also a reason against one Lord Lieutenant in Dublin.

Let us not then by the vacillations of our rulers and the sinister interest of parties be implicated in a position from which we cannot escape without (at least) loss of honour and immense pecuniary damage. No one can say when a civil war in Ireland may arise. No one moreover can say what advantage might be taken of this by the discontented in England. Ireland enormously complicates our difficulties. For her sake we keep up a great army, and Europe thinks us her oppressors! We must either let her govern herself, (and at once acknowledge her nationality,) or take to ourselves greater securities against her turbulence.

To fix ideas, I will now venture on the uncertain sea of Statistics. Let twelve millions of taxes be taken off from the working man. Of this sum, one-half can certainly be saved out of the revenue; for fifteen years ago we spent six millions less than now. By Legacy and Probate Duties suppose that two millions accrue. Then impose it on the ministry to save as much as possible of the remaining four millions out of the general expenses of the empire by such retrenchments as have been indicated: and let the residue, if any, be made up by Taxes on Building Land, on Rent of Land, and on all property which cannot be proved to be the recent creation of industry. To make this as fair as possible, modifications may be allowed which need not here be specified; and I only desire to observe that the ground-rent on Building Land, the

value of which has so increased in all our large towns, *at the public expense* and *without any outlay on the part of the owner*, may justly be taxed at an enormous rate.

But (in the existing danger) to me it seems of far less importance from what property the new taxes come, than that they be levied on realized property, not on industry; provided only that they do not drive capital out of the country. And this they will not do at present, because of the greater comparative security which England offers; moreover, such a measure would so increase the security of capital, as partially to obviate that danger. That the fundholder ought to have no new tax, when he consents to convert his perpetuity into sixty years, is self-evident. As the entire Church property will be wrecked, unless the present tide is stayed, a large mass of surplus funds from Bishops, Deans and Canons, on the death of the present holders, will be voted to discharge the Debt, by those who understand the danger to which the institution is exposed.

But would it not be puerile credulity to expect any of this without new principles and new men, unfettered by our present evil precedents, and by any mere delicacy towards individuals? And is it not obvious that such men cannot be put forward into power, much less sustained in it, without organic reform? Say not that "we want only good administrators," and that the present machinery will then do. Surely Lord Grey, Lord Melbourne, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord John Russell, were all ministers neither wanting in capacity and discernment, nor enslaved to personal gain, nor incapable of public spirit, nor, in short, inferior to the average of those who are ever likely to take the lead in public affairs. It is useless to lay the blame on them as individuals; they are *not* really as unshackled in the exercise of power as the vulgar imagine. In new questions they have very great authority; in times of struggle they often exert a decisive influence; but in regard to all matters which have become *routine* and *precedent* an invisible hand restrains them. In short, *they are not the only administrators of the country*. Besides the House

of Commons, of which they are the reputed organ, they are responsible to THE HOUSE OF LORDS, whose confidence they do not necessarily enjoy, and on whom the people have no control. A minister permanently at variance with that House must either reform it or resign power. And now, unless the House of Lords undergoes radical change, there will be little diminution of public expense, no change of financial principles, no step towards winning over the more reasonable Chartists, no arresting of the accessions to their numbers from the middle classes. Moderate men who abstractedly disapprove of Chartism may at last see no hope of alleviating the convulsion which is to come, but by joining the ranks of Chartists, and so seeking to influence them from within.

Indeed, while the House of Lords has a fixed aversion to all radical change, it is more peculiarly averse to a frugal Government. Our aristocracy has always been a military and naval one: to say this, is to say enough. It would be wasting words to prove what is quite plain; that whatever the zeal of a ministry for retrenchment, the resentment of the Lords would always make it of little permanent value to the nation. Besides, we have observed, that to break the chains of *precedent*, new men are essentially needed. Few aristocrats born, moreover, understand what frugality means: this is a homely virtue hardly decorous to them, certainly never praised; a virtue for a steward or a slave, not for a hero. A man of the people is here wanted, and the Lords will think him a lowborn fellow. Sooner than bear a plebeian finance-reforming ministry, they would maintain every abuse in rigid immoveability, till Chartism or Communism destroy Peerage and Throne together. Reform of the House of Lords therefore seems on every ground to be a prerequisite to frugal government.

It is a far more arduous question to decide in what this change should consist. And as I write, it comes across my heart to apologize for discussing topics of such moment, which to some may seem the height of ridiculous presumption. But I need no apology: for unless men like me—I

mean, the untitled, undistinguished middle class,—treat coolly on such matters with pen and tongue, many now alive will see the same treated by the rabble with rifle and pike. But to return. An able writer in the *Daily News* has lately broached this same subject; and proposes a constant infusion of new blood into the Lords, by making them elective, (for life, as I understand,) *as the representatives of property.* He would leave the present Peers in possession, and probably also their now living eldest sons: vacancies only he would have filled up by election. The elected to be wealthy men, whatever the nature of the wealth; and the electors the holders of realized property, on whom peculiarly high taxes are to be laid.—There is certainly merit in this scheme, which deserves to be maturely considered. If debt were *not* our difficulty; if time were *not* precious; it seems at first sight to have many advantages. It cannot but be augured that the precedent of America and Europe will perpetually lower our franchise for elections of the Commons; and that a century hence our House of Commons may represent only the mind of the *numerical majority* in the country: how valuable then (it may be said) to have a House of Lords co-ordinate with it, which shall represent the *wealth*!

But it must be considered, that if carried tomorrow, no sensible change in the House could arise for twenty years at least; indeed, if the rights of eldest sons be reserved, forty years may pass before any portion of *movement-spirit* can predominate in the House. And after all, if property were the sole new basis of a House of Lords, excellent as this would be to secure a powerful conservatism, it is far from clear that it would help us towards taxing Property, unless the House of Commons were simultaneously made immensely more democratic.

Then again, neither is it clear that in the remote future two Houses are desirable, resting on the separate basis of property and numbers. Unless precedent controlled both, and excellent feeling pervaded the whole nation, collision between two such bodies might be extremely dangerous: indeed whether they

could work together at all, would be an anxious experiment. The two elements of property and numbers ought, I apprehend, to be mingled in one and the same assembly, in order to moderate each other, and hinder the formation of separate *ésprits de corps*.

Nor is any reform in the House of Lords *alone* at all adequate in the present state of things. The slowness with which the machinery of the Commons works might have been bearable in the last century; in the last twelve years may have made us anxious; but after recent events is manifestly ruinous. Seven years the Anti-Corn-Law League had to labour; but seemed at last victorious. The principles of the League have been triumphantly acknowledged. A Parliament has been returned more decidedly favourable to Free Trade than ever before. The Queen's speech announced the Navigation Laws as an important topic to be treated; and now it is likely to be delayed till the next session, as if the battle concerning it had not been fought and won already! So again with the Timber Duties. We had supposed that Sir Robert Peel delayed them from some technical impediment; but the reform is put off for ever, under some pretence of a promise which a minister chose to make to Canada. Our colony is first misgoverned; then bribed, at the minister's will, and at our expense. The House of Commons, as truly as the Lords, will do nothing quickly, however urgent, unless a League stands ready to take power out of their hands.

The very dangerous principle of making the Suffrage *equal* but not *universal*,—was *not* dangerous when the precedent was set; namely, in the times when the Commons House was subordinate in the government of England. But it was a capital error in Lord Grey and his coadjutors to plant this as fundamental in the Reform Bill. To leave any unfranchised who pay taxes (except for proved illegality) is, I suppose, unconstitutional: but we may add, to leave *any mass of men* without public defenders in Parliament, is so opposed to equity, that agitation for the suffrage has in this a moral justification, which wins support to the Chartists. The higher classes

see that universal and equal suffrage is a system for making Youth, Ignorance and Poverty predominant over Age, Cultivation and Wealth : but the less educated only see that it is a mode of protecting themselves from class-oppression, and from that taxation which has been so unjustly laid upon them. Despair adds to their ranks many educated men. The minimum of wealth which now confers the franchise is as arbitrary a limit, as the age of twenty-one, which (according to the Chartists) is to lift a ploughboy on to a level with a discreet and wealthy merchant of middle age : and the equality of the ten-pound householder with the squire who has five thousand a year, is still more absurd than would be the equality of the hand-loom weaver to the ten-pound householder. Hence the Reform Act had in itself the elements of destruction, which showed themselves immediately ; and he will be a rash man who thinks it possible that a franchise *established on no principle* can stand the perpetual sapping of aggrieved and injured Chartists ; the middle classes must first infuse into it new principles, more comprehensive, and at the same time more conservative. To redress our grievances and obviate our dangers, we want a League of the Franchised, to enforce a *true* People's Charter ; not one which enables a single class to swamp all the rest, but one which embraces all alike, so as to secure all from oppression. Rich men should have more power than poor men, partly because on the average they are more intelligent, as a result of leisure and education ; that is, because they are generally *more fit* for power ;—and partly because they are fewer ; and therefore have *more need* of power, else their class is unprotected through its smallness.

By reason of the real grievances which Chartists can plead, and the large portion of truth which they have on their side, we, *if unorganized,* cannot resist them, who are organized. We shall be infallibly mere tools of injustice, first to the highest classes, and in due time to the lowest, unless *we also* form an Organic Union, with the resolve to obtain justice from the former and put a curb on the latter. For these purposes, I propose to require such regulations as the following :—

1st. To give a fixed number of the seats in the Commons (say 100) to representatives of electors who belong to a higher scale of wealth.

This idea may be unpopular at first to all who are low in the present scale; but it will be essential, in order permanently to secure the just rights of Wealth, without which every system must be rotten; and it will be to the holders of the lower franchise a barrier against being swamped by a far lower population than themselves.

2nd. To give a representative, in many populous towns, to all the males *above the age of forty*, who are not included in the present franchise,—which is not to be disturbed.

3rd. To allot other representatives for Counties to the males above the same age.

4th. To forbid any constituency of the lower franchise under the number of 6000; and with a view to this, to join various small towns together.

5th. Supposing that in this way the numbers of the House of Commons were swelled to 800; let it be farther enacted,

That the House upon meeting should elect 250 of its number *to sit and vote with the Lords* for the whole of the session.

Suppose that the poor have in this way 180 members. Few of them will be sent to sit with the Upper House. Thus they will have 180 members out of 550; enough to give a rapid impetus to Financial Reform, without danger of convulsion. A *rapid* impetus is now essential to safety; and nervous fears are no longer manly. Boldness and decision in our organic change is even still more necessary than caution: for we must aim to win over all the good and honourable Chartists, and reunite England.

6th. To add to the stability of the Upper House, let it have *only a suspensive veto* upon the Lower; being able to negative a bill twice and twice only.

The influence of the Upper House would not really be lessened, but improved in its nature. Bills would then much oftener originate with it. When no longer able constitutionally to thwart the Commons, it would co-operate more by elevated and comprehensive views; and the dignity of the Lords would not as now be overborne by out-of-door threats. Two *really independent* Houses can mean nothing but collision or stagnation.

7th. Let all Peers have a right both to elect and to be elected into the Lower House. [If the Lords claimed to elect twenty of their own number to sit and vote with the Commons, so much the better.]

8th. Let all public servants, at the call of the Prime Minister, take their seat, (occasionally or fixedly,) without a vote, in either or both Houses.

If a seat, without a vote, were recognised, the Prime Minister would be able to request the attendance in the House, as often as he pleased, of *any* of the servants of the Crown, to give information in detail on any point desired. This would be a check against their incapacity; and would make able men desire subordinate office even if ill paid, from the introduction into public notice which it would afford. It would also relieve the chief ministers from a load of drudgery which now they need to undergo (a great harm to the public business), and save them from the degrading necessity of being *crammed* by their subordinates for a speech-night. Besides, it would prevent a single constituency from vetoing the Crown's appointment of a minister and embarrassing the discharge of affairs.

Perhaps it might then become possible for Parliament to sit only three days in the week for debates (*by Day and not by Night*) and give three days to the work of Committees. If no private member were allowed to speak longer than half-an hour, business might be far better done in the shortened time.

9th. Let a new Order of Peers be instituted, to whom the right of (politically valid) intermarriage with the Royal Family should be exclusively reserved.

The experience of the Upper House in Norway is a tolerable guarantee to us that such a plan would act well. By Peers sitting with the Commons, and Commons with the Peers, a general blending of feeling would be produced. By founding a new order of Peers with a right of royal intermarriage, (into which order very liberal admission might be given,) not only would Royalty be furnished with husbands and wives, now likely to be scarce on the Continent or dangerous, and the deservedly unpopular practice of foreign affinities be stopped, but the Throne would be strengthened by filling the chasm between it and the Peers; the Peers would be less vehemently adverse to the proposed change; and our young princes would have numerous associates in education and *a career* in their own country. Not to have this, is their curse. Without it, royalty will wear itself out, and become despised.

Of secondary value would be the Ballot, as preventing the disfranchisement of many quiet shopkeepers, who are likely to be as much persecuted by the rabble, as ever their richer brethren have been by the aristocracy. This is a decidedly Conservative part of society. To abolish property qualification for Members of Parliament, and allow any constituency *to rate itself* in order to pay its representative, will follow as a thing of course at the very next reform.

These, it will be said, are violent changes. Suppose it be so; then I reply, we have to expel a violent disease, to get rid of a ruinous vice, and to resist terrible enemies. The disease is National Debt; the vice is habitual Prodigality; the enemies are Financial, Political, Social Revolution, coming on the next generation.

But it is hard to get such measures passed?—Let the Middle Classes be assured, that at this moment it is neither Lords nor Commons in Parliament assembled, but it is *they* who have

the deciding voice in Great Britain. They hold the balance between the Aristocracy and the Chartists. They, though unarmed, are the mighty National Guard to Peers and Throne alike. Their fidelity and reverence for order and property is known. They will not be suspected of desiring violent overturn; and that which they peremptorily claim as a necessary breakwater against the tide of events, will be granted, lest they too be alienated, and the higher ranks left defenceless.

Intelligent Tories and Whigs will remember, that so great concessions as were made in the Reform Bill and in the Corn Law might have been put off for years longer, if *earlier* concessions had been made. They have had many warnings that to postpone is to increase a demand; and we need not despair even to find leaders among the noble-minded of their ranks.

By all means however must the Middle Classes warn the aristocracy that they will not uphold or endure extravagance in an insolvent commonwealth: that they will not become mere tools of unrighteous administration: that they will not look calmly on, while our rulers run the course of France under Louis XVI., nor yet of France under Louis Philippe; but if their prayer be pertinaciously refused, will at last rather adopt any extreme means of enforcing the obedience of their representatives, than bear the fearful risks of continuing our present system. Let them assume this spirit, and they will be able to regenerate the British Constitution.

April 6th, 1848.

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THE RELATION OF PHYSIOLOGY

TO

SEXUAL MORALS.

BY

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The title of this Tract will show that it is not adapted to immature minds. But as it certainly can have nothing in it to stir passion, so it is trusted that there is nothing in it that can justly repel or offend.

THE

RELATION OF PHYSIOLOGY TO SEXUAL MORALS

Let the reader permit me to begin by an extract from a lady's letter, suggested by the Contagious Diseases Acts:—

Men tell us that this is a very delicate question. I call it highly indelicate, yet so much the more needing plain speech and vehemence. If a fine lady found a dunghill set up in her drawingroom, she would not cover it up and disguise it as an elegant piece of furniture: but would call aloud for men's aid, or, in defect of hands, take pitchfork herself, and get rid of the nuisance before her house was poisoned:—at least, if she were a good housewife. Only silly women would think they could afford to be fastidious and inactive.

I have just read an estimable gentleman's complaint, that "many who have only recently had their attention attracted to the whole subject, yet utter their opinion with a confidence and a vehemence, which men who have made social subjects,—this one among the number,—a life's study, would regard as unbecoming." The complaint seems to me utterly mistaken. As well might he say, that the lady who has not spent half a life in the dung-yard or in the laboratory has no right to be vehement against the madness or scoundrelism which during her absence has polluted her apartments. Against immoralities condemned by the voice of mankind dogmatism is the rightful tone; for they ought to be hated; and they cannot be hated, until our judgment is intense. If a friend is so infatuated as to aid and abet the nuisance, he must not expect from us complimentary assurances that we esteem his good intentions. Let the nuisance be removed first. There is a time for abruptness of speech, as

well as for soft language. However sudden our discovery of evil deeds, our conviction that such deeds are evil is not newly imbibed, but is an original intensely fixed principle of moral life. One who deprecates indignation, deprecates all public action of Women against the Contagious Diseases Act. Nothing but burning indignation would suffice to bring them out into a matter so foul, so ghastly.

In the controversy stirred by this Act, which assumes that *soldiers and sailors must have harlots*, we are brought front to front with a deadly doctrine, which, I grieve to say, even the good man to whom I have referred, in a deliberate discourse against the Extension of the Act, himself lays down as an Axiom; while it is really the stronghold of the adversary. I refer to Mr. Thomas Beggs, a gentleman whom I hear to be full of good works,—among other things devoting both money and time liberally to counteract an evil drink-trade, and to rescue fallen women. It is sad to have to protest against such a man; especially because he is an augury that many other good men are on that side. Yet it is a real advantage to have a moral respect for one's opponent, and to have plenty of ground in common.

I quote from the Sessional Proceedings of the Association for Social Science, Feb. 10th, 1870. In his paper, read on Feb. 7th, Mr. Thomas Beggs says, (p. 189) that "in all ages and countries Opinion, Custom, and Law have visited the frailty of one sex with greater severity than that of the other, and it would be in vain to attempt to reverse what Nature has established." *Nature!* Thus do our friends make disastrous concession. Frailty, mere Frailty, in each sex alike must be grieved over with impartial tenderness. That on which we must be severe, is, sensuality, treachery, evasion of responsibility, in the one sex; in the other, indolent vanity, which prefers self-degradation to industry. Nature, rightly interpreted, cannot bid us to be more severe on the one sex than on the other.—But I pass to a far graver matter.

Next, our friend concedes to the adversary the new and most pernicious heresy, that Chastity in the unmarried is inconsistent with Health! He writes as follows, (p. 190)—"The Author of our being has not made the perpetuation of the species to depend upon nice and economical calculations, but upon *an appetite as powerful as hunger and thirst.* Marriage supplies the legitimate gratification, and is that state which is proved to be most conducive to individual happiness and to the general welfare. *Celibacy,* PROMPTED BY WHATEVER MOTIVES, *leads to either disease or vice;* and the man or woman selecting that life *is deprived of much that is necessary to moral and intellectual growth.*"

Does he say this of JESUS OF NAZARETH? or of PAUL? or of Sir ISAAC NEWTON? So heartily do I agree with the argument and sentiments in the midst of which this passage is imbedded, that it does but make me feel its mischief to be the deeper. "Truth emerges out of falsehood, more easily than out of confusion:" hence a close analysis of human instincts, needs, appetites and passions is required. From reticence too bashful on one side, false and shameless doctrine on the other has gained such boldness, that even *women* now come forward to prophesy the eternal triumph of "the animal side of human nature;" that is, in theological language, the necessary triumph of the Flesh over the Spirit.—And this, forsooth, is presented as Science.

What did our good friend mean by the "*appetite* as powerful as hunger and thirst?" He has mistaken a passion of the mind for an appetite of the body. *Every* passion may overpower *any* appetite. The two move in separate spheres. Hunger and thirst rapidly kill us, if they are not gratified. To say this of the sexual appetite is notoriously and simply false. In the man its action is as *regular* and as *unfailing* as hunger and thirst; and when you have said that, you have said everything. Leave the appetite alone,—ungratified, unnoticed,—and it does pure good, but no harm. It adds firmness to the muscles and manliness to the character. It regulates itself physically, and subsides

through activity and other natural means. Evil comes, not from the appetite, as a bodily affection, but from mental causes ; —from mental desire, especially from diseased imagination, from habits of self-gratification, or various forms of excitement from without. When an evil passion of the mind is thus established, its power, no doubt, is illimitable ; just as is the passion of love, hate, jealousy, envy, patriotism, scientific ardour. All may triumph over hunger and thirst.

England is in an impure state, and at a very dangerous crisis ; through which it is hardly possible to come safe, if we permit ourselves to go along with the Parisian heresy concerning the sexual appetite.

The War Office and Admiralty have signally shown how the doctrine applies. The argument is precise. "We must have soldiers and sailors. They cannot be married : hence they are doubly threatened with disease,—from chastity on the one side, or from infected harlots on the other. But we cannot afford to let them be out of health. There is no alternative but to supply them with healthy harlots."—Such a doctrine, carried out by the moral weight and material resources of Government can be nothing but a ruinous demoralization to the whole land.

This doctrine of "disease from chastity" is but a modern excuse for profligates,—invented to save their shame in the presence of purer light and holier sentiment than any known and felt by ancient Greece and Rome. The vice of those days was public and unblushing. The highest poetical geniuses contemporary with Cato and Mæcenas could write, send to them, and publish without loss of esteem epigrams or odes too foul for any possible translation or paraphrase. The word Chastity, as understood concerning the Cæsars by Suetonius, simply meant abstinence from unnatural crimes. The excavations of Pompeii, I am told, reveal, that the very furniture of a drawingroom was embellished by the most odious impurities. The Roman poet Horace, by his own account, went at random into amours sentimental and unsentimental, elegant and utterly gross, natural and

unnatural. He carries himself quite undisguised. He has no occasion to pay to Virtue the homage of hypocrisy; nor can any one imagine that he wrote a word to propitiate stern moralists. He was a free winedrinker, as well as a debauchee. Yet when he would draw the ideal picture of an energetic man, he thus describes him:—

> Whoso aims to reach in career a longed-for goal,
> Has in boyhood endured and done much; has sweated and shivered:
> *Has abstained from amours and from wine.*

That strict chastity in the unmarried should "lead to disease," no more crossed the mind of those unchaste ancients, than that abstinence from wine should weaken. Vinegar and water was a Roman soldier's drink. Their reason for drinking wine was that of so many frankspeaking moderns,—"Because I like it;" and the same was their equally frank reason for "fornication and all uncleanness." The modern rakes dare not be so candid; but the accommodating physician succours their modesty and salves their conscience. He has also been so complaisant, as to pretend that Alcohol is strengthening, and all but necessary.

But what of the Greeks, who were teachers of sensuality to Rome and Persia? Nationally, their public unveiled impurities must have been far more widely spread than in Italy: for we have a guage of them in their ideal of Virtue, and their moralizing on Contentment. Suffice it to illustrate a portentous subject by a puzzling narrative. Xenophon, to whom we owe our most faithful account of Socrates, wrote a highflown panegyric on his friend Agesilaos, king of Sparta. After recounting his military skill, his sagacity and successes, his integrity as to money, the firmness of his oath, the trust of enemies in his honour, his hardihood and *bonhommie*, he at last comes to his self-restraint as to sexual matters, which was "marvellous." Agesilaos, lest any one should doubt his chastity, during his whole Asiatic campaign never slept in a private place, but either in a temple or on the open field: and when he was enamoured of the young son of a friendly Persian prince, "as violently as

a very vehement nature could possibly be enamoured of a very beautiful object," AGESILAOS, though aware that he was giving offence, would not allow the youth to touch him with the ordinary Persian kiss of respect. Offence followed, and friends interfered to restore good feeling: but the king protested, that, while it would be inexpressibly delightful to him, yet nothing could induce him, again to enter battle against that kiss. Upon this the historian comments, that to abstain from what one does *not* love, is easy to everybody; but such self-controul as *this*,... even tends exceedingly to madness! He adds, that he is not ignorant what some think of this affair, (probably that the king did but act the hypocrite,) nevertheless it certainly was a rarer victory than one over the public enemy.

In a moral atmosphere so hazy, that it is hard for us to see through it, one cause and one only seemed sufficient to a Greek for abstinence from sexual pleasure; *viz.* desire of victory in the public games. The Greek athlete cultivated his bodily powers, like the English prize-fighter or prize-rower, to their highest point. The Englishman has discovered that he must abstain from liquors fermented or distilled; the Greek discovered that he must renounce the other form of sensuality. PLATO, in a well-known passage of his "Laws," to which St. PAUL (1 Cor. ix. 25) tacitly alludes, speaks of the many celebrated athletes,—among whom he names ICCOS and CRISON and ASTYLOS and DIOPOMPOS, who, in zeal for Olympian victories, totally abstained during their training, and had their bodies as much lustier than those of the Athenians, as their mental developement was inferior. So then (says PLATO'S spokesman) *they* to obtain victory in wrestling and running thus abstain; and shall our children be unable to persevere for a far nobler victory?

From this practice of the athletes, such abstinence is emphatically called "*ascetic*," i.e. the practice of men who are *in training* for the public games. No tribunal less favourable to anything stern in sexual matters was possible, than the old Greek nation; no test of physical vigour more severe, than theirs.

Yet its verdict,—made, not by philosophers, but by practical trainers,—not for moral, but for physical reasons,—commanded total abstinence, and not mere healthy moderation, when the maximum of bodily efficiency was sought. The verdict is not now to be set aside by medical dogma,—a dogma, not only unproved, but not having the shadow of a pretended proof.

For us, it is quite impossible to repeat the experiment on the same scale, and compete in publicity with that nation, in so many senses *naked* and unabashed. With us moreover hypocrisy would be always suspected or alleged. But though we cannot afford so vast and costly a trial in order to stop the mouths of men who assert without proof, we can indirectly confirm ancient experience and traditional belief by noteworthy analogy from domestic animals, while steadily remembering wherein that analogy will break down,—a topic, to which I shall have to return. Wild animals in general are driven by sexual appetite as blindly as by hunger. Yet the domestic horse, when employed for riding or in harness, unshorn of his masculine powers, works off by steady toil all febrile tendencies; and, unless left too idle, shows wonderfully little of the sexual propensity, even in the season in which it might be expected. But the same animal, if purposely pampered in idleness, (as generally with us,) developes such propensity tenfold; and the less he works, the better he propagates. There is undeniably an antagonism between the two functions. Expend vital force on this, and there remains less for that. The expenditure on one, when small, will not be felt in the other, unless the animal, like the Greek athlete, be put to some extreme trial; yet the scientific law is discerned. Now this analogy is an *à fortiori* argument for us; inasmuch as the brute differs from us in a point unfavourable to him. He has no spontaneous natural vent for sexual superfluities; and it could not have surprized us, if steady labour were inadequate to use them up: yet it proves adequate—at least his health does not suffer. It may be here added, that Plato, in the passage already referred to, asserts as a well-known fact, that the man who keeps his body

in a good athletic condition finds the conquest of sexual appetite much easier than the man who is negligent of training. This is but another way of saying, that the physical supplies, which run riot in the idle man, add to intensity, whether of nerve and vital force or of muscular fibre, in him who undergoes the daily toils of the athlete.

On an opposite side of the question, every thing points to confirm old Greek experience. Notorious fact concerning the ox and the imperfect horse, shows, that by the loss of power to secrete masculine juices an effeminate form is induced. The magnificent neck of the bull and of the stallion catches the eye of every observer: nor has the ox the pugnacious horns of the bull, any more than his fierce temperament. The softness of flesh in the ox, the wether, and the capon, displays how much toughness of muscle is lost with the lost sexual element: and the few facts known of the human eunuch are in the same direction. But whether an element of the body be absent, because not produced, or absent, because expended,—leaves deficiency just the same. For the *maximum* of strength, (if that be the thing aimed at,) we want the hoarding of production.

It is hardly necessary to press that the experience of Roman armies confirmed that of Greek athletes; for here moral causes, prodigiously more important than the physical ones, conspire. Roman generals were well aware, that to put soldiers to hard work, was the only way to keep them well-behaved, healthy and strong. But who of us does not know, that idleness of body and mind, especially with full diet, conduces to wantonness,—first through corporeal superfluity, next through mental depravity? The former is easily treated; the latter, when once established, is miserably untractable.

Let me turn back to Mr. Thomas Begg's enunciation,—"Celibacy, prompted by whatever motive, leads to either disease or vice." If he had said, "celibacy, embraced by some unwise and premature act, is apt to induce after-regrets, tending to *mental* disease," I should assent: but his words, as they stand,

can only mean, that, however steadfast and pure the *mind*, abstinence from *physical marriage* produces disease of *body*. This is the notion, pregnant with pestilence, which I deplore and disown. If he were to explain that his form of words was hastily chosen, and does not express his meaning, I should rejoice: my argument is not against him, except as he may give the weight of his character to this stronghold built up for profligacy.

Mr. Beggs does not for a moment intend to apologize for the illegitimate indulgence of sexual appetite; yet his argument, in spite of him, will apologize for it. Sexual morals are undoubtedly founded on physical facts and general tendencies: why else may not a universal love express itself by wholly free kiss and embrace? If God has so constructed us, that a certain process shall be normally necessary to human health, the external fact becomes a protest of "Physical Religion" against traditional precept, and will prevail with all coarser and immature minds,—that is, with a majority of the young. Virtue, which takes cognizance of every side of man and man's world, finds itself thereupon in discord with itself, if it claim *that* severity in sexual morals, to which, as humanity becomes larger and conscience more chastened, it inevitably tends.

The brutes themselves, in their faithfulness or unfaithfulness to a single mate, guide us to the deepseated arguments underlying our monogamy. The wild birds are beautifully faithful, mate to mate; and we see why. Eggs have to be hatched, generally a nest to be built, food for the sitting bird must be procured, incubation must, at least in many species, be performed alternately by each parent, the young must be fed and taught to fly: for these duties the female needs the aid of the male, and strict monogamy follows. But when poultry, ceasing to live on the wing, come under the care of man, who guards and feeds both the hen on her nest and her chickens; when the aid of the cock is needless to the family;—he becomes a polygamist untrammelled by the duties of a husband, and forgets his

wild instincts.—So, the lion is a faithful* monogamist, because the lion's cubs need the aid of both parents to apprentice them in food-getting; an education painfully expensive to the herds of cattle, so many are slain in teaching young lions how to spring upon huge and formidable beasts. No such cares embarrass and limit the sexual relations of domestic cats, nor the herbivorous quadrupeds. Now of all living things, nothing is so helpless as a human child. To guard, feed, and rear to manhood is a long and anxious process; to train morally, to teach necessary arts and rudiments, even with barbarians, urgently requires a father's aid; much more in our complicated civilized life, with its division of labour, its severe apprenticeships under vast developments of knowledge and skill. If the lion and the dove must be each responsible for his progeny, how much more must man?

But this joint responsibility of two parents for offspring, of which each needs eighteen years to grow up, implies a life passed in common, a life of peculiar intimacy and fondness, a life of constant mutual self-sacrifice and self-denial, which cannot dispense with suitabilities of mental temperament. Now the greater the development of the race, the greater the diversities. Pigeon differs little from pigeon, or lioness from lioness; one partner does as well as another for the brute. The less there is of distinctive character, and power of select attachment, the more easily is every one matched. The old saying, that "the course of true love seldom runs smooth," does but denote how often the more intense moral attachments are out of the grooves of routine.

He must be a base man, who, to avoid imaginary "disease from celibacy," proposes marriage to a woman, while conscious that he has no desire of her permanent companionship, no true

* Not many years back, in the Regent's Park, when a young lioness, after sojourning awhile in a cage side by side with a lion and his mate, stepped through the door which the keeper opened to her *for society's sake*, the married pair instantly killed her.

love to offer her. Yet unless this be allowed, what avails it to propose marriage as "supplying legitimate gratification" to animal appetite? The fact is, that in a man the appetite exists, and is steadily active, whether he loves or not. Surely to marry for convenience without love, is a sort of *life-fraud* upon a woman,—a high immorality. Again, it is not extremely rare, for a young man to have a severe disappointment in love, and by it to be so wounded that he cannot for years love any woman again. Marriage is to him then morally impossible. Moreover, if disease will come on the chaste celibate, will it not also on the chaste husband, in the long interval during which maternity, —about to be, or recent,—preoccupies his wife's energies? or again, if frequent parturition endanger her health and strength? or if a childbirth have inflicted painful consequences? or if it have left on her too violent reminiscences and alarms? There are plenty of reasons, which may either for long periods or entirely reduce the married man to the condition of a celibate, with this difference, that he cannot marry. What is meant then by the general assertion that marriage supplies the legitimate gratification? It has probably in numerous instances much rather excited appetite than quelled it.—On all sides, the doctrine that "abstinence means disease," involves us in chaos. It leads to cruel selfishness in husbands, with much affliction to wives. It turns the "*abandon*" of mutual love, into selfish heavy sensuality. Moreover, as a lady recently wrote: "While men are told that they must choose between vice and unhealth, we know which alternative a majority of them will take."

Nor can this doctrine of "unhealth" stop with the male sex. It *has not* stopped at that limit. Humble schools for girls are beset by secret circulars, which lay down as scientific truth, that girls cannot be healthy without sexual indulgence, and offer to them the means of it "without loss of character." "Their organization," it is said, "imperiously requires it." In this lofty style does sham science strut about in the dark, blighting tender natures. No man can serve two masters: that is, one

must be superior. So in regard to sexual relations, unless the Moral argument be paramount, the Material will trample it down.

Returning now to first principles, let us distinctly ask, What is Sensuality? To obtain a reply, we may analyse the phenomena of eating and drinking.

Hunger drives man and beast alike to eat. The appetite is of sense; therefore, if you look to etymology, it is sensual. Yet the beast cannot be sensual, if the word imply moral blame: nor can man, while his case is perfectly similar to that of the brute. Hunger is a limited appetite: the stomach is soon full: satiety follows. The keener the hunger, if the vitality be not already weakened, the higher is the animal pleasure. Herein is no impurity: on the contrary, it is right, good, and desirable, though the pleasure is of low rank, and by even a dog of noble breed, unless hunger be extreme, is valued less than the pleasure of active running, especially in his master's companionship.

But the man has mind to reflect on the animal pleasure. He can anticipate it in imagination and gloat over it in remembrance; he is liable also to eat for the sake of the pleasure, even when not hungry. It is from this that Sensuality begins,—*when animal pleasure is sought as an end in itself.* Men partly teach their own vice to domestic brutes, as in pampering pet-dogs. The animal, when not hungry, can eat for mere pleasure; yet he has no imagination to dwell on the past and the coming, *no higher nature to degrade into a tool of the lower.* He may become guilty of excess, but he cannot be impure. Of the same kind often are the excesses of rude barbarians. They may surfeit themselves at a feast, but it damages body more than mind, and does not make them less manly; for it is quickly dismissed from the imagination. But the epicure who lives to eat, who is absorbed in the study of nice dishes,—whose Spirit lives as *minister to the Flesh,*—if he even be guilty of no excess, is sensual and impure. His vice is antagonistic to all noble virtue.

Of pleasures some are satiable, others are insatiable. Corporeal pleasures, especially pleasures from the appetites, quickly

induce satiety; for they arise from the supplying of a finite need, as, the filling of the stomach. Pleasure arising from the relief of a pain, or some overfulness, as in disease, is equally finite. A few bodily pleasures are less satiable, as that of bathing and oiling the limbs. As VIRGIL says of the water-fowl, —there is no end of their restless zeal for bathing. But such activity verges on a higher order of pleasure. The cat who kills mice to eat is soon sated with hunting; but if she hunt for sport, she is insatiable: for the pleasure here does not spring out of the indulgence of an *appetite*, but from the gratification of a *passion:* it is a mental pleasure.

Mental pleasures have no definite bound, no certain satiety, and by indulgence or habit can all become infinite. Most of us are soon tired of playing chess or billiards; but to the devotees of these games the interest is unending, the craving for them perhaps insatiable.

With brutes, especially in their wild state, the sexual appetite takes a course not dissimilar to that of hunger and thirst. It arises in a certain month or limited space of the year, which in each climate appears so adjusted by Nature, that progeny shall be born in favourable weather. The appetite arises out of an unusual state of the body, which needs a "vent." To the animal one vent alone is possible. Hence, not for mental gratification, but for bodily relief, it is carried to its goal; by which the appetite is appeased, as rapidly as hunger or thirst. As no visions of animal pleasure precede or follow in the brute mind, as far as we can judge, impurity is here impossible, nor indeed does there seem to be liability to excess. No proper analogy between brute and man, in so far, exists. But the contrasts are strongly marked. The appetite which in the wild animal is limited to a short season and quickly satisfied, with the man is perennial, and practically incessant. Instead of being allayed, it is rather excited by indulgence, (which is said to be* true also

* In Syria,—where in recovering from fever I rode for months a fine horse, perfectly gentle,—I was warned that any sexual indulgence might make him hard to manage.

of the domesticated horse;) and it always has to be controuled by his moral will at last. To abandon oneself to uncontrouled instinct, as does the wild animal, would to man be physically fatal. It could only end in idiotcy, or in some pitiable form of consumption. Probably the true reason for this is, that the only pure and rightful gratification of the human appetite is, when a *passion of the mind* elicits it,—when Love moves instinct: and Love is always able to controul it. Mental passion is of course infinite, and thrives by its own activity. What is true of legitimate love, is probably true also of illicit passion* destitute of love. For, the man who seeks for pleasure as his end, gloats upon his own indulgence, feeds and excites sensuality, which does but crave repetitions, when moral scruples have been subdued. To whatever side of the subject we look, the idea of a needful and useful "vent" for physical appetite is found absurd.

But I must not be understood to mean that happy marriage does not make it easier for man to live chastely. In my belief it is to the very purest men an aid; only, not by its physical effect, but solely by its moral and mentally purifying influences. It does just the opposite of that sensual doctrine about "necessity for health;" *viz.* it forbids looking at woman from the carnal side, and presents a wife to the mind and heart as the nearest and sweetest of sisters. Love to a wife makes desire of any other woman simply impossible, and the same love forbids whatever would harm its object. Notoriously, the state of being in love, before marriage, secures a young man's chastity; though the long continuance of such a state is very harassing and in many ways pernicious. No word that I write must be interpreted to mean, that I think celibacy to be in itself desirable, or that artificial barriers against marriage are not a grave evil,—to both sexes.

Returning to the sensual modern doctrines, we may notice the fiction with which many profligates excuse themselves, by

* A Greek Idyllist sarcastically says of such passion, "It is but the *love* of wolves for lamb."

attributing to chaster men "cold natures," *i.e.* a deficiency in sexual appetite. Mentally and morally, the differences of men are, no doubt, enormous, If "cold" and "hot" mean cautious and rash, none will question that there is this difference, just as some are conscientious and others unscrupulous. But no profligate means this. He does not say, "My neighbour is considerate, and I am reckless," for in that he would find no ease to his conscience. But he says, "My neighbour has no strong physical impulses; else he would behave as I do." This is about as wise, as for a schoolboy who steals a neighbour's fruit, to suppose that the boy who will not join in the theft has no taste for nice things; that his gastric juice or his saliva is not the same in quality, or is less abundant. Physically man is like to man, as horse to horse: it is only our moral difference that is so vast. The sexual *appetite*, of which medical men make so much, is the smallest part of the problem presented to us in sexual morals. Nothing is simpler than its treatment, nor will the appetite fail to be amenable. We have only to keep away such food and drink as will stimulate it, and whatever may make puberty premature: also, it is needful to give to the growing boy or strong young man a sufficiency of bodily toil. But if the mere appetite be successfully kept at its normal condition, that condition is one which at best needs constant restraint. Meanwhile, alluring Art, lax Literature and corrupt Society are ever active to inflame the youthful imagination and kindle the mind. It is the *mind* and the *moral will* that need to be strengthened: if this be not effected, nothing is done. Of so little avail is it to weaken physical appetite, that oftentimes the youth, whose body is wasting under his own excesses, only the more longs to repeat them. The disease is in his mind: it is not an appetite, but a passion, and this is insatiable: here lies the difficulty. Maltreatment of the body, such as religious enthusiasts have often employed, tends little, if at all, to weaken mental desire. The ancients believed (probably not without experience) that eunuchs were peculiarly lustful. To look to materialism for cure of a

mental disease, is a very pernicious mistake. Diversion of mind, plentiful employment, wholesome company and common action, and, if it can be had, the company of respected women, are most to be trusted for counteracting the evil. Diversion of the thoughts is notoriously of the very first importance, and it is best effected by filling the mind with substantive objects of eager interest. The idlest minds are of course most exposed to vice, but none are free from grave danger. Religion is an inadequate defence: indeed confession of sin, by recalling evil trains of thought, may turn out to be pure mischief; and the intensity of self-reproach, which under Christian doctrine is awakened, may drive the struggler into perilous despair. If the imagination of a youth has been once corrupted, I certainly am far from undervaluing the grievous evil: but for that very reason I feel strong indignation against Literature and Art which so recklessly kindle passion. Youth ought not to be exposed to struggles so painful, and they will too often bring mischief on society. There is a great battle yet to be fought for the true purification of literature.* Meanwhile, I cannot but believe that frank avowals from elder men might be highly profitable to youths whose passion is restless through nothing but unhealthy imagination; might convince them, that *physically* there is nothing new in store for them; that, be the *moral* transports of love to warm lovers what they may, yet its mere sensual pleasure can be only

* Of sensational novels and the theatres I am too ignorant to judge what is the extent of their influence; but that they are gravely pernicious, I cannot doubt. I have once been to a theatre since becoming my own master, in order to deliver a boy from the scoff of never having seen the inside: but though I carefully picked the evening, I was doomed to listen to things which I could only hope he did not understand. Once similarly I went to Vauxhall. The performance as a whole was quite innocent: yet some things were gratuitously introduced, and by a female performer, which were expressly adapted and intended to allure to illicit passion. I have never entered the Opera house: but a gentleman who was a frequenter of it volunteered to warn me not to take a boy thither, "unless I wanted to put into his head thoughts which were better kept out of it." Such was the judgment of one whom I cannot think at all scrupulous.

momentary, contemptible, and generally less than a chaste youth already of necessity knows.—Some demons, it is said, can be laughed and scoffed away, who are hard to conquer in fight.

Not that I by any means believe that a young man rightly brought up from childhood can easily become guilty *towards a woman*: on the contrary, I find it hard to believe it possible, except through intoxicating drink. Even without careful training, rude and common men show the immense force of moral influence in restraining their appetites and passions. How very rare is the offence, even in the most brutal, of incest against a sister! of which nevertheless there is the greatest outward facility. Instead of despairing of moral influences, as our Materialists do, surely we should rather aspire to teach boys to revere *all* girls as sisters; and, the more unprotected they are, so much the more to account reverence for them a manly duty.—Does a groom ever behave rudely to the young lady behind whom he rides? If ever a runaway match take place between them, everyone blames the young lady, making sure that she must have taken the initiative. Evidently the cardinal point is, to intensify in men the *moral sentiments*, especially the sentiment of Justice to women. That this is not generally understood, and that to insist upon it is needful,—I believe, from knowing how late in life it broke upon me as a discovery, that unchastity in men and injustice to women are nearly synonymous. In History it is apparent, that men's licentiousness arises out of conquest, trampling down a population, whose women are forthwith treated as slaves of the conqueror's pleasure. Wherever there are slave-girls or freedwomen or despised "proletarians," these are made the natural prey of men's lust. Opportunity suggests license against the women who are imagined to have no rights which men are bound to respect. Hence also aristocratic legislation takes no account of the seduction and prostitution of plebeian women. But a nation which aspires to put all its citizens upon legal equality and care impartially for the moral welfare of the millions, will have to sharpen its laws against male unchastity.

In our rustic population, where the boys and girls are intimate early acquaintances, with a sort of family feeling, we perhaps undervalue their practical self-controul. A country clergyman writes to me, that though the young people, from the day that they are betrothed, behave as if they were married, and children esteemed illegitimate are very common; yet marriage uniformly follows: and if the faithfulness for life of one man to one woman be sexual virtue, it is in his experience all but universal.—They regard their private betrothal as the marriage, and the formal marriage as a concession to public opinion. This is perhaps unrefined, and is certainly very dangerous to the woman; but it is not for a moment to be compared to the frightful state of our towns, where (as attested by large employers of labour) the little girls are scarcely allowed from tender years to know what modesty means, and the rude romping boys grow up in unchecked animalism. Truly the sources of demoralization to us may well appal all lovers of their country, in the morbid growth of towns.

A severe shock is given to a belief in Divine Government, by imagining, either on the one hand that a class of degraded women is necessary for the physical relief of men, or on the other that holy self-controul will bring upon men disease of body, not to say (what is still more paradoxical) moral and intellectual inferiority. It is quite true, that to be *childless* cuts off a large portion of moral relationships; but married people also may be childless. The doctrine at which I point, gives an offensive, unwarrantable and mischievous prominence to mere physical marriage, assigning to it a great and undefinable value.

And here we touch upon one more heresy of modern times, and a very grievous one. A book called The Marriage Problem, by Œdipus, privately printed, with a philanthropic purpose, as I fully believe, has been freely distributed, and widely, as I am told. Its outline is very painful, or rather loathsome; and I cannot mention details. Its prominent thought is, the animal pleasure of indulging sexual appetite, which pleasure, from pure philanthropy, the writer desires as many as possible to enjoy

legitimately: and legitimately, means, under cover of marriage. Believing that great numbers remain in celibacy to avoid the responsibility of children, he benevolently teaches how to marry and *not* have offspring! His first step is that of sensuality; yet the kindly writer is unaware of it. He intends to be moral, yet he holds up to the imagination a momentary animal pleasure, which is to be deliberately pursued as an end in itself; with special care to thwart the ordinance of Nature, and make her mysteries barren of their legitimate noble result. Is then the faith altogether vain, that when man deliberately enters on an unnatural course, outraged Nature will take her revenge in ways unforeseen?

More alarming still, as I judge, is the doctrine of some (perhaps more than a few) physicians, and their advice to young men, which goes on in secret, generally unknown and thereby unopposed. The veil must be rent off: but some introduction is needful.—On certain subjects we are apt to have no experience but our own. Young men who are healthy do not talk to one another on secret matters. Medical men, like the rest of us, have their own experience. If they were chaste in youth, they know of themselves what is the normal condition of male chastity: *if not, not.* The information which they get from patients on sexual matters, is generally from the vicious, who are always tempted to palliate their offences, and are not to be depended on for telling the whole truth or the simple truth. Thus the medical man may chance to be peculiarly deluded, especially if he was, as at least some have been, both early and continuously unchaste.—Now, in my lifetime, a wonderful change has taken place (how widely, I cannot say) in the medical estimate of a phenomenon, by which Nature from time to time brings spontaneous relief to chaste young men. When scarcely as yet a man, I by accident read in a medical discussion, that this occurs "to the young very often, to mature men seldom, to old men never." I found it described as the divine ordinance whereby health is preserved to chaste men, and as bearing in this respect

analogy to a different phenomenon in the other sex. Until recent years, I supposed the beneficence and wholesomeness of this peculiarity in the male constitution to be unquestioned and unquestionable. It is but lately that I find modern representatives of the medical faculty to treat it as a DISEASE, and to prescribe intercourse with harlots as its cure! This fact, which I deem horrible, ought not to be smothered in secrecy.

My readers may well be not only shocked, but slow to believe, that reputable medical men give such advice; and the matter is of importance so extreme, that I must speak more definitely. The first notion of the thing came to me from a book called "Physical Religion," which was sent to me by the anonymous author. I abhorred the book too much to keep it, and can only quote from memory; yet I can say,—he most distinctly recommends to young men companionship with harlots, particularly as a cure, if they suffer from this disease,—as he regards it. The whole thing struck me with as much amazement as disgust; for it was undeniably a scientific treatise. I thought very ill of the writer's practice, as well as of his theory, and supposed him to be concocting a novel pretence for vice. Yet, as I now find, he is very far from standing alone. A gentleman whose word I entirely trust, tells me that he knew several cases of the same sort; in which a youth who for the first time was thus affected, —never having received warning that this is ordinary to young men,—went in some alarm to get medical advice; and was directed...to seek the company of a harlot! This information brought to my memory, that nearly 40 years ago a young man who had incurred reproach by one such act of immorality, volunteered to tell me, that he had "needed it for his health:" *for*,...he had suffered this phenomenon! I was too bashful to make any reply, and quite unwilling to argue with him, or seem to reproach him. I simply thought him strangely ignorant. But I now infer that this immoral doctrine was already whispered from Paris, to which city many English students resorted for medical education after the peace of 1815. Since

writing the above, I am told by a gentleman who is in his 70th year, that in his youth he was shocked by a case which came to his knowledge, of a physician in first-rate practice prescribing harlotry to a patient. I am further informed by a younger friend, who in his boyhood (through erroneous judgment in his father) was forbidden ordinary boyish exercise, but was a very diligent student,—that, when quite a youth, he suffered from an excess of this depletion to which I have referred, and went to an eminent London physician for advice. The reply was shortly this, "The only cure is intercourse with women. You are too young to marry. I cannot advise you to take the risk of the streets; but you ought to keep a mistress." My friend, though then so young, was strongly religious, and revolted with horror from the thought.—After such information, I was unable to suppose this theory confined to the disreputable members of the profession. Besides, I have in recent months received or seen letters from several ladies, bitterly complaining of the awful counsel given by doctors to young men, and deploring that so many women are overpowered by the doctors' authority, and settle down into the doleful depressing belief, that men must be immoral, for their health's sake. As others put it, women under the doctors' teaching are coming to a universal disbelief in male chastity. Some mothers have had vehement contest against doctors, in the effort to save their sons from immoral courses. Further, an intimate friend of mine, whose age must be near 50, now tells me, that in his youth he consulted an eminent London physician; who, though the ailment had no relation whatever to the sexual system, volunteered to say that it was bad for him to remain chaste: and, in reply to some exclamation of surprize, explained that "he must judge for himself how to act: the question of morality did not belong to the physician; but, that *a man must not expect to be in health, if he neglected to exercise a natural function.*" Here was exactly the doctrine of the book called Physical Religion, actively and gratuitously preached by an eminent London physician probably 30 years ago. And after all, how much did

he differ from Mr. Thomas Beggs?—A sage lady writes to me, that when she was abroad with her brother,—a young widower at that time, and one of Her Majesty's Consuls,—he had occasion to call in a physician, who happened to be from Paris. She asked the physician how her brother was. To her horror he replied, "Monsieur votre frère has very little the matter with him; *only he is too continent.*" Different in basis, but equally formidable to morals, is the notion, that it is useless to struggle for the entire purity of young men; and that their temporary unchastity (of course at the expense of women) is to be counted on. On all sides, a *despair of moral influences* is deplorably prevalent. It must be disowned, and a strict moral practice demanded; else, more and more, we shall see fatal acquiescence in a most destructive vice. The European Continent* gives us most awful warning.

On the whole, I find it impossible to resist the conviction, that in all ranks of the medical faculty there is at least a fraction, (highly dangerous, if only a fraction,) which actively preaches deadly immorality. Every simpleton youth who believes and obeys, is a missionary of the doctrine, to his equals in age and

* Individual depravity has there been promoted and intensified by the insane effort of Governments *to remove the effects of sexual vice on women, with a view to make the vice safe to men.* An aged friend tells me, that on going to Hamburg many years ago, he was surprized and disgusted in his hotel, by receiving forthwith a formal notice, where he would find harlots duly cleansed by the Government, and safe for use.—It is almost 40 years, since, on landing in Bordeaux with a company of friends, I was startled and shocked by the Commissioner, who undertook to clear our luggage through the Custom House, offering to conduct us (four young men) to "the women who are for all men," in the interval before the Custom House doors would be opened.—Such single facts tell volumes as to the *ordinary and expected* impurity of life. But to see what a hell of sensuality France has become, Englishmen and women ought to read the pamphlet, (price 6*d.*) called, "French Morality under the Regulation System," translated from Mademoiselle Julie Daubié: London, Trübner & Co., 60 Paternoster Row.—That the War Office and Admiralty, with the example of France before them, should have become fanatically desirous of solving the same problem by the same means, is an amazing and quite unexpected illustration of official blindness.

to his juniors, efficient in proportion as he is free from vicious intent. If but one medical man in ten has taught such doctrine in secret for a quarter of a century, what can be expected but a great increase of habitual vice? which now, they assure us, is inevitable, is to be calculated on, is to be submitted to. Our sole business, it seems, is to bring the consequent *disease* to a minimum! It is high time, that the rest of the faculty who abhor such doctrine, should speak aloud; should not only clear their own consciences, but aid in purifying our defiled moral atmosphere, by proclaiming, as solemnly as the old physicians, the intimate relations of chastity and continence with health and strength; as, of all unchaste practices, with disease, weakness and misery.

I am glad to quote the protest of the late Dr. James Henderson, who thus writes in a pamphlet, published at Shanghai, concerning the health of Europeans in China, p. 65.

"I would be careful to warn every man, especially those newly arrived, against a very common though absurd impression, that there is something peculiar about the tropics, which excites certain passions in a higher degree than in temperate regions. It is surprizing how this erroneous belief seems to pervade almost all classes. These advocates for sensuality maintain, that in the East there is a promptitude and bias to pleasure, and an alienatian from serious thoughts and deep reflection. Now I would ask, in the words of Dr. Johnson, who met with the same sentiments in India, If this *bias to pleasure* be increased in hot climates, why is it that the *ability* to pursue or practise it is lessened? a fact well known to every debauchee. These passions are *not* increased in and about the tropics. No man who knows anything of the human constitution and has watched the effects of climate upon it, would say so. On the contrary, this (so called) bias to pleasure is very much greater in a pure elastic bracing atmosphere, than in a moist hot depressing impure one; which all tropical climates, more or less, are. I happen to know something of men of both classes in the East: and for health, strength and happiness the strictly moral man will contrast most favourably with one of the opposite class. I have seen many suffer severely, destroy their health, happiness and life, by following the promptings of their unbridled passions. Need I say? that I *have never seen a man suffer from keeping himself pure.* Matters stand thus. In the East, many of the salutary and social restraints of home and its happy influences are

removed. There is greater laxity of moral and religious principle..... The removal of religious and moral restraint, the temptations to vice, the facility of the means and force of example, are the real causes of this bias to pleasure." 1863.

By the side of this, I place an extract from a letter recently received from a clergyman whose face is unknown to me.

"I was for eight years a master at Eton, and, both there and among my pupils since, the whole question of sexual sin was constantly forced upon me. For my boys' sakes, I have often had to speak to the first London physicians and surgeons, and have found how little they know about the matter, and how dangerous and misleading is often their advice. I have had, at the request of a lad going to India, to give him positive counsel, against that of a leading physician, who had told him that *to keep himself in health he must have intercourse in India with women.* To me he said: 'I would rather die than be impure.' He came back from India pure, healthy and bright, to tell me that the few who were chaste and temperate were also the few who were in perfect health. This physician's advice, you observe, was given concerning India. It is new to me that any doctors preach this damnable doctrine to our *home*-lads."

But, since the above was in the printer's hands, I learn from the writer that one of his pupils has had this "damnable doctrine" preached to him by a doctor in the neighbourhood.

Moralists have at all times regarded strict temperance in food, and abstinence from strong drinks, to be of cardinal value in the maintenance of young men's purity. But whatever our care to be temperate, whatever our activity of body, it is not possible always to keep the exact balance between supply and bodily need. Every organ is liable occasionally to be over-charged, and, *in every youthful or vigorous nature,* has power to relieve itself. Considering that in man the sexual appetite is not, as in wild animals, something which comes for only a short season, and then imperatively demands gratification; but on the contrary, is perennial, constant, and yet is *not* necessarily to be exercised at all; his nature cannot be harmonious and happy, unless it can right itself under smaller derangements of balance. But this is precisely what it does; and I cannot but think it of extreme importance not to allow a bugbear to be made out of *that*, which

on the face of the matter is God's provision that the unmarried man shall not be harmed by perfect chastity. That it is ever other than natural, normal and beneficial, I never heard or dreamed, until I was well past the age of fifty. The Roman poet LUCRETIUS, in a medico-philosophical discussion, speaks of this matter quite plainly, and treats it as *universal to mankind:* iv. 1024—1045. He imputes it to strength and youthful maturity, not to weakness; and while his description is tinged with epic extravagance, the thought of its doing any one harm evidently does not cross his mind, much less that it is an evil effect and disgraceful stain from previous vice. Now that I learn so many medical men to be unacquainted with it except as something immoderate, and, thereby, depressing and dangerous,—morbid and alarming; I have thought it a duty to make inquiries, where I could properly do so, from persons of whose true purity from early life I am thoroughly persuaded: and all that I elicit, direct or indirect, confirms me in what I have all my life believed. A clergyman reminds me, that the ceremonial regulations in the books of MOSES count upon it, and so does JEREMY TAYLOR; dates, countries and races (says he) distant enough: he adds his belief, that it is perfectly healthful, and tends to be nearly periodical. A traveller to Jerusalem tells me, that he found one of the superior monks "unclean" for the day on account of it; and an inferior monk alluded to it as an ordinary matter. On gathering up what I know, what I have read, and what I believe on testimony, I distinctly assert, first, that this occurrence is strictly "spontaneous,"—that it comes upon youths who not only have never practised, but have never heard of such a thing as secret vice: that it comes on, without having been induced by any voluntary act of the person, and without any previous mental inflammation: next, that it occasionally comes upon married men, when circumstances put them for long together in the position of the unmarried; moreover, even when they become elderly, it does not wholly forsake them under such circumstances. My belief is, that it is a sign of

vigour. At any rate I assert most positively, that it is an utter mistake to suppose that it necessarily weakens or depresses, or entails any disagreeable after-results whatever. I have never so much as once in my life had reason to think so. I have even believed that it adds to the spring of the body, and to the pride of manhood in youths. Of course there is an amount of starvation, (at least I assume there is,) which would supersede it; but to overdo the starvation even a little, may be an error on the wrong side.—Again, there is probably an amount of athletic practice, which will take up all the supplies of full nutriment in the intensifying of muscle or of vital force, and leave no sexual superfluity. But labour so severe is stupifying to the brain and very unfavourable to high mental action. PLATO is not alone in regarding athletes as unintellectual. ARISTOTLE deprecates their system of "overfeeding and overworking." And after all, you will not succeed in exactly keeping the balance, whether you try by starvation or by toil; and the over careful effort will but produce either a valetudinarian, or else a religious ascetic, who is in terrible alarm lest Nature inflict upon him a momentary animal pleasure. A state of anxiety and tremor is not mentally wholesome. We must take things as they come, observing broad rules of moderation as wisely as we can, but without nervous alarm about details. The advantages of Vegetarian food I have learned only late in life. I now know that I might have been wiser in my diet. With better knowledge I should have done far better as to the *quality* of food; but I do not easily believe that a more scrupulous dread of satisfying my appetite lest it cause some small sexual superfluity, would have conduced either to mental or to bodily health, at any time of my life, unmarried or married.

This whole question is complicated by the mixture of the abnormal with the normal, especially in certain earnest writers of the United States. It is proper therefore here to insist, that Morality cannot bend to abnormal cases. If people bring their bodies into a morbid state by unwholesome food or drink or other

habits, the cure is in altering their bad habits: their case belongs to medicine, but cannot be pleaded for relaxing moral canons. Nor indeed would such men as Dr. Sylvester Graham or Dr. E. P. Miller of New York City for a moment so plead. They and other purehearted Americans insist, that entire abstinence from sexual functions through a whole life is not only more healthful than ordinary marriage, but is really conducive to the highest vigour. Nevertheless (what is to me perplexing) they have a unanimous horror and dread of *that*, which I believe to be Nature's own relief to the chaste and unmarried man. They do not seem to be aware that it is *ever* moderate. They think of it only as a disease, a mischief, an ugly impurity, brought about (they say) by vicious indulgence, whether in marriage or otherwise; nay, worst of all, as the final deadly consequence of secret vice. Dr. E. P. Miller, p. 50, has a passage which to me is marvellous. He reproves "some physicians" for daring to say that it is "natural even to healthy men." "A more fatal error than this," says he, "cannot be disseminated."—But how does Dr. Miller know more about it than healthy men themselves? He goes on to say that "a man healthy in every respect, who has lived a temperate life, and has never abused his sexual nature, *would no more suffer this*" spontaneous phenomenon "*than the animals do:* and consequently, this condition tells too truly a tale of the vices of the subject."

In other words Dr. Miller will have us impute secret vice to Jeremy Taylor, because that saintly man plainly shows himself to have personal acquaintance with this occurrence, which he calls *natural;* as it certainly is. Of course it is hard for any of us to prove to Dr. Miller that we are healthy "in every respect," have been wholly "temperate, and have never abused" (especially in marriage) "our sexual nature." But in his confident imputation of vice, he does not see that he is open to recrimination. My first idea certainly was, that the man who does not know this phenomenon to be normal, natural, moderate and beneficial, *must have so exhausted his masculine powers in early boyhood, as never to learn the healthful conditions of male chastity*: and that the

prevalent unchastity of young medical students under modern science is the sad fact which misleads their theory.—Dr. Miller, in his extraordinary remark on the "animals," quoted above, seems to forget that brutes are moved by bodily appetite, not by mental passions, and are without the human imagination.

Some towns of the United States, it is to be feared, are in an abnormal condition. Writer after writer from New York City, and Rev. E. M. P. Wells, of the School for Moral Discipline, Boston, United States, give frightful accounts of universal impurity in schools; by the side of which all I have known or heard of English schools appears slight: and what is remarkable, Dr. S. Graham again and again insists that parents are deplorably *ignorant of the fact*, and *incredulous*. This implies, that the evil has grown to such magnitude since the fathers were boys: else they could not be ignorant. It thus is nearly equivalent to an admission, that the medical experience which this class of writers presents to us is the experience of a single vitiated generation. To me, I confess, their descriptions of the violence of various sexual phenomena and consequent exhaustion appear utterly extravagant;—appear, in fact, to imply a premature exhaustion of masculine powers in the persons who so suffer. If we accept their statements as correct, they are not normal facts of human nature, but facts limited to the recent generation,—perhaps even to the population of New York and some other great cities. The Rev. E. P. Wells, in his very terrible assertions concerning vice in schools, adds, that it is chiefly in those who live luxuriously and do not labour. He imputes it to the boys' food being too stimulating for the amount of their exercise.* Indeed, as regards New York City, the vast development of wealth and luxury in the last 30 years has probably

* I see that one zealous and very confident writer puts down tobacco-smoking as a leading cause of sexual wantonness. So far as it produces *idleness*, one may easily believe this: but high medical authorities say on the contrary, that excess of smoking so depresses vitality as to induce masculine impotence. Dr. Teste as quoted with applause by Dr. Ellis of Ohio, regards "the bashfulness of children of ten years old as incompatible with innocence, and a mark of secret vice"!!

made an enormous change in the bringing up of children; and we may believe that indolence, high feeding, and early spoiling have produced abnormal results.

Nor is England free from the same change: nay, her medical men have been, and are, its most active propagators. Under their approval or even by their direct suggestion, children have flesh-meat and alcoholic drinks so much and so early, that no one need wonder, if (as the doctors often say) the constitution of young people (in our towns and among our gentry) is changed. Dr. Sylvester Graham and Dr. Trall attribute immense results for evil in American boys to the abundant eating of flesh: and the attestation of a barrister concerning his own little boys, as quoted by Dr. Graham, is as decisive as a single case can possibly be, in proof that fleshmeat causes in children premature and very pernicious wantonness.

I have already observed that the old physicians saw a *moral* analogy between the mode by which Nature preserves health in the man and in the woman, when unmarried and chaste. But, it seems to me, there must likewise be even a *physical* analogy, notwithstanding the essential diversity of the cases. For if a young woman be sedentary and without hard work, good feeding produces oversupply; thereupon its natural overflow, being necessarily abundant, deranges the constitution by its magnitude. Headaches, lassitude and feebleness follow. But in the hardworking girl there is but little oversupply, and no inconvenience whatever is felt by her when Nature establishes its normal balance. Also in the more extreme cases of severe female toil and rigidly strung muscle,—in the women who work in the fields,—the girl-porters of the South of France,—the African hardworking women of whom Mr. Winwood Reade tells,—the Arab girls,—the Amazon guards of Dahomey,—the North American Indian women;—we may make sure that Nature does not allow much force to be wasted by her own spontaneous action. Now, guided by this analogy, I easily believe that if a youth is sedentary and well fed,—or let us say, ill fed on improper food, and inflamed by drinks,—not only may

his sexual passion be premature, but its supplies may be excessive; and thereupon the natural reaction, *which is destined to reestablish the balance,* may agitate his system by its violence. If the girl may thus suffer, why not the boy? The depletion is thought excessive, and is felt to be depressing: yet possibly the *suddenness* of the change and its shock to the nerves is the real cause of distress, even if its amount is not too great, in consideration of the small use made of physical strength. In every case, if a youth do thus suffer, the obvious remedy is, harder bodily exercise, and food less stimulating, less perhaps also in quantity. "Take a horse from his oats," is a groom's remedy for too much spirit. *Until this remedy has been tried and failed,* what right has a medical adviser to despair? But what are we to say, when a leading physician, instead of recommending harder work and less food, recommends vile embraces and a foul mockery of tender love? Can imbecility and impiety go further? In imbecility I would compare it to those physicians, who used to bleed a patient, because he had burst a bloodvessel. It is possible enough, that the emptier the system is made, the less it will spontaneously empty itself; if this be cure. But supposing even that the recipe have some other counteracting effect; yet, if once moral scruples be overpowered on the plea of "health," it may easily kindle a sensual fire most destructive of health. We have certainly a right to claim, that medical men, if they are to retain public honour, shall denounce the *causes* of disease, and not try to reconcile us to morbid and impure states of life. Notoriously it is not rare for physicians to advise marriage to a man, *because* his sexual system is weak and disordered. This is to promote yet another form of selfishness, which it is incredible can be other than mischievous to all parties and to the community.

The American physicians to whom I refer, do not at all flinch from duty. They plainly insist on the renunciation of evil food and evil habits, and on the delay of marriage until perfect health is regained; and so alone expect restoration. But my immediate concern is with those dogmatic assertions made by them, which seem to me extreme, paradoxical or unsound. It occurs to me to

ask, whether, like many other doctors, they are not apt to believe their patients too easily. A profligate, to save his own shame, may slander his schoolfellows in mass: ought his word to be accepted as decisive? Again, he may be suffering from secret vice, and he may pretend it is from an excess of natural depletion. To suppose that the American climate has affected the race, is not admissible, while the country people, who are most exposed to the climate, have least evil imputed to their constitution. After all, this part of the subject must be left where it is. The American writers go with me all lengths against the doctrine which I call the modern heresy,—the doctrine that strict sexual abstinence is a physical evil, tending to disease.

One branch of this discussion remains, and it is nearly the hardest to touch of all. From the side of Political Economy it was first made prominent by the brave Mr. J. Stuart Mill. Here indeed Mr. Thomas Beggs is directly opposed to him, and so am I. Mr. Mill denounces the having many children as matrimonial "incontinence," and expects that Society will hereafter decide *how many* children to a marriage are enough, and will justly frown upon, and somehow punish, the parents who dare to have too many. It is not at all from that side that in my opinion "matrimonial excesses" are to be measured. Yet Mr. Mill probably did a service, and a very unpopular one, in plainly declaring that Sexual Morals must take cognizance of human conduct *in* marriage, as well as *out of* marriage. It is a a lesson which religious teachers have been unwilling to preach, and religious hearers unwilling to learn: nevertheless, through the stern lessons of physiology it is forcing itself into notice, and physicians are beginning to speak plainly. It certainly is included in the title of this tract, which will be imperfect if I omit it: nevertheless, I feel the danger of wrongful dogmatism to be here great; I write under correction, conscious that my knowledge is partial, and as one feeling his way. Where moralists have not hitherto spoken out, we have not yet gathered any general concurrence of mankind.

To open the subject, I shelter myself under a quotation from Dr. E. P. Miller of New York City, who writes as a physician on a matter which he knows. He says:

"A large majority of mankind seem to think that the marriage ceremony is a full license for sexual indulgence; and that, in the eyes of the civil law, in the opinion of society, and in view of moral obligations, this rite bestows the privilege of gratifying the sexual desires to the fullest extent. They even go so far as to plead that Christianity sanctions this. *Thousands of professing Christians die yearly from diseases induced solely by the practice which this belief engenders.*"

For miscellaneous reasons I find myself unable to doubt that this grievous statement is substantially true, and that in it profligates have a stone which they may justly fling at the decorous and the comparatively virtuous. The health of wives is undoubtedly broken down, and children are born puny, through the errors and unrestraint of husbands. To what extent such misconduct exists, whether it is rare or prevalent, it does not concern me here to say; but simply first, to lay down, that the sexual passion needs to be regulated and restrained as well within as without the precincts of matrimony; next, if possible, to define on what principles it is to be regulated.

That the passion needs to be regulated and restrained, is almost too plain to argue about: and the matter has already been touched on above. A wife cannot perform two functions at once. Maternity often preoccupies her. Nor can it be healthful or any way rightful, that she have children one after another too rapidly. In a more perfect state, (short of the earth being overfilled,) I believe, young people will marry early, will have children very slowly, but will continue to have them as late as now, and on the whole as numerous as now, but more robust; and there will be much fewer childless families. But the wife's position has to be strengthened. The power of the husband with us is really a crying monstrous injustice. A woman by marriage loses legal rights over her own person, and becomes a slave, or lower than a slave, to her husband. A brutal husband can convert into torment and misery to his wife

that which Nature intended as the seal of mutual perfect love. A selfish reckless or uninstructed husband may wear out her strength and her life. Many physicians assert that this is a common case. I knew a scandalous affair of a lady, in aspect above fifty years old, who fled to her kinsfolk, openly alleging that her husband was torturing and killing her by forced embraces. He meanwhile in all weather had bad sore throat, which the folk around loudly declared to be venereal.—Men would not so act, were they not stimulated to it by *false doctrine* and *unjust law*. The unjust law has indeed generated a state of social opinion, which is more cruel still. A vicious husband may afflict an innocent wife with the most odious of diseases; a thoughtless (not to say, a drunken) husband may kill her unborn child. That a wife who apprehends such mischief has no self-protection, has given us little concern.

Now in these remarks I seem to find a clue to the principle which will regulate matrimonial relations. Women already argue keenly and fearlessly on the topic, that the woman, not the man, must be virtually sovereign, *because* on her falls the chief strain and toil, in childbearing and childrearing. I quote with slight change the unpublished words of a woman. "As the personal consequences of sexual intercourse fall by Nature's ordinance on the wife only, it is the will and the judgment of the wife that must be supreme in determining when these personal responsibilities shall be incurred. Women have animal passion *less* strongly developed than men have, and the sense of personal and moral responsibility rising out of its exercise *more* strongly developed. In their hands therefore the moral interests herein implicated will be most safely lodged." All this is true; nay, I believe, is less than the truth: for I doubt whether any normal and pure* woman has any sexual appetite at all, until it

* I am aware that women who look forward anxiously to a possibly lonely life, often yearn for children and for marriage, independently of love for any individual. But this is a mental affection, not a bodily appetite. Among the very shocking things which meet one in the class of American writers

is elicited by the passion of love. Here the contrast of woman and man is enormous. No husband who has any true love, or any spark of chivalrous sentiment, can deliberately wish to press himself on a reluctant wife: nor ought he to have any legal authority so to do. If this wrong were set right, advantage would forthwith come to every husband who is now too thoughtless and too unbridled. Wholesome restraint would be imposed: he would lose the tyrannical position of lord and master, and would gain the better footing of tender intimate friend, his wife's co-equal mate. The married pair would not, any more than now, be subjected to offensive inquisition, or canons of medical, economical or religious doctors, if only the moral force of social opinion enacted disgrace on the husband, who used even indirect constraint on his wife, or took unmanly advantage of her fond desire to gratify him against her own inclination or judgment.

If it were received as a fixed principle of matrimonial morals, that maternity, once commenced, is sacred and *paramount;* that a mother's duty to the expected offspring overrules all duty of tenderness or submission to a husband; that her wifely function must be *in abeyance,* until her child is born and fully weaned; (which, I suppose, physiologists will justify;) perhaps even Dr. E. P. Miller, Dr. Trall, Dr. Ellis and Dr. Sylvester Graham would think wives to be tolerably safe from the evils which they now deplore. Husbands universally would have to learn, at least for long periods of married life, the lessons of self-controul, which the virtuous and really wise must always have practised; and though the possibility of excess would still remain, its evils would be (in a physical sense at least) comparatively small.

from whom I have quoted, is, their belief in the wantonness of young girls, and the wide extent of "secret vice" among them. Flesh meat again is by some imputed as the cause.—"Sensational" novels are said to have a like exciting power on our girls. The very possibility is a condemnation of them. —Dr. Trall of New York says that the evil is not from passion at all; but odious vice is taught in childhood as a habit, and as a habit gains dominion, with the gentle and refined. To what is the new world coming?

The spiritual moralist will ever have to insist, that to make animal pleasure a conscious object of pursuit, is Sensuality, even in acts not unlawful; indeed, just as in partaking of lawful food: and every moralist will rightly add, that to pursue pleasure for its own sake, is precisely the way to lose it. Snatch at the shadow, and you drop the substance. Love is the substance. Hold it fast; and as much pleasure will come unsought, as is desirable.

But some of our American moralists have a special doctrine on this matter; a doctrine difficult to treat, on which hitherto they do not convince me. Because childbirth is the ultimate physical purpose of fond embraces, they assume that the pair who so embrace ought to be, then and there, *thinking of*, *planning* and *desiring* offspring. A child born under such mental influences of the parents, is called by some of them a *love-child:* Dr. Miller clearly implies that all other children are born of lust, not of love. The *love-child* is supposed to have a nature singularly harmonious, pure and unlustful;* children born without parental desire for them are reprobated as something shocking, and likely to be peculiarly carnal.—But no proof is offered of assertions so new; nor do I find in them any plausibility.

Thus much indeed is easy to concede,—that persons who are conscious of desiring *not* to have children ought not to marry at all. But there is error in the original assumption, that the Creator had but *one* design in enacting marriage; and that, whatever was the Divine purpose, ought to be the purpose also of man and woman in entering marriage. In laying plans of life we take longer views, than it is healthful to take minute by minute. We order the number of our meals and the quality

* This whole class of writers seem to assume a vast natural difference between man and man as to sexual appetite. They regard strength in the appetite as a reproach, and as the result of parental vice. In my belief, on the contrary, there is as little difference as in the case of hunger. Deficiency in the appetite to me appears a regrettable physical defect, not harmless even to a man's mind.

and quantity of food by a consideration of what health and strength require; but it would damage digestion to eat as a valetudinarian, weighing the morsels.

Men of active healthy bodies can generally trust appetite to decide how much they shall eat, especially when food is simple: and that is the higher and better way. Now in the case which I desire this comparison to illustrate, it is not a man's animal appetite that ought to be consulted, and treated as arbiter: *sentiment* is here the rightful instinct; not a selfish, but a loving impulse. The instinct of the man becomes base, not honourable, the moment it is purely selfish. This probably is all that our Americans intend, when they speak vehemently against yielding to instinct. But precisely because the nature of woman is deficient, and almost destitute, of such appetite as abounds in the man, and because she has foresight of consequences to herself, she is the natural corrective to his impulse. If then the man's first thought is her welfare and her gratification, any want of response in her is sure to be felt at once, so that the aberrations of crude instinct are quelled by Love.

The reason for marriage,—not only the sufficient reason, but the best reason,—is Love. If a man have a large estate, and court a lady because he desires an heir to the estate, he could not safely make his desire prominent. She wishes to be desired for herself, and not merely as a means to a further end,—the Heir. A mother kisses her child, simply because she loves the child: the kiss has no end beyond itself. Nay, if she tried to kiss "for the glory of God," she would make the kiss a hypocrisy, and would debase, not elevate it. Why should it be otherwise with the embrace of married love? To me it seems highest in purity, when no end beyond itself is consciously sought. Is not an embrace, like a kiss, rather degraded, if entered into as a constructive operation,—as we are now exhorted to enter it? Appetite is not only a legitimate reason for eating, (if the food is good food and is your own,) but is a better reason than the deliberate purpose of strengthening yourself; which

indeed is apt to be a peculiarly bad reason, when appetite is not keen. Surely the analogy of this case must not go for nothing. The complication, no doubt, is much greater in the matrimonial relation. Two persons are there concerned. *Combined sentiment* in this case is the analogue of *single appetite* in the other. But when passion is mutual, it surely justifies itself; and we can only do mischief by interposing scruples concerning ulterior purposes and wishes.

It is possible that Dr. Miller, who complains that people reply "Nonsense!" (p. 28) to his argument for confining the sexual function to the deliberate and conscious *design* of propagating offspring, very imperfectly understands what is meant by that exclamation. A common instinct, prompted by pure sentiment and noble passion, is justified by its own existence. This is felt by those who cannot reason off-hand concerning things sacred, mysterious and secret: so they vent themselves in a contemptuous interjection. Morality will not be promoted by claims which call out instinctive repugnance.

That the offspring is affected by the purity of parents' blood, will be universally admitted. That alcoholic poison in the veins of either parent may produce in the child an abnormal brain, even to the point of idiotcy, no well informed person will deny. But that the *wishes* or *designs* of parents during momentary embrace can affect the soul of the child, is too subtle a thought to be accepted without strict proof. Yet no proof whatever is pretended, nor is to me imaginable.

While I cannot go along with this American school in their desire to supersede mutual sentiment by deliberation, and to turn into cold blood that which is legitimate to hot blood only; I yet thank them for fearlessly opening an important topic, on which there has been far too much silence. Looking back, as I do, to more than 34 years of married life, I feel that it would have been profitable to me, if 35 years ago I could have read the arguments which have come before me only in the last six months.

And here I find myself agreeing with Mr. Thomas Beggs, against Mr. J. Stuart Mill, and against this American school. Mr. Mill complains, that people seem to think children to drop from heaven; just as Mr. Henry C. Wright complains that they are spoken of as "sent by God." The public sentiment on this point seems to me right and wise. Children are born, not indeed without the concurrence of parents, yet certainly through causes beyond their will. Primarily, the greater number of children to one marriage than to another marriage depends on the constitution of the mothers: to impute the difference to some different conduct of the two husbands must ordinarily be a great mistake. This points at a first and manifest error in one who rebukes a husband for "incontinence," because he has many children. Who is to know, on the contrary, whether a childless husband is not childless from the very fact of his "incontinence"? Because parents cannot and do not know whether they are going to have children, or how many, therefore every pious mind will think of the children as "heaven-sent," and will love them the more. Not to love them when they come, would be unnatural and censurable: but to claim that they shall be desired beforehand, is too much. To desire them, or not to desire, is an open question: but a country like ours, in which the responsibility of children is painfully great, would, I fear, soon be unpeopled, if no children were born, but at the parents' distinct desire. It is for the benefit of the State, that population should continue and grow up: it is by the effort, toil and anxieties of parents that children are reared. Therefore, in spite of Malthus and his followers, it has ever been felt and will be felt, that parents, who bring up a family to be *virtuous* and *robust* citizens, are benefactors of the State; and the larger the family, if its quality be good, the greater the parents' merit. Moreover, the higher we esteem our national breed of men, the firmer must we hold this sentiment. If we desire to see Slavonians, Chinese, Indians, predominant in the great world; if we wish in this United Kingdom and in the United States of America the Irish to overtop the English

stock;—then let it be inculcated on men of pure English race to make a duty of avoiding large families. When it is certain that other ruder nations will increase their numbers to the utmost that circumstances permit, mere self-defence must make English rulers desire a steady and equally quick increase of our numbers, if they can possibly be maintained. Hence the sympathy of the public with the parents of large families, is, I think, entirely justified, unless number has been bought at the expense of robustness. This may easily happen. While I judge Mr. Mill quite wrong, in wishing the public to rebuke a parent for having six or eight children instead of three or four (and to count the numbers only, is wholly inadmissible), yet to have a series of children so rapidly that they become *puny* through the breaking down of a mother's health, is undoubtedly a lamentable fault, which (as above said) might perhaps be prevented, if law and social opinion made every wife understand, that it is her *duty*, as well as her *right*, to prevent it. Nevertheless, assuming that the mother and children are healthful, the public are those who reap the benefit. No one has any right to say that we are over-peopled, while we have rampant vice and bad laws in plenty. Vice causes pauperism, bad institutions cause vice; which of all things is most expensive, priv ˙ ˙ publicly. Vice is unnatural, and therefore cannot have deep roots in man himself; only in bad artificial institutions. Lessen the bad law, and strike down vice, as the State alone is able to strike it down, and it will soon be found that there is *not* too much population. But if there were, the world is large. The United States would be glad to receive ten millions in the next ten years, if we could spare so many: nay, I almost believe they would send and fetch them.

In this sense, I cordially accept some of Mr. Thomas Begg's most important utterances in the paper from which I quoted in the opening. I now slightly modify them as follows:—

"The Author of our Being has not made the perpetuation of the species to depend upon nice and economical calculations, but upon a powerful

passion. Marriage supplies the conditions under which the passion may act legitimately, and is the state most conducive to individual happiness and to the general welfare. Celibacy, prompted by pecuniary caution or by luxurious habits, is parent of indolence, materialism and vice: and the man or woman who is a celibate from such influences loses moral and perhaps intellectual growth. The prevailing taste for luxury tends to concubinage, and consequently to foster the great evil of prostitution. Compatibility of age, temper and inclination, mutual esteem and attachment of a married pair, are far better guarantees for the culture of offspring, than the possession of worldly goods. I do not plead for *imprudent*, when I suggest *early*, marriages. *The miseries which are a disgrace to our civilization do not spring from these:* nor will they be met by any fantastic restrictions on marriage, nor by limiting the fruits of the marriage bed. If men in a beleaguered fortress may reasonably complain of being overpeopled, then equally may we: not otherwise. In each case the beneficent designs of Providence are thwarted by the folly, pride, and cupidity of man."

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The history of ethics is, we believe, very well understood by the few who have taken pains to study it closely; nor do we suppose that it contains any paradox to such. But, on a superficial view it is highly paradoxical and full of inconsistencies. On the one hand, it appears that the earliest knowledge attained by mankind, is an acquaintance with moral right. The child, or at least the youth, seems to know it so instinctively, as, from the freshness of his sense, to give truer verdicts on many subjects than experienced men. Barbarians, to the astonishment sometimes of our churchmen, manifest that we have very little to teach them of that knowledge of which we may have been too ready to think ourselves the privileged depositaries. On second thoughts, we see not only how it is, but why it is thus; that human society would never be able to coalesce at all, unless moral feeling were universal and instinctive; an almost immediate consequence of which is, the desire of public rule, enforcing justice; and since all the sciences of observation and experience presuppose civilized life, they are naturally posterior to that knowledge which is a previous condition of civil union.

Nevertheless one branch of ethics which touches domestic life most closely, and as to which we need in very early youth firm and positive principles, is a marked exception; so that in it we find an avowed and sharp contrast between barbarian and civilized ethics. Of course we refer to the relations of the sexes, and the approval of polygamy and concubinage among barbarians. Scarcely have we explained this to ourselves, when we are mortified to discover that in the midst of Christianity and civilization, no sooner do men throw off reverence for traditional precepts, than an alarming fraction of them gravi-

* In consequence of our dissent from the opinions implied by our much-esteemed contributor at p. 17, he has, at our request, prefixed his name to his article. It was in type, ready for our last number, which must be borne in mind in reference to some of the expressions.—*Editor of Westminster Review*, April, 1860.

tates towards an immorality of sentiment on this subject far baser than that of barbarians.

When we pass from social to national ethics we find paradoxes still greater. In many ages of the world the very nations who seem most scrupulously virtuous in their internal relations, are judged by their neighbours outside* to be proportionably unjust and violent in their foreign behaviour; and yet seem not to know it, but generally to have a firm belief that they are acting a rightful, reasonable and necessary part, when their conduct, *if* it be wrong, is nothing short of murder, robbery, and other high crimes on a great scale. Historians have often remarked, that the foreign dependencies of free nations are ruled more oppressively than those of arbitrary monarchs, and that where both possess plantations cultivated by slaves, the slaves of the freer people are treated more rigorously and have less chance of rising out of their degradation. Again and again does impartial history remark, that when by means of free and just institutions a nation has become inwardly strong, it rarely shows any desire that its neighbours should share like advantages, but perhaps pharisaically alleges that they are not fit for freedom. It is apparently as ready to assail national existence as if it did not know the dearness of nationality; in short, it is hard to say that the wars of free states have been entered into at all more scrupulously and justly than those of despots, or that their successes have been less greedy and less ferocious.

These and such like phenomena may not only be explained, but *so* explained as to blunt the edge of our indignation, though it cannot abate our sorrow. But while such facts as we have named may seem casual or transitory, a deeper and more permanent paradox remains, that, according to the current morality of Christendom, two nations may be engaged in deadly struggle and *neither be in the wrong*. While inflicting mutual miseries, of which the deaths and wounds in battle are but a small fraction, both sides may be virtuous and feel reciprocal esteem, so that by a few strokes of the pen passing between two ambitious and narrow-hearted men, the armies which yesterday put forth all the appliances of force and craft and science for mutual destruction, to-day embrace as friends and honour the hostility which has distressed them. This paradox also, no doubt, can be explained, but to explain it falls short of satisfying the judgment. To say

* The Athenian ambassadors in Thucydides (v. 105) say straight out to the Melian Senate: "Among themselves, and in regard to their native institutions, the Lacedæmonians for the most part behave very virtuously; but towards all others they, most signally of all men whom we know, account what is pleasant honourable, and what is convenient just." Within twenty years all Greece confessed the truth of this harsh statement.

that in a war both sides are right, is to overthrow the only moral theory on which, as far as we know, war has ever been defended, viz., by comparing it to necessary self-defence against a ruffian, or to police-procedure against a criminal, which is justified in civil life. This theory essentially supposes that one side is guilty or unjust. To treat combatants on both sides as morally on a par, and both justified by the law of "discipline;" not only entirely overthrows this analogy, but admits the atrocious moral heresy that the organic centre of a State, called "the Government," can, at its own pleasure and its own sole responsibility, liberate its citizens from human duties towards the citizens of other States. As in certain religions, or religious orders, it is supposed that the high-priest or grand master may claim and receive absolute obedience, concentrating in himself all the moral responsibility, so that the votaries are conscientiously bound to obey whatever deed of ferocity he may enjoin, and are acquitted of blame by the fact of his command; such, according to the appearance of things and (it would seem) according to the creed of Christendom, is the relation of every dutiful subject towards his "Government." Two armies meet for mutual slaughter. Neither of the two asks, or may ask, the justice of the quarrel, the rightfulness of the end sought or of the means used. Their respective "Governments" take the responsibility of this; and though of the two it will be admitted that one or other may be in the wrong, yet the soldiers on both sides are held to be acquitted; and that, even if they happen to believe their Government to be perpetrating high-handed crime.

In such a state of public facts, and such a theory or no-theory to justify them, no one can wonder at the rise and progress of an opinion that "war is essentially an immoral state." This opinion exists in minds wholly opposed, and with results wholly opposite: the one class condemning war *in toto* for its immorality, the other always justifying it *in detail* on the ground of "necessity," yet pleading its essential immorality to defend every procedure in it which is most unscrupulous but happens just then to be convenient. To the former class of course the Quakers belong. Once perhaps scarcely any but actual members of the Quaker body went all lengths in the absolute condemnation of war; but now many who are not Quakers may be heard to use language similar or identical: and we think the grounds of this opinion have somewhat shifted since first the Quakers adopted and systematized it. Originally it may have been suggested by a severe literalism in the interpretation of a single Scripture text; but the Quakers have shown in a thousand ways that whenever they seize a broad principle, they can overleap special texts as decisively as the boldest and freest of Christians. In fact, so

strongly marked has been their unflinching devotedness to broad and even extreme principles, that in the few cases where they may seem to press a text slavishly, one may rather believe that the letter to which they appeal is their servant and tool, than that it is their master. Nor is it by quoting "Resist not evil," that they make converts to their peculiar view of war, but by displaying the want of moral basis to justify the horrors in which wars abound. Indeed, to the policeman no Quaker has any real opposition. If they do not cry aloud their approval of his proceedings, one still cannot doubt that they approve in their hearts: and whenever an attempt is made to argue with them, they deny the *fact*, that war is an operation of international police, inasmuch as there is no court, no magistrate, no public trial, no verdict; nor is there any ostensible and intelligible mark by which by-standers can learn which is the culprit and which is the officer. The total mass of those who are called the "peace-party" in England is not great; but unhappily, while they are *not* numerically strong enough so to enforce preventive justice that war may be avoidable, they *are* morally powerful to divert nearly all the zeal and energy which might else effect very sensible improvements in martial law and in the forms of declaring war, so as to make hasty and unjust war much more difficult.

Looking simply to what *is*, and not to what we *wish* to be, it seems inevitable to concede to the Quaker that war is not a process of police. Nations are mutually in the condition of a community in which there is no magistrate, but every man wears arms and revenges his own wrongs at his own instinct, if he is strong enough; or if he is not, then associates some coadjutor to waylay and punish the offender. Then naturally the little and the weak are prudentially just, but the strong and swaggering can afford to use more latitude; since it suffices for them to be only not *so* unscrupulous as to bring about a coalition that will overpower them. All must entitle such a state of things *anarchy;* the essence of which is that force is used for private ends, without the intervention of those forms which experience and reason dictate as most efficacious for maintaining public law. If society could be transported back to anarchical times, or rather, if we ourselves could be transported to the backwoods of America or the inmost wilds of Australia, where from the extreme thinness of population judicial institutions were as yet utterly inefficacious—terrible as would be the calamity to our sentiment, we could not embrace the Quaker doctrine of going unarmed. To display a peaceable, or we might call it a sheepish deportment, in the presence of wolves, would stimulate wolfish appetite and exasperate unscrupulous ferocity, with evils immensely worse than

those which result from sturdy and perpetual hostilities. Equally, or indeed much more, do we maintain that for a rich, industrious nation like England, to proclaim that she does not fight however cruelly attacked, would involve to herself and to the morality of the world mischiefs a hundredfold worse than those of our stubbornest wars. Our readers therefore must not suppose that we are espousing the Quaker side in its essential points; but unless the thoughtful part of the nation probes this question to the bottom, conceding to the Quaker and to the peace party all that is true in their view, unscrupulous men of the extreme opposite class, have the game in their own hands; and the nation drifting without moral guidance, learning nothing from past calamities, must expect, like all other great empires which have done the same, to fall at last into irreparable disaster. Precisely because we stand on an eminence, we encounter immensely more risk than those who have no heterogeneous and distant dependencies.

Hitherto the ministers of religion, equally with the literary men and the poets, have virtually blown the flames of war by teaching, directly or indirectly, that it is the duty of "subjects" to fight in any or every cause which their "Governments" may prescribe. Although, until a great revolution of mind has taken place, neither Church nor State can organize international rule in place of anarchy, this is only a stronger reason why those who alone can promote a revolution of mind should beware of misdirecting their moral influence. Let us for a moment consider what the doctrine means. War, as it exists, is at its best comparable to a just process of "Lynch Law," or to the just resistance of a felonious attack; and at its worst to the ferocious struggle of two savages, alike regardless of justice and of formal legality. Imagine that in a state of anarchy, the heads of two families have fallen into feud; and that each commands his younger kinsfolk to aid him, and to kill as many as they are able of the other family. It is probable that they would zealously obey; nor could we severely blame them; but might merely remark, that these poor ignorant people know no higher law than that of obeying their chief, though he bid them to rob and murder. But what should we think, if a European missionary, whose sacred character enabled him to go safely to the houses of *both* the combatants, were actively to exhort the young men of *each* to obey their chief in such matters; and were to preach publicly, that in every case of deadly quarrel it behoved the younger members of a family to abstain from inquiring into the justice of the case, but, be it just or unjust, to prosecute every feud which their chief might take up? Should we not feel it hard to moderate indignation against such a moral teacher? It would be manifest to us,

that if the chief were under the necessity of winning the approval and sanction of his own kinsfolk, this would at least put some little more of reason and moderation into his projects of attack. More peculiarly, if from the paucity of powerful leaders there were little restraint on him from without, while from the number and strength of his followers he might have great restraint from within, it would seem the height of imprudence, almost of malignity, to inculcate that the question of entering on feuds, and how far they are to be pushed, ought to rest with him alone. We are not speaking in dark parables; for the application of this to national wars is very evident. If the central authority, whatever its nature, which decides on war, is merely politically dominant, but has no high moral superiority to the cultivated part of the nation; and its decisions are not made under such judicial public forms, as alone carry with them the ostensible mark of conscientious justice; on what moral grounds can the community be acquitted of guilt, if it perpetrate hostilities in mere obedience to them? Surely all pretence of morality vanishes, if on the one hand the people are exempted from moral responsibility while obeying the command to kill and plunder, and on the other no such scrupulous forms have been used which any one could imagine would justify the hanging of a notorious murderer or the fining of a notorious swindler. We are often indignant with Chinese morality for having a different law for the native and for the foreigner; but what else is our own practice? If a murder has been committed openly among ourselves, the murderer may not be hanged as soon as caught, but a public trial is enforced; his accusers and his jury are *put on oath*, and he is allowed to *defend himself*. If, on the contrary, a Chinese officer has given some offence to an English officer, war is forthwith begun, not once nor twice only; and English sailors are bid to commit the extreme of violence, without the intervention of a single sacred form, which may save their consciences from the sense of being pirates and murderers. Under these circumstances the introduction of religion into war is apt to cause only a greater revulsion of feeling still, by suggesting that it adds hypocrisy to lawlessness, and endeavours to make or represent the highest and purest of beings our accomplice. To the Englishman the late Emperor Nicholas's Te Deum bears this aspect; but what else to the Russian did Lord John Russell's appeal to God for the Right seem to be? Neither side has *ostensibly* taken care to be on the side of God, yet each side makes the assumption that God is with it, when He cannot be with both. No cause has more powerfully tended to make States irreligious, than the natural disgust felt by public men when the most sacred name is thus manifestly (on one or both sides) in the worst sense "taken in

vain;" and out of this irreligion of States another long train of evils has flowed.

With many persons the uneasy feelings which such considerations inspire, are set aside by the flattering though true remark, that "war has been gradually becoming milder and less indiscriminating. On this we have more to say; but first we desire to mark sharply, what is the nature of the ameliorations which alone have been attempted or pretended. The "laws of war," so much talked of, absolutely leave the question of justice untouched; they accept war as a *fact*, and dictate merely the modes of declaring and of carrying on the war. This is exactly what was probably often done in detail by a Christian priest after the overthrow of the western Roman empire. Hopeless of inspiring in the turbulent barons around him any care for either the forms or the substance of justice, he may have striven to make their fightings, if fight they must, as little atrocious as circumstances allowed. The only laws he would have a chance of recommending, are those of honour and chivalry: first, as to declaring war:—not to make your attack suddenly, before the other party is forewarned of your hostility, but give previous notice, so that your war may not wear the aspect of assassination. Next, as to the mode of the war:—not to attack non-belligerents, as women and children; not to do permanent damage *wantonly*, as cutting down fruit trees where other timber is to be had; not to waste the fields and starve a whole population *without urgent cause:* to treat as non-belligerent all disabled men, whether disabled by extreme age or by wounds. Out of the last principle rises the duty, not only of giving quarter to the wounded in war, but of sparing the life of all who surrender: since, by binding them, they are rendered non-belligerent. Yet there also *urgent cause* may justify slaughtering prisoners, as by Henry V. after the battle of Agincourt, if they are too numerous to keep and their escape may be dangerous. Thirdly, to respect a flag of truce and the sacred heralds, and observe all compacts made during the truce for the conduct of the war.

Such precepts fundamentally commended themselves (with limited exceptions) to Hector and Achilles; so little has Christendom to boast in them. The great development of the principles with us has depended on two changes internal to society. On the one hand, a very large portion of the *men* of every nation has become as completely non-belligerent as the women; on the other, the extinction of slavery has destroyed the pecuniary value of captives of war. The result of these changes is immense, and we must not be supposed to underrate them. We must dwell on them for a moment.

The barbarous assumption always was, that as soon as a state

of war has commenced (never mind how or why), either side had a right to kill the other, and therefore had an absolute right to the persons and property of the other, if they could be seized by violence or stealth. Hence, if a warrior spared a life which he might have taken, that life becoming his, it was open to him to sell the captive as a slave, or to accept ransom. Accordingly, to give quarter to an enemy in battle, was accounted a deed of avarice or of prudence, rather than of mercy. An immense impetus is given to war, where an invading army is permitted to plunder at pleasure, and where the whole possessions of the country are esteemed the natural right of the successful invader; and still more, when the bodies of the inhabitants are reckoned as nearly the most valuable property. Even a poor people affords plenty of plunder, when they themselves can be sold for slaves. While this idea was dominant, every war had all the atrocity of a slave-hunt; and every man in the country became a belligerent, when exposed to calamity so horrible. Hence also arose the terrific scenes which recur so often in the pages of classical history; when husbands kill their wives and children, and throw themselves and their property into a burning pile, rather than fall into the hands of the conqueror. Cruelty and atrocity, deadly feuds of race and even of border cities, were exasperated to a degree now scarcely imaginable. Where belligerent states were conscious of kindred origin, there was an incipient amelioration* from their being ashamed to sell captives of war, or from believing that the surrounding states would not buy. No cause so sustained the bitterness of the quarrel between Christendom and Islam, as the reduction of captive Christians to slavery by the Saracen and afterwards by the Algerine corsairs, long after the states of Christendom in their mutual wars had abandoned even the idea of private ransom for captives. However, the overthrow of domestic slavery was but one of several changes simultaneously operating. The development of war as a peculiar art, the rise of Italian and Swiss mercenary troops, the establishment of standing armies, on the one hand led to professional sympathy between adverse ranks, and on the other converted the masses of the people into non-belligerents. Hence not only the right of quarter to those who surrender, and gentler and honourable treatment of prisoners of war, but also the desire not to exasperate the peasants of a country into enemies, but, by limiting the demands made upon them, prevent their despair.

Great inconsistencies still remain in practical vigour, which

* To the opposite effect Tacitus observes, concerning the battle of Bedriacum, in which the army of Otho was defeated by the Vitellians (Hist. ii. 44):—"There was the more slaughter, because in a civil war captives are not converted into plunder." The brutal soldiers had no pecuniary motive for sparing life. But the more or less of slaughter on the field is not that on which the ferocity and miseries of war turn.

are not pointed at and forced upon attention as they deserve. The different treatment which property on land and property at sea receives during war, is perhaps the most prominent of these inconsistencies. From time to time the question is plainly asked, Why is the property of peaceable traders to be confiscated at sea, when the same enemy would have refrained from touching them on land? The answer is, unfortunately, an excellent one in its way: "Because the distinction is found convenient to powerful belligerents." On land, an invader who has to meet an enemy's army in its own home, has difficulty to feed himself, if the peasants are bitterly hostile; and if he can induce them to furnish supplies by some moderate compulsion short of robbery, he much facilitates his operations. But at sea, he carries his supplies with him, and is never dependent on the good will of the merchants whom he despoils. Moral reasoning has no chance against such arguments; and, unhappily, England, by reason of her power at sea, has had the chief interest in upholding the practice of plundering an enemy's merchant-vessels. Even the rights of neutrals have been dealt with very unscrupulously; and whatever recent changes have been made for the better, have risen since our second American war, out of the notorious determination of the great republic to uphold at any cost her own view of her neutral rights. In the late Russian war our attacks on the innocent Finns, confiscation of cargoes of salt, dashing exploits to capture some poor little vessel, or burn marine stores in private yards, were certainly very ignoble to us. The odium was great, the gain contemptible; and it would be well, if the retrospect might at length induce an abandonment of the principle involved.

The Finns, pressed down by Russia, may have been in heart our friends; but that goes for nothing. In fact, the moment a neutral is overpowered by our enemy, he is treated as himself our enemy. No more striking illustration of the rights allowed to *weak* neutrals is needed, than the defence which is made of our two attacks on Copenhagen. In 1801, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark had joined in an "armed neutrality," to maintain their rights at sea, as "neutrals," against the pretensions of England, who for the convenience of her war with France crippled their commerce. To break this northern alliance, "which threatened our naval supremacy,"* Lord Nelson was sent to destroy the Danish fleet. Seventeen sail were burned, sunk, or captured by him. The Emperor Paul was at the same time assassinated, and the coalition dissolved itself. Six years later—

* As far as I am able to learn, the confederacy demanded no neutral rights beyond what we have now freely conceded by the act of Lord Clarendon, at Paris, without even a debate in Parliament.—F. W. N. (2nd ed.)

"The terrible chastisement which the Danes had received at the hands of Lord Nelson had not promoted any friendly feeling towards England. . . . It was known to our cabinet that there had been secret articles to the peace of Tilsit."

And it was believed that Russia had there consented to the conquest of Denmark by France.

"There was no army in Denmark capable of resisting the French forces. If we could have relied on the friendship of the Danes, we could not rely on their weakness. In short, if we did not make sure of the Danish fleet, Bonaparte was sure to get it. The great law of nature, the instinct of self-preservation, dictated the step which we took. Our Government rushed to its object without a declaration of war against Denmark, because such a declaration would have defeated the object," &c.—*MacFarlane's Hist. of Eng.*)

Thus Denmark is *suspected* of being angry that we destroyed her fleet six years before; and is *convicted* of two offences, that of having built a new fleet, and that of being weak by land. Our cabinet thinks she is certain to be overpowered by her enemy; therefore, to anticipate him, we come down upon her with sudden and overwhelming attack ourselves.

Far more afflicting was the case of Genoa: let Dr. Arnold* tell the story. In the autumn of 1799 the Austrians had driven the French out of Lombardy and Piedmont. The remains of the French force clung to Italy only by the Riviera of Genoa. Their general, Massena, hopeless of relief till the following spring, fortified himself within the lines of the Genoese towers; and the Austrians, not daring to attack him there, sought only to reduce him by famine. Lord Keith, the British naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, lent the assistance of his force to cut off the supplies of Genoa. The winter passed, and spring returned. Famine had begun to accomplish its work. Over the green hill-sides ladies of the highest rank wandered under the eyes of our sailors, cutting up every plant which could be turned to food, and bearing home common weeds as a treasure. Ere long, infants died before their parents' eyes, husbands and wives lay down to expire together. When twenty thousand innocent persons, old and young, women and children, had perished by this most horrible of deaths, the distress at last became unendurable to the French army. Massena is said to have been as well-behaved to the unhappy Genoese as military exigencies allowed; which of course means, that his soldiers were to be the last to starve. But when relief became desperate, and half the garrison had been disabled, it was allowed to surrender and march out freely with the honours of war. And what had been the guilt of the Genoese? The sole offence alleged against them is, that they had no military force powerful enough to hinder

* "Oxford Lectures on Modern History," 1842; lect. iv.

the French army from throwing itself into their city. Yet "the laws of war" justify the conduct of the Austrian and British commanders; and Dr. Arnold, while evidently execrating a deed, which rests equally on the two cabinets, has no other solution of the difficulty, than that "all non-combatants should be *allowed to go out* of a blockaded town." But what ships would take them? and who would feed them when carried away from their supplies? Evidently no issue can be found from this hideous barbarity, without adopting totally new principles as to the rights of belligerents against neutrals.

It is well to contrast these proceedings with those sanctioned in the officers of justice, when sent by impartial authorities to execute a sacred verdict. Suppose that a desperate felon, after conviction, murders the constable who is escorting him to jail, and escapes. He is pursued, and runs into a house, where he barricades himself with an old woman and some children. What would be said of his pursuers, if they burned down the house, and with it burned the innocent family, in order to kill or capture the criminal?* Or, to change the hypothesis, imagine the constable wilfully to run an innocent man through the body, in order to stab the felon behind him; how should we receive his calm justification, that "he had no choice about it, for it was his only way of reaching the guilty person? Nothing is clearer than that such a remedy of guilt is worse than the disease; yet belligerents are allowed to assume, that the object at which they aim—victory—is of *paramount* importance, so that all other rights are to be sacrificed to it, whenever they are strong enough to enforce the sacrifice. This they are allowed to assume, although it is certain that one or the other is committing hideous outrage; and neither clergymen, historians, moralists, public writers, nor statesmen raise any cry of indignation that can be heard through the tumult of intense selfishness and greedy ambition.

Perhaps because in Asia we have for a hundred years been brought into worse temptation than any other European power—being side by side with industrious, highly-peopled, but comparatively weak nations—therefore it is, that in many points we cling to some barbarous practices longer than others. The notion that all the property of an enemy's country naturally belongs to an invading army, comes from the worst times of barbarism, and is theoretically discarded by all Europe; yet the English armies in the East still hold fast to the idea, long since

* If the newspapers have told truth, this very deed was done many times by our officers in the early stage of the Indian mutiny. They burned down cottages with unarmed men, women, and children in them, because armed mutineers had escaped into them.

renounced in Europe, that every town which they capture is their prize-money, and must pay to the army a large ransom as a commutation for their natural right of plunder. Our newspaper writers, especially those of India, blow up a flame of indignation and even of disaffection against the Government, if it dares to dispute this "soldiers' right." A marvellous example of it was lately exhibited at the siege of Delhi. That city, like unhappy Genoa, had been guilty of the crime of weakness. The citizens were unarmed; we had kept them so; and if they had been our stanch and vehement friends, they had not power to resist the mutineers, whom the Honourable East India Company had failed to keep in control. This was an obvious certainty. The inhabitants first suffered taxation, or rather plunder, from our mutineers; next were made guilty by us for the fact; and in the capture were treated with a ferocity such as well vies with any deeds of Russia or Austria; finally, an immense outcry was made against Lord Canning, for the injustice of depriving the army of the spoil of Delhi—our own city!

It is only within very recent years that the atrocious system of paying *head-money* to soldiers or sailors for the numbers they kill, was abolished by us. Austria brought great and just detestation on herself for thus remunerating the murderers of the Gallician nobility, in 1846; but it is still more recently that we adopted the same mode of reward to our sailors for the wholesale massacre of an alleged piratical tribe in Borneo, under the guidance of the philanthropic Rajah Brooke. The stir made against it in Parliament by Mr. Joseph Hume, Mr. Cobden, and a few others, has led to its final abolition; but the recency of this conversion ought to make Englishmen less pharisaically proud of their international morality, and more resolved to undertake the task of self-purification.

The laws of *purveyance* display another very unsettled question, in which, we are happy to say, England has set a good example. In an enemy's country an invading army cannot but make requisitions of supplies from the people around; but it may pay for them, either at prices fixed by itself, or even at market price. Even in France, so long ago as 1814, the Duke of Wellington paid for everything in ready cash—the only way which is not illusive. In Persia we lately did the same. The Russian and Austrian armies, when ashamed or afraid to seem to rob, pay in bits of paper, signed by unknown generals, colonels, or commissariat officers. Farmers and peasants soon despair of ever getting payment, or are ruined before payment is possible, and sell the paper for a mere trifle to speculators who buy it up. On the return of peace, if the paper has largely fallen into the hands of a powerful millionaire—a Rothschild—it will sometimes

be paid in full, and with little delay; otherwise, either with much delay, or not at all. The greedy violence of the Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia during the late Russian war, went beyond all bounds; for they not only commanded the service, or rather the slavery, of the people with their carts and horses, but laid claim also to their military action against their acknowledged and legitimate sovereign. When a belligerent is strong, it would appear that he may break all the "laws of war" with impunity, at least against lesser nationalities.

Among the rules of European warfare, hardly any touches so nearly the feelings of military men, and hence the whole European aristocracy, as the right of captives of war to honourable treatment. When the war goes on between nations which were just before in amicable diplomatic relations, this right is granted, sometimes with ostentatious care. If the Austrians had hanged, we will not say, Sardinian regular officers who had fallen into their hands, but even Garibaldi, who at least bore the King of Sardinia's commission, it would have been met with loud and violent resentment. Yet when the nations belligerent have not recently met on terms of diplomatic equality, at least three of the great powers have in our memory discarded at pleasure this most fundamental law of civilized warfare.

The first instance to which we allude is that of Russia in Poland. The Emperor Alexander, having occupied the Duchy of Warsaw (a poor fragment of the old kingdom of Poland), for military convenience against Napoleon I., refused to evacuate the country after his fall; cajoled the aristocracy by proposing a liberal constitution, and forced Austria, England, and Prussia into acquiescence by trimming the scale between them and Napoleon, when he returned from Elba. In a very few years Alexander discarded the constitution, and openly usurped a despotic rule, hereby tearing up with his own hands his own legitimacy. In consequence, after the French revolution of 1830, the Poles rose as a nation to claim their freedom, and took the field with regular armies. In two great battles they were successful; but their resources failed against those of Russia, and they were at last subdued. That it was a national war in a national cause, and in defence of rights guaranteed to them in the Treaty of Vienna (1815) was plain. It was a war waged not by mere guerilla, but in orthodox regularity. Yet the conquered Poles were treated as the vilest of criminals, and were sent to the torturing life of Siberian bondage in great numbers. No European power dared to enter a protest.

Next came the turn of Austria, who, after worse treachery to the Hungarian nation, hanged their captive officers as soon as the war commenced. Neither England nor France protested, because it was known that Russia was backing her up, rejoicing, no doubt, to

see Austria enter into final implacable feud with the greatest of her kingdoms. At the end of the war the Hungarian generals who had surrendered to Russia, and had been treated with marked honour until all were caught, were at length handed over to Austria to be hanged; and again no power in Europe dared to protest. Yet Englishmen imagine, that their sovereign, strong in their affection, might take courage to speak for the right cause before all the world. Alas! what a delusion! when England herself finds it so convenient, or so suitable, to practise similar deviations from civilized war. Russia called the Poles "rebels;" Austria called the Hungarians "mutineers and rebels;" words which like "heretic" or "infidel" are allowed to overthrow the first principles of humanity and of right. But the received laws of war avowedly ignore the question which side is constitutionally or morally right; they only ask, whether both sides are strong enough to confront one another in the open field; if so, these laws must be in every case observed, whether the enemy consists of rebels or of robbers,* in order to prevent needless atrocity. Nevertheless, England has never been magnanimous enough to act on this obviously just principle.

It is not merely an Edward I., who treated the Scotch and the Welsh† as "rebels;" nor is it only the Irish whom we have so treated, where we had at least the excuse, that the Irish nation was always divided against itself. George III. and his Tories would have hanged Washington as readily as they hanged the Irish leaders; it was still worse, perhaps, to send in the Red Indians against our American colonists. To the Caffres, entreating terms of peace, our general-in-chief replied: "We make no terms with *rebels*;" and would hear of nothing but unlimited surrender. Finally, most signally of all, though the Indian armies met us with regular war, we refused to recognize their belligerent rights, denied the possibility that men with skin so black could have a spark of patriotic feeling, or that the Great Mogul, by whose gift and signature we up to that day held our legal position in India, had any royal right to quarrel with us, or to receive the moral homage of his own countrymen. His sons freely surrendered at the smooth-tongued persuasion of

* Many of our readers must remember the fearful exasperations of the civil war in the Spanish colonies, owing to the Spanish commanders persevering to treat the insurgents as *rebels*. Such cruelty did not save the royal cause, and, as we believe, can seldom or never have any tendency to promote a final triumph.

† "You are a lucky people," said an Austrian to an Englishman; "your old kings did most of the atrocious work to your hand, and George III. finished the last of it in Ireland. Unfortunately for us, we have got to do it yet. When we have violently fused up our populations, as you have done yours, then we will be as virtuous as you." This man, like all other immoral men did not know that every immorality entails its own curse, and that England might, with far less mischief to herself, have won mildly and honourably what she seized by violent wickedness.

an English officer, who presently shot them in cold blood, at his own will and motion, and was rather admired for it. The king himself was tried by court-martial, and sentenced to ignominious punishment. Captive soldiers were deliberately killed by the hundred—we fear by the thousand; to say nothing of the unarmed population strung up in lines on suspicion, or without public trial. Regiments which desired to lay down their arms, and stipulated for nothing but their lives, were again and again refused this privilege. Finally, when all our fear was calmed, when no hot blood remained, when extravagant falsehood had been exposed, Tantia Topee, the last, perhaps the most gallant of their leaders, was betrayed to us for money, and hanged. If Prince Schwarzenburg could have foreseen these doings, how many more envenomed words might he have added to his celebrated despatch in reply to Lord Palmerston's faintly whispered hope that Austria would be merciful in her hour of conquest?

Well, at least it is only against "mutineers" and "rebels;" hence the evil is not a widely-spreading precedent. It is to be hoped, that in war against regular, acknowledged governments, we set a good example to all the world, and conscientiously obey the laws of war—at least the fundamental ones.—But there is nothing more fundamental to civilized warfare than that no war shall be commenced without a previous statement of grievances and demand of redress—a demand made to the sovereign himself; and that *only after* he has refused redress, and when in consequence war has been solemnly declared, with its motives and aim, shall hostilities be begun. In dealing with great powers, we anxiously observe these forms. France, Russia, America, have again and again committed against us exasperating offences, yet we have not at once rushed into war, but have demanded explanations and redress. At this moment we are embroiled with America, by General Harney having occupied an English island with United States' troops: if an English admiral thought to earn the praise of energy by the dashing exploit of expelling him, it is certain that he would be cashiered, and perhaps meet yet severer punishment. But when we have to deal with Burmah, with China, with Persia, we forget all our "Christian" rules; as though, if these powers be the barbarians that we allege, it can be right for us to sink to their level; or, as though we can teach them to observe the international law of Christendom by any other method than by practising that law towards them.

If there is any external phenomenon of war more striking to men's imagination, as indicative of its justice or injustice, it is the mode of commencing it; whether with grave deliberation, slowness, apparent unwillingness, or with haste, suddenness, and an endeavour to take the adversary unawares; or rather, trea-

cherously to treat one who is in amity with us as an enemy. A power which is substantially unjust, gains at least the appearance of gravity and moderation, if it makes its demands with formality, deliberates over the refusal of redress, publicly warns the other side of impending consequences, appoints a time after which hostilities must commence, and, only after thus holding open a door of escape, undertakes the war as if compelled. All this forbearance we do show to a great power, as recently to Russia. But if, on the contrary, a war is suddenly commenced by the voluntary act of a distant official, without even allowing the Home Government to express an opinion; or, what may seem even worse, if orders from home have been given to lull the other party into unsuspicion and come down upon him with a sudden act of war; then, even if the cause of war be ever so good and urgent, it has all the aspect of odious violence and treachery, being more like to a deed of assassination than to a legitimate process against a criminal. It is peculiarly frightful that such abrupt procedures have been repeatedly practised by English officers, sanctioned or not publicly reproved by our highest authorities, without any strong or permanent indignation of the English public. It is but a few years since the English fleet, carrying an army from India, attacked Bushire, simultaneously declaring war; and our envoy, narrating the facts, boasted of the skill with which he kept the Persian authorities, down to the last moment, ignorant that there would be any war at all. Soon after, the statement of the Persian minister was published, that forty days had been given by our ambassador to their plenipotentiary at Constantinople for communicating with his government, and that not a quarter of that time was elapsed when our sudden assault was made.

There is much in all this to excite grave alarm, and call for a total reform in our foreign dealings. Christendom was once our only world of diplomacy; we are now in contact, not only with mere savages with whom no political relations at all are possible, but with old, thickly-peopled, industrious nations, who cannot be expected to know or practise the technical peculiarities of European international dealings, but who can practice all the duties of good neighbourhood. If our officers are allowed to plunge into chaos because they are able (rightly or wrongly) to allege that a foreign power, whether China, or Persia, or Burmah, or Siam, or Japan, is neglecting some point of the ceremonial law of Europe, the law of right and of God will assuredly avenge itself upon us.

There never yet was a prudent government, however despotic, which conceded to its servants abroad the right of making war without consulting it. Suppose it to be ever so careless of justice, ever so grasping, ever so willing to assume that an officer,

subject to daily irritation at the resistance of his will by a foreign power, is himself an adequate court for deciding on the justice of commencing a hostile attack, still its justice is only one point of the case; the expediency of it is generally a vast argument. A local officer, at Hong Kong or Rangoon or in the Peiho, looks only to the limited question before him, and cannot be expected to embrace all sides of the case. The Persians or the Chinese may have wronged us, yet it may be highly inconvenient to us to invade them on account of the wrong. A small force can do nothing but occupy one or two forts, and there remain, perhaps to be half starved. A large force is sent with great effort; and even if it be fit for human potentates proudly to forget the contingencies of war, and how many great armaments of invasion have failed miserably, crippled by the elements, by pestilence, by famine, and finally have been defeated by an adversary once inferior;—yet we have to ask, are we not made weak and almost passive in Europe and elsewhere, if we have to carry on a war at the opposite side of the world? And if we succeed in the invasion, what are we to do next? Should we try to annex more provinces to our empire? but this may, not unreasonably, cause a league of great powers against us. Moreover, unless the new districts themselves give us reliable men and money, every such extension of empire is a source of weakness. Surely the propriety of such extension should be publicly and calmly discussed by the Cabinet and Parliament and Nation at home, and is not to be prejudged by an executive officer on the other side of the world. Yet this is done by our way of going on. One man strikes a blow, in Burmah perhaps or China; a cry then arises in the "independent press," that, "once in for the war, we must go through with it, else we shall be despised." If the end of it is that we annex a province, and no immediate visible mischief accrues, a precedent is established and an impetus given to like "energetic action" of every local executive. To give prizes for conduct, of course stimulates to similar conduct; and for many years past our officers in Asia have been thus incited to take into their own hands a very summary settling of disputes.

Neither the Emperor of the French nor the Emperor of Russia allows his subordinates to make wars for him at their pleasure, but the free English nation appears almost to have forgotten that nation or Parliament has any voice in such a question. The Parliament delegates its control to the Privy Council, the Privy Council to the Cabinet, the Cabinet to some admiral, or some civilian in the far East, accustomed to despotism; and appears to have adopted as a fixed principle, that in order not to discourage energy in its servants, their conduct, even when disap-

proved,* is to be publicly sanctioned, and to be rewarded if successful. The Ministry, talking high of the prerogative of the "Crown," (all of which they assume to themselves,) by the connivance of the *out* party, which hopes ere long to come *in*, have wonderfully succeeded in making the nation and Parliament believe that the sole decision on war, peace, and treaties *constitutionally* belongs to what is called the Crown, that is, to the Ministry of the day.

It is easy to see the monstrosity of such a state of things, and that if it were constitutional, it ought not to be, and ought instantly to be reformed, even if all precedent were the other way. There is no more fundamental principle of freedom (for it is even admitted under despotism) than that no nation shall be dragged into a war by its executive against its will and judgment. But to say this, is to say more than we here need; for if it were admitted that the ultimate decision rested with the executive government, yet if there be any organic deliberative institutions at all, their voice must at least be first elicited, after mature review of the facts. Nay, if even a majority of every class in the nation desired war, yet they have no right to enter into it without first hearing what the minority has to say on the other side. This is the essential meaning of deliberative institutions. The minority has to undergo risk, to make sacrifices, at the command of the majority: well, so it must be, *if* the majority cannot be convinced. But it is the duty of these to listen calmly, to receive and to give reasons. This essential right is overthrown, if a war is entered into, or indeed is patched up by a treaty fraught perhaps with new dangers, by a sudden act, without time for deliberation, or by only one side of the State—the party in power. The Sultan of Turkey† enters into no wars without the solemn advice both of his Cabinet and of his Council. But the English Cabinet has believed itself omnipotent in Asia since the overthrow of the Sikh power, and, therefore perhaps ventures on liberties there, of which it would not dream against any of the great powers of Christendom.

Nevertheless, so hard is it to induce a modern Parliament to care for any principles, however sacred and obviously necessary,

* In a former article we remarked that Commodore Lambert, who began the last Burmese war in disobedience to the positive written orders of Lord Dalhousie *was mildly rebuked* in words, yet was continued in command. His act was followed up although distinctly disproved, and at the close of the war he *received a special honour* from her Majesty.

† By a regulation of Solyman the Magnificent, which professed, we believe, to be based on the Koran, the Sultan cannot begin any war until the Sheikh el Islâm (the head of the religious functionaries) has declared that it will be rightful. So excellently intended a rule was sure to be evaded upon occasion. In fact, the Sheikh can be deposed by the Sultan, and a more compliant successor appointed, which somewhat lessens the spirit of this functionary.

by arguments drawn from the morality and expediency of the case itself, unless there is either compulsion from abroad or precedent at home, that it is of great importance to appeal to our constitutional lawyers for information as to precedents. Mr. Toulmin Smith, in his valuable sessional publication, the "Parliamentary Remembrancer,* has brought together a series of precedents on this subject, distinctly showing that in old England, during those times in which our historians are apt to tell us that the king was without constitutional check, it was already a well-defined positive rule, which our boldest kings dared not to violate, that *the consent* of the Great Council, and afterwards *of the Parliament was necessary to a* WAR *or to a* TREATY. Referring our readers to his pages (especially, pp. 3, 4, 96, &c.) for details, we here borrow from him a few facts which contain the principle. One of the articles of the Ordinance made by certain barons in the 5th Ed. II. (A.D. 1311) begins with the recital of the existing law in these words :—"Forasmuch as the king ought not to undertake deed of war against any one, but by common assent of his baronage." It is true that all these ordinances were revoked ten years later, but with the protest that no such matters could be dealt with, unless they were "treated, accorded, and established in Parliaments," &c.

In the 5th year of Edward III. the king's Chancellor declared that he

"*Summoned the Parliament* on matters touching the Duchy of Guienne and the king's lands beyond sea, *in order to make peace* or *other issue* to the dissensions between the kings of England and France. . . . The said Bishop of Winchester, Chancellor, on the part of our lord the king" (say the Rolls of Parliament) "asked of . . . . . all the barons and great men there assembled, whether the king should take the way of arbitration (*proces*) as the king of France had proposed, or should make war. *The prelates, earls, barons, and other great men counselled*, as the best, *that the king should make a friendly treaty* with the king of France on the aforesaid matters."

In the 17th year of the same great king (A.D. 1343) a Parliament was holden at Easter, the proceedings of which are given in the Rolls with unusual fulness. While the king was in France with his army, and had laid siege to the city of Vannes, two cardinals, as ambassadors of the Pope, besought him to make a truce, in hope of concluding during it an honourable peace. The king, wishing to retain the Pope as a friend, assented to

* This work, having no advertisements and no other news than parliamentary, cannot afford publisher's expenses. It is issued by post, *to subscribers only*, every Saturday, from the office of the printer, 10, Little Queen-street, Lincoln's Inn Fields. The subscription is one guinea per session. All persons who are concerned to watch the proceedings of Parliament, and hear questions argued from a lawyer's point of view, quite strange to our newspapers and Parliament itself, will find much in this periodical to reward study, even if few follow the writer to the full in his zeal for antiquity. No other work of the kind, we believe, exists; yet it would seem quite necessary to public men and public bodies.

the truce, and forthwith sent from his side Sir Bartholomew de Burghersh to attest all the facts to the Parliament, *and asked of it permission to make peace.*

"The said Sir Bartholomew said, on behalf of the king, that, because this war was undertaken and begun by the common consent of the prelates, lords, and commons, the king did not wish to treat of peace, nor to accept a peace without their common assent."

The replies of the two Houses are calm and straightforward, approving of the truce and of an effort for honourable peace, but without one word which can suggest that the king had shown to them any unusual condescension.

In the next year, the king informs the Parliament that *the king of France has broken the truce,* and requests their counsel, *what he is to do in so great a necessity.* (Do our Queen's ministers now ever condescend thus to ask advice of Parliament?) Both Houses reply: that the war must be carried on; and vote supplies, with the caution; "*provided that the money be spent in the business shown to them in this Parliament.*" . . . . They had then no idea of equipping a great force for the king, and letting him use it without consulting them as to its direction. (Rolls, 18 Ed. III. Nos. 1, 6–10.)

In the 28th year of the same king, Parliament was officially informed that negotiations for peace had been proposed, but that the king "would not make peace without the assent of the Lords and Commons:" thereupon he inquired if they were willing. Reply in the affirmative having been made, the Chancellor again put it to them: "*Then you will assent to the treaty of perpetual peace, if it can be made?*" And the Commons replied, one and all, Aye, aye; on which it was resolved that there should be a public record thereof. (Rolls, 28.)

In the 36th year of Edward III. (A.D. 1362) Parliament was asked to give assent to a *proposed treaty* with David Bruce, king of Scotland. *They refused their assent.* Very many cases of the same kind in regard to the wars of Scotland (says Mr. T. S.) might be quoted. We cannot dwell longer on similar affairs in the same reign, but we pass to the spirited and warlike king Henry V., who first asks advice of Parliament concerning "matters of foreign embroilment," and having entered into war with France by their consent, next year informs them that he hears the French king to desire peace, but that "he would not conclude the same without the assent and good counsel of the Estates of the realm," and begs that when the whole facts are before them, "he shall be informed by the good advice of his very wise council here present (the Parliament) *what will be most profitable and honourable to do in the matter.*"

In the next year, assigning the reason of summoning a Parlia-

ment, he says, that he had "with the assent of all the Estates and commonalty of the realm," gone into France, and "had there so done, that in a short time, by the high grace of God, he had won the town of Harfleur, which is the principal key to France, and had afterward fought at Agincourt, in the land of France, with all the power of France; over whom God had given him great victory." He goes on to state his vain efforts for peace after the victory, and again asks "the gracious aid and counsel of the Lords and Commons" as to his further proceedings.

When the actual peace arrives, the Rolls state that, by a provision in the treaty itself, "the said peace needs *not only* to be sworn to by the said kings, Henry of England and Charles of France, *but also* to be allowed, accepted, and approved by the three Estates of each kingdom." It is then stated that the king of France had sworn to the peace, and the Estates of France had allowed and approved it; and that the king of England had, in order to the confirmation of the same peace, according to the manner and custom of the kingdom, summoned the Parliament, and desired the three Estates themselves to look into and examine the tenor of the same peace. The result is, that they "approve, *allow*, *authorize*, and accept it."

This is surely enough to show that modern Cabinets employ the word "Crown" as a cover for usurpation against the Parliament, such as our great and warlike kings, when not yet enslaved to a ministry, never claimed as any part of their prerogative. In European wars, the Cabinet never dares to affront the Parliament and nation by substantially going against their approval, yet sedulously avoids the form of seeming to ask their advice; and in regard to treaties, arrogates fearlessly to itself an actual despotism. But it is our Asiatic wars which have brought out the formidable fact, that the Cabinets claim to discard the authority of Parliament altogether. It deserves remark, that when their endeavours to lull Parliament into negligence prove vain, our ministers act the demagogue in the worst sense, according to the old craft of those who seek to establish a despotism on the ruins of solid deliberative institutions by the aid of popular passions and popular ignorance. An outcry is made about "insult to the British flag," great newspapers garble the facts and write inflammatory articles, and the Parliament is coerced by the ministers and the democracy. On the last occasion, when the House of Commons condemned the second Chinese war, it was subjected to a penal dissolution; yet its vote of censure remains unrescinded; and now, behold, a third Chinese war looms upon us! This is not the place to discuss the substantial right or wrong of the new quarrel; but we do protest against the *mode* in which England is dragged into it. To fight first and deliberate afterwards, is

the way to deliberate with inflamed minds; besides that it brings upon us the odious argument, which Lord Dalhousie has not scrupled to sanction by his pen, that in Asia England cannot afford to retract, lest moderation be mistaken for weakness! The House of Commons did not discuss the question whether Sir John Bowring or Governor Yea were fundamentally right or wrong in their quarrel; but they dealt with the general question, whether a local executive officer is to commence hostilities at his own private opinion; *not* in immediate defence against attack, but taking on his single self the maintenance of the "honour" of England. National honour is a precious possession; but it is for that very reason a jewel, *the maintenance of which cannot be delegated* by the great Estates of the realm even to a Committee of themselves, or to a Cabinet which represents one side or faction of England; much less to a single local officer. On these general grounds, disapproving the war as *hasty* and *unauthorized*, the House of Commons solemnly condemned the proceedings of Sir John Bowring. The vote has never been reversed: the minister then defeated has feared to stir the subject. And behold, hardly has the same minister by unforeseen events been a few months in power, than a perfectly similar deed takes place:—an English functionary, not assaulted by the Chinese, but alleging some ceremonial offence, concerning which the Home Government and the Parliament ought to be consulted, enters on hostilities which must either be disowned by us with much humiliation, or followed up at the risk of new war.

There is a phenomenon in this transaction fraught with monstrous possibilities, to which we request attention. Let us try the patience of our readers by a very absurd hypothesis. Suppose Sir Francis Head (or some other friend and admirer of the Emperor of the French), sitting in Parliament, to move for a bill which should authorize the Emperor to place a French war-minister in the English Cabinet; which should further authorize the English minister-at-war, in private concert with the Frenchman, to direct the proceedings of the Queen's fleets, without the previous cognizance of the rest of the Cabinet or of the Prime Minister. We might be perplexed whether to think the honourable member mad or treasonable; no, we should think him mad; for the treason would be too visible to impute to any sane man. It would not need any intense jealousy of the French Emperor to lead to the instant hissing out of such a bill. Without participating in the panic of possible invasion by his fleets, without imputing to him any worse sentiment towards England than the common jealousy of our wide spread and ever encroaching power, we certainly deprecate volunteering to put our military and naval movements into his control, or exposing them to his intrigues. If

he have any deep designs, and fears they will meet our opposition, if on this account he desire to paralyse our European action and reduce us to helplessness, or even make us dependents on his bounty; in no way can he have better hope of success, than by embroiling us in a distant and unlimited war. To accept his aid is *pro tanto* to make ourselves dependent on him. A small succour cannot affect the war seriously, but it may blind us as to his malicious intentions. Be his auxiliary force large or small, it is but auxiliary: he is no principal in the war, and can withdraw when he pleases without damage to France; and if his aid be large and valuable, by threatening to withdraw he can constrain us not to oppose any of his European schemes. Besides, if we allow him to co-operate largely in an Asiatic war, we give him exactly what he wants—an excuse for maintaining a navy of disproportionate strength; which, when trained in actual service, may ere long be used for European purposes highly disagreeable to us.

Now, if for a moment we put, for argument's sake, this monstrous hypothesis, that a French and English war-minister sitting together in Downing-street directed the fleets of England without consulting Parliament or the Cabinet, it would have at least one practical safeguard against terrible mischief. Public opinion would be wide awake; all eyes would be fixed on the English war-minister; any grave error of judgment in him would easily be called treason; to allow himself to be seduced by the plausibilities of his French colleague would be an offence which could meet with no mercy from the nation, the Parliament, the Cabinet, or the Queen. Our minister would deliberate with a rope round his neck; and the opinion admits of reasonable defence, that he would act with greater sagacity for his country than is to be expected from a Governor of Hong Kong or a Commissioner attached to our Chinese fleet. In fact, every evil which might be feared from a French Minister visibly sitting in Downing-street, deserves to be feared ten times over from our present arrangements. The commander of the French ships and troops, whether in the river of Canton or in the Peiho, communicates with the local English executive, and the English nation knows nothing of it. None of us can know, or even guess, how far the Frenchman's advice may have ingeniously implicated us in toils which his master is spreading. For aught we know, his intrigue may be busy to guide the Chinese to the very acts, which he then warmly advises us to chastise. The cautious English nation will not allow its sovereign to decree war at the whispers of an unofficial person, nor except by the act of the Privy Council; yet it permits a man, whose name members of Parliament are not certain to know, at the other side of the world, joined in military

council with an irresponsible foreigner, to enter upon war in the Queen's name. It is a cheap defence to say, "It is not war against the Emperor of China; it is but chastisement of a provincial Chinese officer." No doubt our second Chinese war was fought, without any declaration at all, under this pretence. But hereby we do but aggravate our own lawlessness; certainly the Empire has not *yet* fallen to pieces, although we seem to be aiming to reduce it to the state of India after Aurungzebe, in order that Europe may come in to prey on the carcase. That the future history of China will have any similarity to that of India, we do not at all believe; but that is not our present subject. We are but remarking that it is war against the Chinese Emperor that we make, whatever may be pretended to the contrary; and that in such war we permit ourselves to be implicated at the will of one rather obscure Englishman, whose ear is open to the secret counsel of a servant of Louis Napoleon. All this is as inconsistent with prudence, common sense and decency as it is opposed to every principle of civilized warfare, Christian or Pagan.

Formalities of war give no security against the vilest hypocrisy, nor against the most odious injustice; yet in the worst case they are of great value, not only to the nation attacked, but also to the army attacking, and to its masters. Is it requisite, after the Indian mutiny, to insist, how terrible a scourge a demoralized soldiery may become to the power which has organized it? Not one of the great powers, not even Austria, has more vital reason to beware of lowering the morality of its army, than England. A mixed army of Asiatics can be elevated to nobler sentiments (as the late lamented General Jacob practically showed and attested) by sympathy with what is just and noble in its leaders; but it far more easily drops into unison with all that is worst in them or in their government. The morality practised by us in the siege and storm of Delhi was mainly a concession to the barbarism of the Sikh soldiers, who had joined our standard in thirst of plunder. If it be true that rude men cannot learn religion without symbols, much more true is it that they cannot understand justice and righteous war without their symbols. When they see us *to-day* in amity with a foreign nation, receiving their visits as friends, purchasing from them for mutual convenience, honouring their flag and their magistrates, and *to-morrow* assailing them with war for some local quarrel turning on a point of honour (a sort of quarrel which everybody notoriously can always make when he is determined to make it), the soldiers, who have not even the excuse of nationality for obeying our commands to slaughter, must inevitably sink into the moral condition of pirates. They cannot imagine themselves to be fighting for any high idea: they fight neither for their country, nor for their creed, nor for the

Right, nor for civilization, but solely for pay and promotion. For this essentially selfish object they are made to kill and rob (war to them is necessarily identified with these two words); than which nothing can be more demoralizing. The same men, unless attached to officers of uncommon mental qualities, are certain to turn against us whenever hope of selfish advancement suggests that course as prudent; and far short of this, our dread of their fickleness is sure to make our conduct towards them vacillate between dangerous concessions and equally dangerous severity. Old Napoleon used to compare England to Carthage, and hence inferred her destiny to fall by the arms of his (Gaulish) Rome. If he could have foreseen the full development of our Indian armies, and have compared them to the vast mercenary hordes which were the curse and worst internal ruin of Carthage, his comparison would have been less superficial.

Yet, in truth, historians point us to a very similar development, still more manifestly fatal, in Rome itself. Carthage fell by foreign force; Rome solely by her own armies and by the operation of military discipline—so called; that is, by unInquiring obedience to the word of command. The old Romans began with a formality quite superstitious, the king and senate consulting the college of heralds for erudite instructions as to minute ceremonies. For perhaps four centuries, the discipline of the army was admirable: its decline began from the day when a general* first took upon himself to make war at his own judgment, trusting to obtain a bill of indemnity, if successful, with booty and honour of course. A general who so acts will be sure to indulge his soldiers, in order to win their attestations and influence. This was but a step towards the times in which the generals succeeded in teaching the troops that their sole business was to obey, when led not only beyond their province, but even against their country.

By virtue of our annual Mutiny Act, the soldier ceases to be a citizen; he is nothing but a slave. By knowingly accepting a shilling from a recruiting serjeant, he is interpreted to have renounced his civil rights, his understanding, and his conscience.† He is at once transferred into a new sphere of relations, of which he has neither theoretical nor practical knowledge. What a trap of iniquity is martial law, was exhibited in lurid colours

* Cn. Manlius: Livy, book 38.

† Until a recent period, our peasants were entrapped into the ranks with a coarseness akin to the violence of the pressgang. Various provisions have of late years been made for the protection of a recruit, *provided* his drunkenness has been so complete, that he can swear that he did not know what he was doing in accepting the enlistment money; *provided also* that within twenty-four hours he can repay all the moneys advanced to him, and twenty shillings more as a fine. We fear these laws give little or no immediate protection; but they admit a valuable legal principle.

which might have turned to scarlet, in the late discontent of the East India Company's European regiments. When the Company was deprived of its control over the Indian armies, the Queen's servants claimed, as of course, to command the soldiers of the Company; but the men refused to obey, alleging that they had not enlisted in the Queen's service. Their plea may have been bad in law, but it was a plea of which the civil courts have to judge; the military executive must not be judge in his own quarrel. But this was not the worst. Orders were next given to one of the Queen's regiments to fire on their countrymen as on mutineers. Sooner than obey such a command, which to them, no doubt, seemed a horrid murder, they put *themselves* into the position of mutineers; and who shall say what dreadful results might not have arisen out of the complication? A general takes upon himself to judge a disputed question of civil law ("Are or are not these men exempt from the operation of the Mutiny Act?") and commands his soldiers to shoot down those who, in defence of their supposed civil right, decline to obey him! It is not by crude, immoral despotism that discipline can ever be strengthened; such discipline as conduces to safe victory and orderly rule must grow out of honour and conscience. By crushing the moral sentiments, no higher discipline is attainable than that of unscrupulous and tumultuous janizaries. If the disobedient regiments had been lawless and threatening, the case would have been totally different; but to expect men to fire at their comrades because the latter fancied (however vainly) that Parliament had given them their discharge, is a terrible indication what sort of obedience our military men expect from soldiers. Troops trained in their school would surely obey a general who, in the most approved Parisian fashion, ordered them to disperse a Parliament or a Court of Justice.

The actual state of the law (as we receive information) is such as may *perhaps* indicate that Parliament has been cheated by the Executive. In the Annual Mutiny Act a soldier is subjected by Parliament to summary death for a vast number of offences, including disobedience to any LAWFUL command. But this most important word LAWFUL is omitted in the oath provided for the soldier in the Articles of War. To refuse to take this oath would be the very highest act of mutiny; yet it imposes on him a duty not sanctioned by the Act of Parliament,—that of obeying the command of his superior, whether it be lawful or unlawful! Not only is no tribunal provided, to which a soldier might appeal if commanded to commit a dreadful crime, such as to shoot his innocent and unjudged comrade, but the very idea that lawful commands *only* are to be obeyed is, as far as possible, forbidden to be whispered within the camp. That it is the

soldier's duty to obey command, and *not* ask whether it be a lawful command, is practically enforced and admitted. Thus a despotism is usurped, going far beyond the already great and terrible power consciously placed by Parliament in the hands of the military executive. This state of things reminds us of the infamous duplicity by which the slave-trade was formerly carried on. Parliament passed an Act which authorized British ship-masters to bring workmen from Africa to the colonies, *provided they came by their own consent*, and added penalties on those who should carry them off by *deception*. But the Executive Government, here and in the colonies, uniformly winked at the notorious breach of these clauses, and sanctioned the carrying off black men by violence and deception. After which it was pretended that the kidnapped people and their progeny had become the lawful cattle of the planters by parliamentary enactment.—Is the soldier's oath at this moment legally imposed?

In the shock of war, when an enemy is in sight, civil rights must be, more or less, suspended. If our own country were the seat of war, we could not wish to retain during the crisis our present rights of free speech, free press, freedom from arrest, free movement, all as perfect as now; for, as the Piedmontese lately well judged, such rights would be used by the enemy for his own purposes. Dictatorial power should then be lodged for awhile in the noblest man, and in a nation which loves its laws and liberty is seldom abused. So also, during actual warlike service, civil rights must of necessity be largely curtailed. Promptitude being matter of first necessity, there is no time for the formal scrupulosity of our law-courts. But it is not on this account requisite to leave no conscience at all to a soldier. If he were ordered to kill women and children, all will justify his refusal. Neither yet should he turn his weapons against his unarmed countrymen, nor against the public institutions. Blind obedience cannot be approved. If commanded to flog a comrade who has not been tried and sentenced by a court-martial, here also refusal would be praised by every civilian. Why then is it hard to admit that he ought to disobey, if commanded to attack the public friends of his country? If there has been no declaration of war by the Queen, to use hostilities is *piracy*. When it is equally notorious in the one case that there has been no sentence of court-martial on his comrade, and on the other that there has been no declaration of war against Danes or Chinese, why is he to take cognizance of the former fact and disobey, but to ignore the other and obey? Why is he to refuse to commit assault on his comrade, but consent to commit piracy, at the mere word of command?

Moreover, setting the law of military obedience as sternly as one may during actual war, this is no reason at all for making it equally severe on the professional soldier during the months or

years of peace. The subordinate civilian in a government office is not very apt to disobey orders or to affront his superior: martial law is not found needful to secure respectful compliance. Why is it any the more necessary in time of peace for ensuring obedience from an ensign or lieutenant? Surely, on them the fear of losing their commissions would be always a sufficient restraint. To the private soldier, it may be objected, dismissal might be no punishment, but rather a boon; but if this be a general fact, does it not argue ill-treatment of the soldiers, amounting to cruelty? Recent discoveries have painfully illustrated this, as far as the London barracks are concerned. It is but a year since we devoted many pages to this disgraceful topic, and we need not further recur to it than to insist that the British soldier could never have thus rotted with odious pestilence in time of peace, had he dared to complain; and it is the needless severity of martial law which makes his complaint impossible, because hopeless. No other class of men can be thus coerced into grave-yard silence. Convicted felons would have dared to open their mouths and publish their injuries: only the British soldier could be thus immured to suffer and die with sealed lips. The life of a soldier in peace ought to be a life much coveted; inasmuch as its labours might be merely the labours of the palæstra, such as all young and active men like; and if, instead of cruel martinet-discipline and the intolerable *ennui* which drives them to dissipation, their vacant hours were well directed, there would be little danger of their thinking dismissal a light punishment, nor is it probable that any bounty would permanently be needed to allure them. But this touches on a wider subject than we intended. It suffices here to insist that in the existing system, the soldier, often cruelly entrapped into his slavery, is treated like a slave; and that this ought to be fundamentally changed. The details afford material for very lengthened and mature discussion.

There are many who believe that the time will come, when no weapons of war shall be forged, and universal peace shall reign. If they expect this time to be brought about without human effort, and that in consequence they may fold their arms in contentment or in despair, their belief is a mischievous superstition. But if they look to this consummation as the final result of manifold struggling towards a juster and purer state, and accept this struggle as laid upon us all by the Highest Wisdom, then it is a generous creed. We also believe that a time will come when men will look back in wonder and pity on our present barbarism; a time at which to begin a war—unless previously justified by the verdict of an impartial tribunal, bound in honour to overlook what is partially expedient to their own nation or party—will be esteemed a high and dreadful crime. The "Governments" will never initiate such institutions until compelled by public opinion

and by the inevitable pressure of circumstances; nor is any nation in the world yet ripe to put forth such pressure; otherwise it would not be difficult to devise a supreme court, or rather jury, which would put a totally new moral aspect on war. We honour the good intentions and the moral courage of a man who, like Mr. Cobden, comes forward to advocate international arbitration as a means of evading war; and we can admit, that many great wars might have been advantageously avoided by us, *if we had been willing* to submit to arbitration. But it is too visible that not only are foreign despotisms unwilling, English ministries and English governors-general are equally unwilling to submit their claims to judgment, when they think they are able to seize by the strong hand what they fancy is their right. It seems to us, that those who wish to stop needless and unjustifiable war, have to begin their work from another point—the reform of martial law. Let some member of Parliament give notice that he means to oppose the unceremonious annual renewal of the Mutiny Act, and meanwhile move for a committee to consider in detail what is the least loss of civil rights which will suffice for army discipline. A new Mutiny Act should embody several principles, first, that a broad distinction be made as to a soldier's surrender of his civil rights during peace and during war; secondly, that in the peace-discipline his subjection be assimilated to that of an apprentice or other servant who may not leave his master, and all questions between him and his superiors be tried in the civil courts; thirdly, that the militia never be under war discipline, except if the country were invaded; fourthly, that war-discipline otherwise begins only when war has been declared *in the capital* by her Majesty, *with the formal assent of Lords and Commons*; fifthly, even in war, the *limits* of a soldier's obedience need to be more strictly defined; for it is abominable and unendurable, that when the Queen has declared war against *one* power, the commander should lead his men to attack *another* power, against whom no war has been declared. To expect a soldier to obey under such circumstances, is to train him to overturn the constitution and laws of England, whenever commanders are found unscrupulous and daring enough to attempt it. All such laws of obedience are essentially immoral and demoralizing.

The effect of such a change in martial law would be to make piratical hostilities on our part almost impossible. If nine or ten years ago this had been the state of the law, Commodore Lambert would never have dared to commit the offence for which Lord Dalhousie rebuked him,—of bombarding Rangoon without orders, and indeed against order: but every sailor, when commanded to fire, would have known that he was committing slaughter at his own risk; inasmuch as neither her Majesty nor her Indian viceroy had declared war. The English navy would

forthwith become, what we fondly fancy it is, a *purely de*[fensive] force, whereas in the eyes of foreigners it is now *esse*[ntially] *offensive,* provoking extreme dislike of us, and inciting [every] great power to raise a navy in opposition to us. In those [days] remember Navarino and Copenhagen, how could any other sentiment towards us be expected, especially when our statesmen coolly avow that they send a fleet as "a demonstration" to influence negotiations. But if it were well known that our ships at Gibraltar, at Malta, at Corfu, or elsewhere, are *bonâ fide* a police repressing piracy and all lawless violence, but in no case can dare to blockade a port, bombard a city, or fire into a vessel, unless the cause have been heard, and both sides pleaded in full Parliament, with abundant time for ambassadors and diplomatists to discuss, to explain, to retract or compromise; should we not soon be everywhere welcome as mere preservers of the public peace? And might we not find that one quarter of our present Mediterranean fleet sufficed for that duty?

We fear that no Quaker will move in the direction of improving that which he condemns *in toto;* but the Peace Party by no means consists of none but Quakers; and if any of them read our pages, we earnestly press on them that it is by claiming a revision of the Mutiny Act, and by opposing its unconditional renewal, that they will find an opening for their action. Of course the change will be called impossible: what new thing is not? but there is only one misapprehension which it here seems worth while to anticipate. A felonious attack is unceremoniously resisted by *civilians,* equally as by *soldiers.* The spirit of our countrymen is abundantly proved on all sides of the globe, and, without martial law, can be fully trusted for repelling active assault when made upon them. In India, in Borneo, in the backwoods of Canada, or in seas where pirates abound, English civilians are always willing to fight, in pure self-defence, of course without her Majesty having declared war; nor can there be the slightest danger that soldiers should refuse, in cases in which merchant sailors are always courageous. Nor are our policemen under martial law. It must not then be pretended, that, by such a reform of the Mutiny Act as we advocate, the right and necessity of real self-defence would be for a moment compromised. But it would on the one hand stop the officious zeal of individuals, who fancy it belongs to them to maintain the honour of our flag (a zeal by which they cruelly dishonour it) on the other, it would control usurping ministers, or the dynastic influences which they represent; in place of this enforcing public parliamentary debate and solemn approval, as a necessary pre-requisite to any voluntary deed of war.

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